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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 When considering technologies that pervade society and daily life, few come 
close to the sophistication and permeation of embedded systems. These special-purpose, 
applied computers provide services for a wide range of systems, such as transportation 
control, avionics, chemical plant control, communication, and even personal electronics 
[1-3]. These systems are so popular, that over 99 percent of all microprocessor integrated 
circuits in production as of the time of this writing are intended for use in embedded 
systems [4]. An added benefit to embedded systems is that workloads spanning large 
and/or complicated services can be distributed and partitioned to a number of 
strategically-placed sub-systems (i.e., agents) by using networking technology. This 
enables an improvement in system monitoring and control; the distributed agents can 
increase productivity and functionality of the overall system.  
 As distributed systems increase, so do the challenges of operating them in a 
reliable and safe manner. In addition to reliability concerns, distributed and networked 
embedded systems face natural impediments to their operation, such as radio-frequency 
interference with their wireless communication systems, or malicious attacks designed to 
compromise the operation of a system. Both of these types of interference threaten timely 
system operation; in cases where hard real-time deadlines are critical to both task 
execution and the overall goals of the system, such interference could lead to devastating 
consequences [2, 5-7]. To address that threat, the research work presented in this 
dissertation aims to provide a real-time, lightweight solution to allow distributed systems 
2 
 
to identify interference vulnerabilities, assess performance degradation, and circumvent 
security breaches. A specific application, namely disaster area assessment, is highlighted 
to demonstrate the feasibility of the technologies and methods developed during this 
dissertation. The author believes that unique life-saving benefits can be provided by 
integrating fault-tolerant distributed sensing mechanisms with disaster area assessment 
methods. These can be used to identify damage on the ground following localized 
weather phenomena such as tornadoes, microbursts, and straight-line winds. In particular, 
the dissertation will focus on fault-tolerance within the scope of mobile ad-hoc networks 
(MANETs) [8, 9]. 
 The design of fault-tolerant distributed systems involves the understanding of 
basic network architecture, and how its features can make it vulnerable to natural or man-
made forms of interference [10, 11]. As such, certain challenges must be addressed in 
order to develop a robust solution that meets the requirements set out in this dissertation. 
The first challenge is to identify a candidate network environment that would benefit 
from a specific fault-tolerant approach. The second challenge is then to understand what 
aspects of the network are most at risk. These include weak encryption schemes, non-
robust networking architectures (for instance, the lack of direct-sequence spread spectrum 
radio technologies), and single points of trust and responsibility. Because this dissertation 
will focus on MANETs in particular, the author is restricting his scope to mobile 
networks implementing a form of IEEE-standardized networking technologies, such as 
802.11x (WiFi), 802.15.1 (Bluetooth), and 802.15.4 (ZigBee) [10, 12]. This restriction 
lessens the focus on implementation details of the networking infrastructure, and instead 
enables the examination of system behaviors, application profiles, node proximity, and 
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node mobility. A proposed solution must also meet the challenge to provide an acceptable 
improvement over the state-of-the-art.  
 The research described here presents a solution to the unique challenge of 
maintaining fault-tolerance in a mobile network scenario. By improving upon two key 
mechanisms of discovering available resources on a network with homogeneous or semi-
homogeneous devices, reallocation can be performed faster and more efficiently; this 
improved reallocation results in a system that is more stable and has a higher effective 
uptime, especially when coupled with intrusion detection system (IDS) technologies, as 
shown in this work. This dissertation describes three specific contributions:  
1.) developing a method to reallocate resources on a compromised mobile ad-hoc 
network, assuming the network is equipped with redundant resources to provide 
fault-tolerance,  
2.)  analyzing the impact on performance of this proposed technique on networks of 
variable size and connectivity, and  
3.) applying the findings of this method toward a real-world application – aerial 
disaster area assessment using multiple, distributed unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs.)  
4.) During the course of researching and developing this topic, a number of 
challenges manifested themselves, including the need to understand the 
correlations among various network topologies, the density of the networked 
nodes, and mobility. These challenges required work to clarify how they affected 
system performance. Performance is measured by determining the time required 
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to find new resources, as well as by counting the number of messages transmitted 
on the network to find new resources. The work presented in this dissertation 
yields a baseline performance gains of 6-fold speedups, and a required message 
count reduction of up to 80% from end to end. The speedup and message 
reduction was analyzed in the context of differing network structures. The 
benefits of the proposed system, which is called DARTS (Distributed Apt 
Resource Transference System), was then integrated into the final implementation 
involving aircraft-based distributed sensing for disaster area assessment, called 
DARTBOARD (Distributed Apt Resource Transference for Broad-response 
Overhead Airborne Reconnaissance Dispatch). Thus, the challenges for 
developing a reallocation method that: (1) improved system uptime, (2) reduced 
the overhead of reallocating a resource, and (3) applied this knowledge into a 
workable real-world system for assessing storm damage, have been met and 
outlined in this dissertation. 
5.) The dissertation will be organized into nine chapters. Chapter II introduces 
mobile ad-hoc networks and their characteristics. Chapter III introduces reliability 
and security concerns, such as identification of specific threats, including 
jamming, spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, and similar intrusion strategies. 
Chapter IV explains the basic principles behind tasks, task reallocation, resources, 
and the proposed method. Chapter V details the method’s performance on 
variably-sized networks. Chapters VI through VIII combine for the scenario of 
disaster area assessment using UAVs. Chapter VI details weather-related 
phenomena, namely tornadoes. Chapter VII covers material related to aircraft and 
5 
 
configuration for the implementation seen in Chapter VIII. Chapter VIII seeks to 
outline the implementation of the fault-tolerant method in a real-world example, 
using actual in-field data and network simulation cases. Lastly, Chapter IX 
discusses conclusions and future possibilities for the work outlined in this 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS (MANETs) 
 This chapter covers the essentials of ad-hoc networking, and their associated 
networked nodes, which consist of embedded systems. System design constraints, such as 
power and size limitations are introduced to aid the reader in understanding why certain 
design choices have been made in the implementations detailed in later chapters. 
 By definition, a mobile ad-hoc network, or MANET, is a subclass of a basic ad-
hoc network. This dissertation defines an ad-hoc network as any loosely-defined network 
between two or more nodes (e.g., embedded devices) such that nodes may enter, be 
acknowledged by the group (i.e., node discovery), or leave based on pre-established 
protocols of discovery [8, 9, 13-15]. Nodes may be fully or partially connected – meaning 
that clustered groups may lie outside the range of communication of another group [16]. 
Therefore, we can extend this definition to include MANETs such that the networked 
nodes include at least one or more nodes that are mobile. MANETs are relevant to our 
discussion of distributed systems because a typical multi-agent distributed sensing 
implementation relies on networked nodes that fit the definition of an ad-hoc network, 
and furthermore have a tendency for mobility [9]. The reasoning behind this will be 
discussed in significant detail in Chapter V. 
Networking 
Networking is the fabric that binds together ad-hoc network nodes. For static 
systems, range and expected environmental interference are factored into the network’s 
design and protocol selection. Because ad-hoc nodes are designed to enter and leave 
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based on requirements, power supply, or mobility situations, wireless networking 
protocols are typically preferred. A subset of wireless networks, such as the 802.15.4 
ZigBee protocol are used because they are optimized to work with a decentralized 
network architecture [12]. Mobile systems are more difficult to design, since range is 
generally not constant, thus making a hierarchal network infrastructure difficult to 
implement [12]. Let us briefly examine the difference between hierarchal and distributed 
(i.e., ad-hoc) network instances.  
Principles of Hierarchical Networks 
Hierarchal or infrastructure-based networks assume a central point of 
connectivity, which is connected to a routing system. All traffic must go through the main 
access point (AP, the antenna-like cone in Figure 1) before being directed to other nodes 
connected to the same or other access point. The advantage to this system is that routing 
and client models are well-defined Also, connectivity is simplified if the system is 
provided with a standardized binding 
protocol, such as found in 802.11x, and 
a standard transport protocol, such as 
IPv4 and IPv6 [16-18] bandwidth must 
be shared and divided among nodes. 
Figure 1 shows such a sample of such a 
centralized system. However, there are 
some key disadvantages for general 
network use, and other disadvantages that make infrastructure-based networks unfeasible 
to implement for mobile systems. The first is that bandwidth must be shared and divided 
Figure 1 - A traditional centralized network - the router is 
connected directly to the firewall 
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among nodes because all wireless nodes must connect to a localized access point. This 
can cause resource competition problems, and can threaten the operation of bandwidth-
critical applications should too many nodes attempt to join the access point. Second, an 
infrastructure-based network is not often made of mobile components, especially when 
considering the access point itself. However, mobile wide area network (WAN) routers 
exist and are becoming popular for use in mobile computing applications, allowing 
multiple client computers to connect to internet resources wirelessly. Despite a trend 
towards mobility, centralized networks cannot account easily for range issues in a mobile, 
distributed system. For instance, an access point may be able to cover several nodes, but 
not others that have moved out of range. More access points, range extenders, and 
repeaters can be installed, but at considerable expense and complexity when compared to 
an ad-hoc network. 
Principles of Ad-hoc Networks 
 In contrast, distributed, or ad-hoc networks are based on device-to-device mesh 
networking. [19] Seen in Figure 2, the device nodes form links to nearest neighbors. 
Compared to infrastructure-based networks, this offers several advantages; network links 
can easily be established and can accommodate mobility 
by allowing dynamic link establishment. Furthermore, if a 
link is degraded, then other routes may be available, 
allowing communication to bypass an unresponsive 
device. This bypassing method, however, is determined 
by topology – a network comprised of serial nodes could 
easily be threatened by a single link failure. Of course, disadvantages exist as well; 
Figure 2 - An ad-hoc network 
example 
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routing is considerably more complicated. The process of routing allows messages to be 
sent from a source to a destination, using intermediary nodes or networking equipment 
[19-22]. With infrastructure-based networks, such as Ethernet and WiFi networks, the 
static nature of the network setup generally makes routing simple – a computer will likely 
remain at a particular port and address mapping for the duration of the needed 
transactions. This can be observed when a computer switches access points while 
attempting to maintain connectivity; any open sessions drop and must be re-established. 
As a result, this means that infrastructure networks do not support roaming. In ad-hoc 
networks, routing must be determined either on-demand, or by using a polled or gossip-
based update method, allowing nodes to understand how traffic should be routed. Both 
on-demand and active routing discovery methods are significantly more complex than 
those found in infrastructure networks. Such methods include reactive methods like Ad-
hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing (AODV) [23], which focuses on finding optimal 
routes in highly dynamic systems, as well as table-based routing protocols such as the 
Ad-hoc Wireless Distribution Service (AWDS) [24] and the Destination-Sequenced 
Distance Vector Routing (DSDV) [25], which utilize routing tables between nearest-
neighbor nodes that are periodically refreshed as needed. Regardless of the method used, 
routing is central to effective data distribution. It represents a fundamental transmission 
method, and is second in importance only to physical connectivity such as wireless radios 
and Ethernet lines when considering MANET connectivity. Because routing is so critical, 
it also represents a choice point of attack, as disrupted routes can easily destroy any 
network coherency almost instantly. If data cannot reach its intended target, any tasks 
dependent on multiple nodes may cease to execute completely, causing service disruption 
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or even physical damage to the overall system that depends on the MANET. Based on 
this threat model, much work has been done to identify security intrusion breaches by 
utilizing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that map traffic patterns and correlate them 
based on MANET routing performance [23, 26-41]. This dissertation does not focus on 
routing-based IDS techniques. The intrusion detection methods applied by this research 
will be discussed in Chapter III.  
Lastly, ad-hoc networking faces the need for range management, as well as 
roaming capabilities. Under ideal conditions, network connections are retained or 
suspended if a node moves out of transmission range and back. Most ad-hoc network 
protocols are now being implemented using the 802.15.4, or ZigBee protocol. Flexible, 
power-conscious, and reliable, 802.15.4 offers a good compromise of bandwidth and 
transmission range [10]. Only ad-hoc, wireless networking will be discussed in solutions 
and implementations during this dissertation.  
Routing depends on the availability of a physical network layer through which 
packets may be sent and received. For most MANETs, this is accomplished using a 
wireless radio stack that corresponds to a variety of wireless protocols. Such protocols 
include: (1) the now-ubiquitous 802.11 wireless transmission protocol, or WiFi [11, 16-
18], (2) a low-power, low-throughput protocol known as 802.15.4 [10] and its 
derivatives, and (3) 802.15.1-2002, known more widely as Bluetooth [10]. Others still 
employ digital cellular data networks, such as 1xRTT and Ev-DO for the Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) network standards, and UMTS, HSDPA/UPA, and GPRS for 
the Global Standards for Mobile (GSM) standard [42]. In each case, the radio stack 
provides a data transceiver which best fits the target application.  
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 802.11 and its derivative implementation sub-standards (i.e., a, b, g, and draft 
“N”), provide a high communications throughput by using multiple send/receive antennas 
and channels, reaching up to a theoretical 300 Mbit/s in the case of draft “N” [11, 16-18]. 
A logical downside is the large power requirements of the radios for transmitting data at 
such rates. Thus, a solution for networks requiring less throughput but needing power 
conservation can be found in the 802.15.4 protocol, which allows for a reasonable range 
of connectivity and low power requirements, at the expense of throughput [11, 16-18]. 
For the duration of this work, it is assumed that network-layer connectivity has been 
established through one of the protocols mentioned above. There will be no significant 
further discussion on the physical network layer. 
MANET Node Discovery 
Another key shared components between most if not all MANETs is that of a 
discovery protocol [8, 9, 13, 15]. Discovery allows nodes to identify new, incoming 
devices that wish to join a MANET. Discovery protocols work in one of two principal 
ways: push and pull [8]. Push-based discovery protocols instruct existing nodes to 
broadcast information about the MANET to any incoming new nodes. Pull-based 
discovery protocols allow the MANET to respond to broadcast requests from incoming 
nodes. There exist many protocols that support both push and pull mode of node and/or 
service discovery. 
 Based on security, performance, scalability, and power requirements of the 
MANET, there will likely exist a unique protocol that can satisfy most of the individual 
requirements. For instance, a MANET that requires extremely low power consumption 
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with some method of security might use a public key exchange security protocol in 
combination with a pull-only discovery method. 
 Discovery also provides a window for attack, by which a malicious node or agent 
may choose to obscure the discovery process by jamming, by falsifying handshakes (i.e., 
a mutual identification establishment that occurs during the discovery process), by 
spoofing other nodes, or by reporting incorrect information about the MANET to which a 
node wishes to join, thereby causing it to join a network that may not be the intended 
target. The security threats will be discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
 A corollary to the discovery process could be called pruning, which is the 
excision of nodes by the MANET, or their voluntary (or involuntary) removal by their 
own operational processes. Pruning may occur for a number of reasons; a MANET may 
be at full operating capacity and at risk of network communication problems such as data 
packet collisions or too much crosstalk over the wireless frequencies. Or, a node may 
simply be passing out of the range of the network, such as an aircraft continuing on its 
journey after forming a brief network with surrounding aircraft. Such an example can be 
seen in the Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast system, or ADS-B [43-46].  
Embedded Systems Properties 
 Let us now shift our focus to understanding the basic components present in a 
MANET, and then discuss how these components operate interdependently in a 
networked situation. Our first point of discussion is in regards to the embedded device 
node itself. Because embedded computers are designed (both from hardware and software 
perspectives) to operate within a limited range of applications, care must be taken to 
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observe four significant limitations in the operational capacity of an embedded device 
node. These limitations and characteristics are, according to implementation difficulty 
experienced during this research work, are in order of design importance: (1) power 
supply limitations, (2) processing power limitations, (3) weight and size (physical) 
limitations, and (4) in our mobile case, the mobility concerns themselves. Let us briefly 
analyze these four points to better understand hardware/software co-design issues. 
Power Supply Limitations 
 The power source of a MANET node can be variably restrictive. This is true in 
the sense that a device may be powered in different modes at different times, in addition 
to the fact that some systems are designed with limited, but portable and independent 
power sources such as batteries and photovoltaic cells. Others have significant power 
reserves such as direct line power, or portable generators with long fuel supplies. In the 
case of a restricted power supply, such as a battery, the node must be designed with 
tradeoffs of computing power and energy consumption rates in mind. As a side-note, 
lower power consumption generally equates to lower thermal dissipation, meaning that 
the CPU requires less cooling, a weight advantage in system design [47, 48]. Power 
source restrictions may come from a variety of different sources. In mobile systems, 
where weight and size constraints may be key (e.g., in the implementation of ultra-micro-
scale aerial vehicles), batteries must be designed around the physical characteristics of 
their intended chassis, as well as conform to maximum weight guidelines so as not to 
cause problems with mobility concerns. Other conditions may arise from the 
environment. For instance, lithium-ion-polymer batteries, though lightweight, moldable, 
and containing a high energy density, are still subject to efficiency concerns when 
14 
 
operating at low temperatures; the organic solvent to which the lithium ions are bound is 
ultimately a liquid [37, 49]. Thus, a device operating on such a battery could experience 
lower projected runtimes because of its location – a concern that needs to be addressed in 
system design stages. 
Processing Power Limitations 
 The processing capabilities of embedded systems are typically dictated by power 
requirements, and are a direct consequence of power supply constraints; a palmtop 
computer or Smartphone running a quad-core Intel Core i7 processor (industry-standard, 
high-performance microprocessor as of the time of this writing) would likely exhaust its 
battery supply within minutes, as such central processing units (CPUs) can draw upwards 
of 135-150 watts, depending on their thermal design power (TDP) [50]. Not only would 
the power source be drained quickly, but the system would then require a massive 
cooling solution that might weigh more than the device itself; modern computers as of the 
time of this writing often employ large copper heat sinks and fan units that together can 
weigh over 1 kg.  
 This is another reason why mobile processors, typically requiring less-complex 
instruction sets, and fewer on-chip performance features, are typically RISC processors, 
which due to their smaller instruction set have a lower transistor count, drawing less 
power, and needing only passive cooling (in which a fan or liquid dissipation system is 
not implemented) through the system’s case, or in rare cases, a small aluminum heat sink. 
Home internet routers, smart phones, unmanned aerial vehicle control systems, and many 
other embedded system types typically use processors that conform to the ARM 7 or 
ARM 9 family of RISC processors [51]. In this dissertation work, the autopilot system 
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implemented in a candidate remote distributed sensing aircraft, utilizes an ARM7-
compliant microcontroller platform. The 32-bit ARM-based microprocessors and 
microcontrollers are therefore flexible and reasonably powerful for their category, and 
can be clocked and modified (such as adding multiple execution superscalar architecture, 
as seen in the Cortex A8 variant of the ARM11) to improve performance, and put in 
multi-core arrangements (such as the Cortex A9, a dual-core, superscalar architecture 
variant of the ARM11 [51].) This capability, in combination with enhanced manufacture 
technologies that permit smaller feature size, can create a usable tradeoff between 
performance and power utilization. ARM-based RISC processors are also generation-
backwards-compatible, meaning that they are able to execute code compiled for previous 
intellectual property generations. The ARM processor model is not a specific piece of 
hardware, but rather an intellectual property library licensed to chip manufacturers for 
their specific implementation. An example of this is found in mobile phones: a CPU 
manufactured by Qualcomm called the Snapdragon is instruction-set compatible and 
derived from the same ARMv7 (not to be confused with the ARM7) architecture as a 
chip manufactured by Texas Instruments called the OMAP3440 [52].  
Weight and Size Limitations 
 Size constraints dictate the footprint of the embedded system. In mobile cases, 
this is especially important, as oversized components such as sensors, processing 
electronics, and radio communications equipment, and associated power sources such as 
batteries, can cause significant challenges for mobility. In the case of autonomous ground 
vehicles, for instance, mobility on a sloped path might be compromised by a battery that 
is too heavy of a load for motors to counteract. Further complications could arise if the 
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vehicle were dependent on wheels, where added weight could compromise traction in 
more difficult terrain. Internal mechanics may also face design challenges if control 
systems are too large to permit free operation of belts, shafts, gears, and other 
components. 
Mobility Constraints 
The last major characteristic of all MANETs is derived from its name: mobility. Mobility 
adds an increased requirement for maintaining network cohesion, as nodes may be 
drifting in and out of communication range at all times. This stresses a number of key 
components; for instance, a node that is barely within range may cause wireless 
transmission rates to drop drastically in order to maintain communications with an 
increased presence of noise. The change in data rates can, in turn, cause a failure of 
dependent tasks on the MANET, since the task may no longer be able to execute in real 
time with slower peer connectivity. One consequence is the increased requirement for 
radio transmission power necessary to maintain communications cohesion; this is a 
problem for any system reliant on a limited power source. 
 The MANET as a whole must also face variable operating conditions. If the 
system were to stray into a boundary with increased radio interference, then the entire 
group may fail catastrophically without a chance for recovery because sufficient nodes 
are unable to compensate for the interference. Or, conditions may change that prevent the 
operation of one or more critical nodes needed to carry out a task. Whatever the case may 
be, MANET communications protocols, task allocation mechanisms, and distribution 
mechanisms must be ready to overcome limitations of the environment in which they 
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must operate, as well as possible unknown obstacles that may interfere in unpredictable 
ways with their general operations. 
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CHAPTER III 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DETECTION 
 This chapter covers essentials on computer security, and its applications towards 
embedded systems. Topics on attack methods and fault conditions are introduced to 
foster an understanding on some of the challenges that embedded MANET nodes face. A 
three-level hierarchy for comprehensive security is introduced following classification of 
the threat model. 
Security and Reliability 
 Attacks and node failures motivate the creation of the intrusion response 
mechanism that will be detailed in this work. Within the context of a MANET, an attack 
constitutes an intentional disabling or disruption of software, services, or hardware of one 
or more nodes on a network. This causes a degradation or cessation of the MANET’s 
functionality. An attack challenges some or all of the five basic tenets of network 
security: (1) data integrity, (2) confidentiality, (3) availability, (4) authenticity, and (5) 
non-repudiation [53]. 
 An attack on data integrity consists of modifying the contents of data during 
transmission over the network, or while resident on a device node. For instance, in the 
communications between two aircraft over a channel, a third party may attempt to 
maliciously alter data being sent from one aircraft to another so that the nodes might 
incorrectly identify their relative positions. To combat attacks on data integrity and other 
core security aspects, there exist a number of passive intrusion prevention techniques 
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called cryptographic services. Crypto services will be explained in more detail later in 
Chapter III. 
 Confidentiality attacks seek to identify or disclose information in transmission 
along a network. Returning to the networked aircraft example, suppose that vital 
information on either a target or destination for an operation is being transmitted between 
devices. This information could be valuable to a third party in conflict with the operation 
being performed. The confidentiality attack would aim to discover the contents of the 
transmissions to thwart the objectives of the network. While it may seem that an integrity 
attack must be a subset of a confidentiality attack, this is not necessarily the case; weakly-
encrypted data packets can be modified without discovering their contents; however, 
confidentiality attacks are generally precursors to integrity attacks [53]. 
 Availability attacks are one of the easiest types to implement. Generally, an 
availability attack is designed to prevent the flow of information across a network. In this 
case, one or more nodes attempting to transmit data are unable to do so for an 
undetermined period of time, which can cause a partial or complete disruption of services 
on the network. These typically fall under the Denial of Service, or DOS category. On a 
wired network, availability attacks can be implemented as a flooding of the hierarchical 
networking components such that network packets can no longer be routed successfully 
from source to destination. On a wireless network, jamming the wireless carrier 
frequency can achieve the same result, though with varying degrees of effectiveness 
based on the location(s) of the jamming device(s). 
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 Authenticity is the guarantee that the source and destination of a transmission can 
be validated as genuine. In particular, authenticity ensures that no unwanted third party 
can be the source of a transmission. Attacks on authenticity seek to undermine the 
capability of a network to accurately identify the source of a transmission, as well as the 
identity of the receiving node(s). Because an authenticity attack is difficult to perpetrate 
and requires intimate knowledge of network protocols and node identifications, this 
dissertation will spend less time focusing on this type of attack. 
 Lastly, non-repudiation seeks to ensure that a receiving party cannot deny the 
receipt of a transmission, and that the originating sender cannot deny having sent it. This 
property is useful in trusted communications where unique data payloads may be 
transmitted sequentially or in a time-critical manner. This dissertation will not focus on 
non-repudiation attacks.  
 The attacks on the various network security principles can be accomplished 
through service denial (Denial of Service or DOS attack) and jamming (a type of service 
denial), impersonation (Spoofing), eavesdropping (Sniffing), data modification, and man-
in-the-middle attacks, which can accomplish any of the above [53]. Each of these 
techniques involves differing levels of implementation difficulty, network access, and 
target unique portions of the network.  
Service Denial via Jamming 
 As mentioned earlier, a jamming attack consists of flooding or overwhelming the 
network transmission capacity of one or more networked links. Typically referred to as a 
Denial of Service attack, jamming attacks are simple to implement because they require 
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no trust or authentication from their targets. Using the networked aircraft model as an 
example, a jamming attack would manifest itself as a radio transmission on a similar 
frequency spectrum as that used to communicate between the aircraft nodes. At sufficient 
strength, this rogue signal is capable of overwhelming the receiving radio transceivers on 
the nodes by lowering the signal-to-noise ratio to unacceptable levels. At these levels, 
data cannot be distinguished from the noise, and the transmission is lost. The jamming 
device needs no privileged network access – or any network access at all. Armed simply 
with the knowledge of transmission frequency spectrum, the attacker can disable one or 
more nodes depending on its intent, proximity, and the number of jamming devices used. 
The properties of a jamming attack – its overpowering of a network interface, and the 
apparent localization of the jamming source on a wireless network, make it one of the 
easiest to detect. A network suspecting a jamming attack will notice remarkably reduced 
data transmission rates across communications links that seem to be localized. The source 
of the jamming signal can then be identified.  
When considering the five aspects of network security, jamming affects 
availability. It also indirectly affects non-repudiation, and loosely, data integrity – though 
at this point no data is received. Similar analogs exist on wired networks, in which the 
hierarchical routing structure is bombarded with network traffic (such as a SYN flood, 
consisting of TCP/IP packets that initiate a connection request but never completely 
establish it – flooding the networking device with useless requests). The intended target is 
no longer able to route information at a reliable rate. In addition to the inability to route 
and send data, jamming has an indirect effect on performance: it markedly reduces 
battery life of devices experiencing the attack; if a communications link is severed, 
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multiple retries along the channel will be necessary. In addition, increasing power to the 
radio transmitter modules may be required, further reducing available power. 
Spoofing Attacks 
 Spoofing is the behavioral dissimulation of a trusted node by a malicious attacker 
node. The purpose of a spoofing attack is to damage a node or to inhibit a task’s 
execution by maliciously issuing commands that appear to originate from another 
legitimate node. In the context of the five principle of network security, spoofing affects 
data integrity (i.e., a spoofing node that serves as a routing device may, for instance, re-
write data that is meant to be transmitted along to another node), data confidentiality (i.e., 
spoofing can lead to eavesdropping), authenticity (i.e., the spoofing node is trusted as if it 
were someone else), and to some degree, availability, (i.e., the spoofing node can 
potentially stop the routing of information as if it were a normal occurrence). Because it 
affects so many aspects of network security, spoofing is regarded as a dangerous attack 
because it gains the trust of the nodes on the network. This allows the attacker to inflict 
nearly limitless damage on the network without any means of discovery by conventional, 
passive, cryptographic, intrusion prevention policies. Consequently, it is also one of the 
most difficult attacks to perpetrate, since a well-designed network will feature several 
layers of protection that must be individually broken before spoofing is possible.  
Referring once more to our networked aircraft example, a spoofed node could 
misdirect information about the position, speed, and objectives of other aircraft on the 
network, deliberately causing a collision or failure of the joint objective. In contrast to the 
jamming attack, which is more random in nature (even though a particular node may be 
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targeted, the effect of cutting off communications may not be immediately known to the 
attacker), a spoofing attack has direct and well-defined consequences, as the attacker is 
responsible for causing changes at the very fundamental level of the network. In addition, 
using intrusion detection technology at this level would require significant knowledge of 
the application and its behavior in order to efficiently detect the presence of an attacker in 
a timely manner. To further obfuscate its presence, a spoofing attacker may choose to 
behave in a manner that seems sufficiently normal so as not to raise suspicion, 
particularly from an anomaly-based intrusion detection system.  
Spoofing can most easily be implemented during the node discovery phase. 
Should the attacker, represented by its own node, properly craft its discovery credentials, 
the node may be convinced that the attacking node is in fact another device, and 
thereafter assume it to be a trusted device without further investigation. An attacker may 
also be able to compromise an existing node on the network that has properly established 
trust. In this case, the node may be reprogrammed or altered in such a way that it still 
retains its trusted relationship, but now broadcasts information generated with malicious 
intent.  
Compromising Confidentiality with Eavesdropping 
 Eavesdropping involves capturing and retransmitting packets (or, alternately, 
receiving copies of a network packet by a node that is not intended to receive it) to 
identify its contents. These contents might be passwords, objectives, or any other 
sensitive data that should not be discovered by non-trusted parties. This is pertinent to the 
data confidentiality aspect of network security. On wired networks, eavesdropping is 
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typically performed by using a packet-sniffing software application that allows the 
system’s network adapter to pay attention to packets for which the adapter is not a 
designated recipient. The adapter is said to be operating in promiscuous mode. During an 
eavesdropping attack on a wired network, unencrypted network packets are the easiest 
target. However, today’s networks more frequently make use of encryption and 
authentication methods, such as Secure Shell (SSH) (application-layer), or Internet 
Protocol Secure (IPSEC) (internet layer, between transport and link-layer on the TCP/IP 
stack) to prevent sniffing from identifying the packet contents. Still, depending on the 
cryptographic method in use, it may still possible to decrypt packet contents using known 
plaintext attacks, for example, by exploiting a weakness in the encryption method.  
 On wireless networks, particularly MANETs, eavesdropping may occur through 
reception of network data transmissions either through a node that is associated with the 
network, or through brute-force recording of all radiofrequency spectrum activity. The 
former requires a trusted relationship with the network, assuming that the nodes are 
operating on a secured communications system. As mentioned earlier, a spoofing node 
may be party to an eavesdropping attack. The latter is much more difficult to detect on a 
wireless network, if at all possible. Thus, intrusion detection technologies are rendered 
useless on eavesdropping attacks since there may be no known signature or anomalous 
presence on the network that can be used to identify an attacking device. The only 
defense, in this case, is a robust encryption method to ensure data confidentiality. 
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Man-in-the-middle Attacks 
 A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack occurs when a third party receives or 
retransmits a portion of the data in a modified manner. During the attack, the two 
originally-communicating parties do not perceive the existence of the third party, or 
instead see it as a trusted resource [27, 53]. This attack can be used for eavesdropping and 
for data modification. Data modification is as simple as it sounds – a violation of data 
integrity by means of retransmitting or altering network packets and their contents to 
reflect new content with malicious intent. The man-in-the-middle attack faces 
implementation challenges that are similar to a spoofing attack. In the case of 
authenticated, encrypted network connections, the attacker must intercept an 
authentication token, such as a public key, in order to execute the attack. When 
implemented on a wireless ad hoc network, the man-in-the-middle attack essentially 
behaves in the same manner as a spoofing node.  
 In a wired, infrastructure network, public keys used in cryptography can be issued 
from a certificate authority and verified such that the intercepted key cannot be used 
without verification (discussed later in Chapter III). On an ad hoc network, however, such 
a system may not exist. Detection of a man-in-the-middle attack through IDS techniques 
can be performed by identifying latencies in transmission that are not typical of the 
connected nodes. Thus, an MITM attack would likely be detected by means of a 
signature-based intrusion detection system that can detect common symptoms of the 
attack itself.  
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Node failures without malicious intent 
 In addition to attacks representing malicious intent, MANETs, and more broadly 
almost all other ad hoc network types, are vulnerable to node failures caused by 
environment, hardware defects, or software programming errors [54]. Of these, the most 
complex and difficult to analyze and predict is the environmental factor. Environment 
encompasses many variables that can cause one or more nodes to fail to respond. 
Temperature, which can affect battery life in either extreme of hot or cold, can also cause 
hardware failures if the nodes are unable to properly cool themselves through either 
active or passive cooling elements. Because most embedded devices use low-power RISC 
platforms such as the ARM 7, ARM 9, ARM 11, or similar derivative instruction set 
architectures, [2, 51] relatively low heat is generated, and thus passive cooling is the most 
common method used to keep systems operating within normal bounds. Passive cooling 
also reduces energy requirements. Natural barriers are another factor that can affect 
communications performance. If mobile nodes find themselves in a location interspersed 
with natural, dense rock formations, such as mountains, radio transmission may be 
curtailed or even impossible. Also, regions containing high metallic mineral content can 
also affect the range and integrity of communications.  
 Not all environmental challenges are natural; man-made radio frequency sources 
may interfere with MANET operation even if the effect was not intentional. This would 
be analogous to a jamming attack without malicious motivation. In order to minimize 
effects of interference on communications bands, especially from other devices 
competing for bandwidth on the same frequency spectrum such as cordless telephones, 
Bluetooth radios, and other 802.x protocol devices, most ad hoc communications 
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hardware employs the use of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum technology, or DSSS 
[55]. DSSS-enabled radios all share a pseudo noise symbol string (PN string) which can 
be used to modulate the phase of the data stream to be transmitted. This is done through 
cross-multiplication of the original signal by the PN string. The resulting transmission 
appears semi-random in nature, but contains the important property of allowing a certain 
amount of overlap with other existing signals in the space without degrading the 
transmission. The received signal is decoded with the same PN string in a reversible 
operation to yield the original data transmission. 
 DSSS is utilized in code-division multiple access networks such as cellular 
networks (1xRTT, Ev-DO, WCDMA, UMTS, HSDPA/UPA/HSPA+ and others [56]) not 
only to allow for interference-free operation, but also to allow for multiple transmissions 
on the same frequency band to occur simultaneously. Thus, there is a natural tradeoff 
between signal strength, quality, and bandwidth. The 802.11 series of networking 
standards also employs DSSS, with the newest draft “N” standard extending the concept 
even further by allowing multiple send/receive antennas (multiple-in/multiple-out, or 
MIMO) on different channels to enhance throughput. The 802.15.4-2006 standard, which 
is rapidly becoming the overwhelming choice for low-power, low-bandwidth networks, 
also utilizes DSSS. Recent developments show that the ZigBee implementation of 
802.15.4 will soon make an entry as the de-facto wireless networking standard for home 
automation services and devices [1, 12, 57-59]. 
 Despite the inclusion of DSSS and other techniques used to prevent interference 
from reducing or preventing transmission, communications loss is still a major factor in 
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MANET deployment. In aerospace telecommunications, for instance, NASA is 
developing a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) protocol that allows a network to operate 
under the assumption that at some point, a node will either exit communications range, or 
fail to communicate due to interference or another environmental factor [14, 16, 42, 43, 
45, 46, 60-64]. DTN networks can be implemented between satellites, between mobile 
robots, and between the extraplanetary systems and ground stations used to monitor their 
activities.  
 In addition to environmental concerns, defects also present a challenge to reliable 
communications. Of the two defect categories, hardware and software, software typically 
comprises the most frequent cause for a communications failure that is not related to 
environment or attack. A software-level error may be responsible for application-level 
issues, or may affect a deeper level of network operations at the stack level. In either 
case, programming practices for building correct-by-design systems can be used to ensure 
that no system enters deadlock should an error occur; due to the nature of complex 
software systems, eliminating bugs is unfeasible. However, proper handling of 
exceptions, and the inclusion of failure mode operation can go a long way in preventing 
widespread system outages due to defects in the software. 
Metrics for failures and attacks on MANET communications 
 Given the failures described due to attacks and environmental conditions or 
defects, this dissertation briefly proposes some baseline metrics to be used that can 
accurately quantize node failures and associated difficulties on MANETs. According to 
Perkins [19, 21], there are three main performance metrics associated with a 
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communications channel: (1) average throughput, (2) average routing overhead, and (3) 
power consumption. This dissertation will focus on the first and third aspects. The first 
metric to be considered is the loss in data rate, and consequently, average throughput in 
kilobits per second. This implies that the communications channel is compromised but 
has not failed completely. Such a scenario might occur during a jamming attack, or 
during environmental interference. Supposing that a node is being jammed, there are then 
two effects that can be observed in terms of throughput degradation. First, a localized 
effect can immediately degrade throughput at the site of the jamming attack or where 
environmental interference may be present. The second effect is overall reduction in 
throughput and data rate in the network due to the reduced performance of the affected 
nodes. This effect occurs when one considers either routing or a dataflow in which 
affected tasks on the nodes produce or consume resources on the network. This effect 
results indirectly from the localized effect, and may impact the network globally. If at any 
point data from the affected nodes on the network is needed at other nodes, suspended 
tasks and services will contribute to a greater overall loss in network throughput. 
Furthermore, when considering routing, jamming one node might completely terminate 
connections to that node, as well as bring the MANET’s communications infrastructure 
to a halt. With these points in mind, this dissertation will refer to two metrics related to 
data rates. The first metric is percent local bandwidth loss, and refers to the loss of 
bandwidth at the immediate node level. The second metric will be called percent global 
bandwidth loss, which represents the overall network throughput loss occurring under the 
attack or node failure scenario. Global bandwidth may be calculated as an average, where 
global bandwidth, 
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where  represents local bandwidth and n is the number of connections on the network. 
Alternately, global bandwidth may simply be expressed as the sum of the bandwidth of 
all the individual connections, not expressed as an average. This dissertation will use the 
first method. Because most of the networks investigated here will be using 802.15.4 
derivatives, most of the bandwidth figures will be measured in kilobits per second. 
Equally important is mean bandwidth, determined by the average throughput of data on a 
network, calculated similarly to the global bandwidth, but substituting average bandwidth 
per link rather than maximum bandwidth. 
 The next metric used in this dissertation is a global measure of the number of 
nodes rendered inactive by a jamming attack or node failure. Though this may seem 
rather elementary, it is important to assess how network performance degrades as more 
than one critical node becomes unavailable. For instance, when considering routing along 
a sparsely-populated node, the loss of two nearby routes that represent the 
communications boundary between other more densely populated segments of the 
network could be devastating. In contrast, if only one were lost, there might be sufficient 
communications range for the remaining node to bridge both network sections on its own, 
albeit at a reduced data rate. Associated tightly with the number of nodes lost is the time-
to-resource lost. During a jamming attack, there may be a delay between the start time of 
the attack (and its identification by an intrusion detection mechanism), and the time when 
the resources represented by that node become unavailable. This metric is useful in 
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determining how much time is available to perform resource reallocation before services 
across the network become disrupted. In the case of routing, the time may be limited and 
short. However, for cases in which a resource is required at low time intervals, there may 
be sufficient time to reorganize network resources using redundant nodes or resources in 
time to compensate for the lost node. 
 Lastly, when considering the actual proposed reallocation process, there are 
metrics which can assess the efficiency and suitability of the reallocation algorithms. 
These will be explored in detail in Chapter IV, and include items such as total 
reallocation time, number of required network transactions, and a form of quantizing the 
quality of replacement resources. 
Attack Protection 
 When considering network security, there are three principal components to 
providing safe and secure operating conditions for a network, regardless of its 
architecture; these components are intrusion prevention, detection, and elimination [28, 
29, 65-67]. Each of these components contains within itself a vast amount of past 
research, methods, schools of thought, and most importantly, tradeoffs. 
 Intrusion prevention is, perhaps, the most-well-studied aspect of computer 
security. It combines aspects of obfuscation, encryption (to assure data confidentiality 
and integrity), and authentication (digital signatures) [34, 40, 63, 68, 69]. The key 
components to intrusion prevention are typically passive methods that make it difficult 
for an attacker to gain access to a network and its resources. Intrusion prevention is 
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therefore the first line of defense in any network security structure, delaying or deterring 
a potential attack. 
Obfuscation 
 Obfuscation is the most primitive method, and therefore least resilient method of 
intrusion prevention. It primarily involves hiding the transmission or source of data being 
sent across a network. For instance, when sending data across a TCP/IP network protocol, 
one way of obfuscating the transmitted data is to send packets across a number of 
different TCP connections and respective ports at random or quasi-random intervals so as 
to prevent easy sniffing of a single TCP port. However, this method is easily attacked by 
identifying port traffic, sniffing those ports, and then reassembling data based on the 
absolute sequence numbers encoded in the headers of each TCP packet. Though 
obfuscation alone is typically an ineffective method of providing data integrity and 
confidentiality, when used in combination with robust encryption and signature methods, 
it can strengthen such methods significantly.  
 A more well-known obfuscation method involves non-broadcast Service Set 
Identifiers for wireless 802.11x networks. Before standardization of secure wireless 
protocols, such as the semi-secure WEP, and the more robust WPA and WPA2 methods, 
not broadcasting the SSID was a way of preventing unauthorized access to networks by 
simply not advertising their presence. However, common knowledge or simple hacking 
can easily circumvent this, and thus non-broadcast SSID networks are rare. The 
usefulness of non-broadcast networks becomes much more apparent when implementing 
this obfuscation with encryption. A non-broadcast, encrypted network provides two 
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deterrents, and thus obfuscation can provide an important first layer in passive intrusion 
prevention methods. 
Encryption 
 Encryption provides a measure of data confidentiality by obscuring the contents 
of the data. Encryption finds its roots early, as far as several thousands of years ago, with 
the introduction of the cipher. A cipher represents a modification of the transmitted or 
stored data, or plaintext, such that it cannot be read without a decryption method. The 
Caesar cipher is one of the most primitive encryption methods, in which the contents of 
the transmission medium, in that case the alphabet, were incremented by one or more 
units, constantly throughout the plaintext. For instance, the phrase "encryption is passive" 
might have been encrypted as "fodszqujpo jt qbttjwf", where each letter was incremented 
by one unit. It is considered a stream cipher, in which each atomic unit of data is 
processed as a continuous stream [70]. While it may have been effective in its time, the 
Caesar cipher is obviously easy to crack, whether one knows the shift interval or not. 
 Today, encryption pervades every aspect of communications and secure data 
storage. Most techniques implement block ciphers, in which a constant quantum of data 
is encrypted at a time. Such ciphers include AES, DES, RSA and related methods [68, 69, 
71-74]. Because of the constant nature of a block cipher, many of its variants may be 
easily implemented in hardware. In the case of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), 
commonly used in encrypted hard disks and data communications equipment, the data 
blocks are successively shifted, mixed, and encrypted with a key. This can be achieved 
with shift registers and Exclusive OR (XOR) hardware gates. Figure 3 shows a basic 
block diagram of how the AES cipher works. AES is also utilized in common software 
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encryption packages, such as TrueCrypt, which can even provide deniability (i.e., an 
encrypted container 
or volume will be 
indistinguishable 
from random 
contents of the disk) 
of the encrypted 
contents if remaining 
space on the storage 
volume is properly 
randomized. 
 The strength 
of an encryption 
method is somewhat 
dependent on the number of bits used in the encryption key. If it is too short, then a 
"known plaintext attack" may be used to attempt to crack the encryption method. This 
type of attack requires some sort of generalization or assumption about the source being 
targeted. For instance, a PDF archive is known to begin with a particular type of header at 
the start of the file. If the encryption key is short enough, either brute-force cracking 
methods can be used (in which keys are tried in sequence or randomly until the password 
is cracked), or the problem may be simplified to solving a set of linear equations, because 
the encryption methods, with the exception of RSA (which uses exponential methods), 
almost always use a linear system of encryption. The known plaintext can be used as the 
 
Figure 3 - AES Encryption Block Diagram 
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solution to the linear system, requiring the solution of a number of equations that 
generate the correct answer. In general, the method of encryption of the attack target is 
almost always known. Therefore, choosing an encryption key that is sufficiently large is 
critical in preventing either brute-force or known plaintext attacks. Because encryption 
relies on the presence of a decryption method, and subsequently the existence of a key or 
set of keys to allow encryption and decryption to take place, these methods are 
susceptible to attack; a strong encryption method is useless if, for instance, the key is 
discovered, or one system negotiates a secure connection with another system that is not 
who it claims to be.  
 Let us then consider the need for a method of authenticating sources. The most 
commonly used is that of a digital signature with a third party source of trust. A digital 
signature involves the use of a certificate that is verified by a Certificate Authority (CA). 
The certificate is used to digitally "sign" a public key to be used in a public key 
cryptography method such as RSA. Public keys are exchanged between communicating 
hosts, and information is encrypted with the recipient's public key. The data can only be 
decrypted with the host's own private key, as the public and private keys represent 
factorial complements. Because of the computational difficulty (at least for conventional 
microprocessors), factoring extremely large numbers (and thereby cracking the keys) 
proves to be extremely time-consuming as the size of the key increases. The importance 
of the CA is underscored by the man-in-the-middle attack. For example, a public key sent 
from Alice to Bob may be intercepted by a third party, Charlie. Charlie then resends a 
request encoded with Charlie’s public key (instead of Bob’s). Bob, thinking it is 
receiving a transmission from Alice, encodes the data with Charlie’s public key and 
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returns it. Charlie can then decrypt the transmission, alter it, and then re-encode it with 
the original public key it intercepted from Alice, sending the data back to Alice as if 
nothing unusual had happened. If, instead, the certificate were signed by a certificate 
authority, Bob would verify the contents of the public key and discover it not to be 
genuine. As a result, the MITM attack would be effectively thwarted. The public key's 
signature can be traced back to the certificate authority. Signature generation itself may 
use a variety of different methods, such as PGP and GPG (Pretty Good Privacy and Gnu 
Privacy Guard, respectively). The digital signature itself is created from a hash of the 
original public key's plaintext. Called a message digest, this hash will fail if the data is for 
any reason altered. Therefore, the public key's integrity is also protected [69, 75]. 
 Because obfuscation and encryption methods provide passive methods of 
protecting data (though data may supposedly be actively obfuscated, this dissertation will 
assume that all obfuscation attempts are passive), any lapse in security could allow a 
system or network to be compromised without notice, and allow malicious activity to 
occur that may only manifest itself once too much damage has been done. An Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) is created on the assumption that any and all passive security 
methods can be broken. The development and implementation of an IDS is shaped on the 
premise that the identification of an intruder can be exacted through monitoring a set of 
behaviors, conditions, or transactions occurring on a network or system [26, 28, 29, 32, 
33, 36, 41]. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
 There are three main localizations of IDSs: Centralized, Decentralized, and 
Hybrid. These categories identify the localization of the IDS logic or scanning 
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mechanism. Localization depends largely on the target network architecture, throughput, 
available computational power, and whether or not the IDS should identify unknown 
anomalous behavior or a specific threat model that carries a particular manifestation 
signature. A large amount of research has been done on centralized, signature-based IDS 
methods, because they can be implemented on general-purpose, ubiquitous computing 
platforms [26, 29, 34, 38]. 
 A centralized IDS, as 
represented in Figure 4, is 
generally implemented at the 
firewall or top-level router such 
that it can monitor all incoming 
and outgoing traffic for patterns 
which may comprise an attack. For 
instance, a port scan, in which the 
attacking computer probes a computer or set of computers for open and responsive 
services that may be vulnerable to attack, can easily be detected by the range, frequency, 
and spread of requests made by the attacking computer. The identification can then lead 
to further action if desired, such as a connection termination and denial to the attacking 
machine. Because a centralized, routed network architecture is one of the most widely-
known network topologies, IDS techniques designed to protect these systems, which 
include enterprise and business networks designed for general-purpose computing, have 
been developed for many generations and are commercially available as powerful 
products to protect their intended hosts [28]. 
 
Figure 4 - A centralized IDS 
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 On the other end of the spectrum exists the decentralized IDS. In this case, 
monitoring is performed at the network node level. Rather than scanning all network 
traffic going through the top level of a network infrastructure, a decentralized IDS 
performs quantized and discrete monitoring of localized events and data that may be 
relevant to a node and its neighbors. When paired with a decentralized network such as a 
MANET, this offers a number of key advantages. Primarily, it reduces the amount of 
computational power needed, since several if not all nodes on the MANET are 
performing detection roles. This eliminates the need for one entity to analyze all network 
packets. A decentralized IDS can also allow for a fine level of granularity in its 
observations. Since nodes may independently form conclusions about intrusions related 
to their own microcosm, a specific threat may be perceived where a generalized approach 
may otherwise fail to detect an anomaly. Reputation systems also fall into the category of 
decentralized systems. While not considered a classic intrusion detection system, the 
reputation mechanism, as proposed by Buchegger et al. provides a method by which 
nodes evaluate routing contributions based on previous activity. It is a peer-based review 
system, and is optimized for providing peer-reviewed routing for peer-to-peer networks 
[76-78]. 
 A decentralized IDS solution also allows for application-level intrusion detection. 
This can remove the need for scanning packets, instead relying on application-level data 
to be passed to the IDS engine, implemented either in hardware or, more likely, software. 
Application-layer granularity allows the analysis of specific behavioral patterns that are 
unique to the target implementation, which may carry more meaning than network traffic 
which may not be indicative of an attack. For example, if in a three-node network, 
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containing nodes A, B, and C, let us suppose that node C has been compromised. In this 
network, a basic set of requests is made among all three nodes. Each request is identified 
by a two-digit hexadecimal code. Suppose that node C, due to an attack, begins to issue 
new requests to nodes A and B that are not accomplishing the network's original purpose. 
A centralized or packet-analyzing IDS would not notice any difference, provided that 
node C does not change its request issue rate. Because the packet sizes would remain the 
same for the two-digit request codes, any changes in application-level behavior would go 
undetected. On the other hand, an application-level-based IDS would notice a change in 
the frequency of the new event codes, and raise a flag, if it were appropriate. 
 A decentralized IDS also provides for fault tolerance. Should the centralized IDS 
become compromised in any way, the entire network it manages would be open and 
susceptible to attack, provided a failure of encryption and authentication methods. Even 
worse, it could provide a method for analyzing a target network's behavior, which could 
have devastating consequences. Decentralization therefore can tolerate the loss of one or 
more IDS nodes. Effectiveness, of course, would be reduced, but not fully eliminated. 
Furthermore, an analysis of failed or compromised IDS implementations can lead to 
improvements or identification of an attack pattern.  
 The third category is that of an IDS with hybrid locality. Such a system has been 
proposed for implementation in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
network infrastructures, which are essentially MANETs connected to an infrastructure, 
and without the mobility component. These systems are designed to monitor and control 
industrial process applications, and due to the sensitive and potentially harmful effects of 
a network attack, IDS implementations are rapidly becoming critical to safety [57]. In a 
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hybrid-locality IDS, identification and control is performed on select nodes that are part 
of the main network. Monitoring also takes place at the central infrastructure level to 
which the nodes report and receive instructions. Note that most of the hybrid-locality IDS 
approaches focus their observation on timing principles and packet behavior, with less of 
an emphasis on application-layer monitoring. 
 
Figure 5 - Timestamp vs. Discrete Event IDS logging 
 IDS monitoring relies, in general, upon a set of basic components. The first 
component is a logging mechanism with which events can be recorded and maintained 
over a time period 
 → . Events may be recorded according to timestamps or time 
steps, whichever method facilitates the desired method of analysis for the particular IDS. 
A particular advantage to using the time-step method is that it removes the need to 
account for time in computations, since all events occur as discrete event steps with each 
event comprising a uniform time interval. Figure 5 illustrates the two methods. The event 
log or cache may be flushed periodically to allow for a more accurate model of the 
system, in case the system has transitioned to a new mode of operation. Alternately, the 
event cache may be analyzed by using a sliding window, in which only the last m events 
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within  →  ⊆ 
 →  are valid. Utilizing the time-step discrete event method allows 
this window to remain uniform over a discrete dataset.  
 The actual method of analysis, sometimes referred to as the IDS engine, is what 
sets different approaches apart from each other. While data logging and event caches 
generally follow similar structures, the analysis method is tailored for a specific type of 
analysis and application. Some engines work based on statistical analysis of events, and 
determine when a particular network behavior is out of specified bounds. Such engines 
work well for periodic systems, such as SCADA networks in which data is designed to be 
transmitted and received at precise intervals. However, such monitoring can also create 
an enormous blind spot; an attacker can time his or her payload to execute at equally 
precise intervals to circumvent detection. 
 Other engines may analyze interactions between nodes and eschew time 
altogether, looking for a specific order of operations to occur. Should any interaction 
occur out of its designed sequence, the IDS may then raise a flag. An obvious weakness 
in this method is that it cannot distinguish whether or not a node acting in sequence has 
been compromised and is just "playing along" to go undetected. There are literally 
hundreds of different IDS methodologies and engines that have been proposed. 
 Because different attack methods manifest themselves in unique ways, no one 
engine will provide optimal detection efficiency for all attack types. To illustrate this, let 
us suppose that there exists a four-node network containing nodes A, B, C and D. Each 
node can communicate with the other three nodes, as seen in Figure 6. Node A controls a 
stepper motor to precisely align an optics array on a space-based telescope array. Node B 
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is responsible for measuring the temperature of the optics to ensure proper calibration, 
and reports its findings to node A to compensate for thermal effects. Node C receives 
information for targeting purposes from a supervisory communications system. Node D is 
redundant. Let us also suppose that node C is compromised by an attacker, with full 
access to the node's resources. Two identification engines exist. One detects the contents 
of data packets to determine if the payload of the data falls within acceptable parameters. 
The second engine 
specifically identifies the 
number of thermal 
adjustments made by node 
B in order to determine 
whether it is operating 
properly. 
 Given a 
compromise on node C, 
the second IDS engine would be unable to identify any malicious behavior unless node C 
began interfering with B's communications link to node A. However, the first engine 
would likely raise a flag when the nature of the data coming from node C begins to 
change from a normal series of commands from the supervisory system, to commands 
that could potentially damage the optics array and jeopardize the overall objective. In 
contrast, if node B were affected, the payload and frequency might not change, but only 
the actual data itself, causing a misalignment of the optics and destroying the validity of 
Figure 6 - Example ad-hoc network with delegated distributed tasks 
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the experiment. Thus, a combination of approaches solves this elementary intrusion 
problem. Of course, either or both systems could be easily circumvented. 
 Systems that combine multiple detection approaches may be considered fusion or 
hybrid IDS methodologies. One such system, proposed by Lauf et al. [29], combines two 
engines in a time-variant IDS methodology such that one detection phase complements 
the operation of another. Other approaches suggest the usage of sensor data fusion and 
IDS engine fusion for parallel monitoring. Each engine can raise its own alert flag, and 
once a critical mass of alerts, or a situation-specific quorum is reached, the system is 
considered to be under attack from an intrusion [29]. 
 The attack methods and the candidate MANET implementation are the two 
largest factors dictating IDS design. Before starting this analysis, let us briefly delve into 
the subject of intrusion response. 
Intrusion Response 
 Intrusion response corresponds to the last line of defense available to a network. It 
is also one of the most undefined. The implemented mechanisms depend on the amount 
of damage an attack could cause on the network, and/or the criticality of the system under 
attack. For instance, in the case of a centralized IDS where all traffic must flow through a 
top-level infrastructure, the intrusion response of choice is to sever incoming and 
outbound connections from the attacking source, thereby blocking the attack entirely. 
Alternately, rather than blocking a connection, a MAC address, or IP address range, a 
particular signature of network activity may be dropped rather than routed. For example, 
this might correspond to port connection attempts over the NetBIOS protocol to a local 
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network from outside, which can occur from worms and other malware attempting to 
exploit improperly-secured Windows-based PC network shares. Blocking the port from 
all incoming NetBIOS requests solves the problem by completely disabling access to this 
potentially vulnerable resource, while allowing internal requests to machines over this 
port to continue undisturbed. Of course, this solution may have the unintended 
consequence of disabling legitimate requests. 
 Intrusion response, for the most part, is relatively straightforward for centralized, 
hierarchal networks. For MANETs and other ad hoc networks, intrusion response is a bit 
less well-defined. The intrusion response for an ad hoc network must therefore be based 
upon the particular network’s design intent and implementation. Let us use as an 
example, a ten-node MANET, C. Each node, , contains an IDS implementation. Let us 
suppose that a particular node, , has become compromised.  communicates with 
nodes , ,  and . Since each node’s IDS is capable of anomaly detection, one 
might envision a variety of rules that might be enacted to excise the compromised node. 
One rule might be that for all  ∈  , and for all  ∈  (where N indicates the number 
of nodes, L is the locally connected group of nodes with which the compromised node is 
connected, and M is the number of nodes in the local group), if the number of nodes 
detecting an intrusion is greater than floor , the compromised node is excised, 
meaning it is blocked from further communications.  
 Once a compromised node has been removed, the intrusion response phase has 
completed its goal concerning the affected nodes. At this point, it would be useful to find 
replacement resources on the network that represent two types of redundancy. The first 
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type of redundancy will be referred to as a node clone. In this situation, a complete copy 
of the replacement resource happens to exist somewhere on the MANET. This is a likely 
scenario for networks featuring large number of homogeneous devices, such as the 
massively-distributed micro robotic exploration and sensing platform proposed in [79]. In 
such cases, it is assumed that node failures will occur at some point during normal 
operation. We can extend this pretext further by assuming that one or more nodes will be 
attacked during the course of normal operation, and therefore include “hot spare” 
resource nodes that can be thrown into the mix at a given time. Of course, such a solution 
may have significant overhead concerns: extra resources, communication, and memory 
space may be required to maintain an understanding of these nodes, which will be using 
power even when they are not fulfilling a purpose. An alternative to a node clone is a 
virtual node clone, in which a node is able to divert part of its processing time or other 
resources to a task as if the node were exclusively assigned to that task. In reality, this 
builds on multiprogramming and multiprocessing capabilities and resource sharing to 
allow the displaced task to use the “new” resource without affecting or severely 
degrading the performance of the task(s) that were originally assigned to it.  
 Alternately, one might consider shared resources as the second type of 
redundancy – a variant on the virtual node clone scenario, in which redundancy is not 
expressed in terms of duplicate nodes, but rather as secondary resources that may or may 
not be suitable replacements to a displaced task. As an example of the second option, let 
us assume that a collective of ground-based, extra-planetary mobile robots is exploring an 
unknown terrain. Within the network, one robot provides a high-resolution color imaging 
capability via a charge-coupled device (CCD); this provides data in real-time to enable 
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obstacle detection. Another robot is designed to provide thermal imaging, which requires 
a low-resolution CCD camera onboard that robot. Should the robot with the high-
resolution CCD fail, we can re-allocate the second, low-resolution CCD device on the 
thermal imaging robot to replace the first robot's camera. If the low-resolution CCD is 
acceptable, we say that it is a fit resource. It is possible that multiple fit resources may 
exist on a network. Our discussion now leads us to existing frameworks for identifying 
capable resources on a MANET. These frameworks are called Service Discovery 
Protocols, or SDPs, and are discussed in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ATTACK AND FAILURE MITIGATION THROUGH REALLOCATION 
 This paragraph aids the reader in understanding basic principles about system 
resources, their consuming tasks, and ways to search for additional available resources in 
the event of a node or resource failure. By taking advantage of available resource 
redundancy on the network, reallocation of these tasks to new resources can take place in 
a manner that is most-efficiently suited to the network’s design needs. 
Discovering Resources 
 Mian et al. [9] suggest that most service discovery protocols operate on the 
application layer in a manner similar to wired networks, with the caveat that service 
discovery on MANETs must operate with location and proximity-awareness in mind. So, 
what does an SDP do, given a set of nodes, mobility awareness and a consumer of the 
services? And more importantly, how does any of this relate to the continuing discussion 
on reliability and security of task-to-resource-allocated ad hoc networks? This section, 
Discovering Resources, will introduce principles of service-oriented SDPs and routing-
oriented SDPs and then show how their principles can be applied to offer a solution to the 
task-based model called DARTS, implemented in Chapter VII. 
Organization and Registration 
 According to Mian et al. [9], we must start with looking at a service description, 
which is a form of abstracting the qualities and capabilities of a service. A service is 
defined as a piece of hardware, software, or an abstract component that is needed by a 
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consumer (which can be high-level, such as the end-user, or low-level, such as another 
process or hardware instance). Examples of services might be a networked printer, data 
storage array, or an authentication service. Based on the service description, nodes on the 
network (wired or wireless) can then identify which node is a suitable candidate to fulfill 
those requirements. The method in which this is performed is specific to the algorithms 
implemented by the particular SDP. Registration then refers to how nodes on the network 
store information about the services represented by the MANET. The completeness of 
registration data on a global level dictates the depth of which a search algorithm must be 
performed to find valid resources. In addition, how much information is stored on each 
node also dictates whether or not nodes will need to perform periodic updates to refresh 
knowledge about the services provided by other nodes. At this point, we begin to see a 
tradeoff; in the extreme cases, there are two possible outcomes. The first case is where no 
node knows anything about the services of surrounding nodes. Should a consumer poll 
the network for a service, the network must be flooded with requests to find a suitable 
service. The benefits to this scenario are that no updates are needed among nodes. If a 
consumer arrives only at extended intervals, the elimination of updates may increase 
efficiency and power utilization on the network. Alternately, the second scenario dictates 
constant updates among nodes in such a manner that all nodes are aware of all the 
services provided on the network. This presents scalability, memory utilization, and 
traffic problems, especially when considering mobility. Scalability can be a problem 
because updates must propagate continuously among many links. As the network 
increases in size, the number of update transmissions will increase accordingly. Memory 
utilization – a significant issue on MANETs which may have limited memory capacity, is 
49 
 
used up by lookup tables and similar structures to keep updated copies of node resource 
information tables. These tables must be updated often if nodes are continuously 
associating and disconnecting from the network, and if the topological configuration of 
the network is altered due to the mobility of its nodes. Traffic issues arise from the need 
to send update information from one node to the next. Depending on how much data is 
being transmitted, this may be a non-trivial amount of overhead on a network, 
particularly 802.15.4 networks that have a low average bandwidth.  
Resource Discovery via Network Flooding 
 Following registration, we can then perform a search for services, which is 
initiated by the user or one or more arbitration nodes. Active searches correspond to 
registration methods that do not have network-wide omniscience of resources. In this 
case, a flood of requests is sent across the network until one or more nodes return a match 
for the service. Alternately, registration methods that utilize global lookup tables or 
structures that are updated periodically through advertisement messages may reduce the 
overall traffic requirement at the moment of a service request. However, as mentioned 
earlier, this method is prone to long-term traffic problems as advertisements and updates 
must constantly be performed to conform to the network and resource configurations 
available at a given moment [8, 9, 13-15, 80]. 
 Gao et al. [8] group SDPs into multiple approaches according to single, dual, and 
multi-layer approaches. In a single-layer approach, all nodes are grouped into one 
“logical layer” where each node provides the same category of services. According to the 
authors, flood search protocols belong to this single-layer approach. In order to reduce 
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the network overhead from flood searches, modifications to the flooding algorithm exist, 
such as the inclusion of probabilistic data to prevent multiple discovery routes from being 
re-used. Also methods exist in the single-layer approach for advertisement-base services, 
such as those mentioned previously. One such example is called the Group-based Service 
Discovery protocol (GSD). This protocol caches advertisements between nodes. Thus, 
service requests need not traverse the entire network to find a service, as a node further 
down the discovery chain may have knowledge of which node contains the service. Of 
course, this method is still prone to possible outdating due to mobility concerns, and node 
entry/exit. Furthermore, it still requires the implementation of advertisement packets, 
which create network overhead. Two-layer approaches utilize the clustering of nodes in 
terms of physical proximity to each other to reduce the amount of network traffic 
required to find a service. Hashing techniques are utilized in order to determine which 
node in the cluster (referred to by the authors as a matrix) is responsible for maintaining 
service information. Multi-layer structuring is a hybridization of several single or dual-
layer techniques, and is generally too costly in terms of network overhead for use with 
MANETs [19, 81, 82]. 
Searching for Resources via Advertisement/Gossip 
 When considering implementation of SDPs with a MANET, special care must be 
taken for SDPs utilizing advertisement or gossip protocols. The rate at which a node 
moves over time will likely determine the topological arrangement. Thus, SDPs targeted 
at MANETs must incorporate feedback on mobility into both the registration process, as 
well as the discovery process. Note that an efficient flooding algorithm does not face 
these challenges as the state of the network during the flood search will be a snapshot, 
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assuming that the flood does not propagate too slowly. Thus, non-flooding methods must 
then update more frequently, using expiration data for the validity of the information in 
the registration tables. In addition to temporal modifications of the advertisement 
protocol, it is suggested that spatial modifications be made such that the advertisement 
radius be constrained to fewer devices. Again, this will have a long-term effect of 
requiring significantly more communications to achieve an updated registration [8, 13, 
14, 20]. 
 In addition to the service discovery protocols mentioned so far, there exist 
discovery protocols that are designed exclusively for routing purposes. Similar in nature 
to the SDPs for finding services, routing-based discovery protocols ensure that a network 
has routable links from point to point such that no node is isolated. Why should we look 
at routing-based discovery protocols when well-defined methods exist for SDPs? Routing 
on MANETs is a well-studied field that has yielded many accepted and standardized 
methods. AODV and DSR, for instance, form cornerstones of on-demand routing in 
which routes are not established until required by the network. Other strategies feature 
continuous updates, such as the advertising schemes seen for SDPs. There exist three 
main categories for routing protocols [22, 83]: Unicast, Multicast, and Broadcast. For 
simplicity and to stay relevant to future discussion, we will briefly cover the Unicast 
category here for perspective. 
Unicast Routing 
 A unicast routing protocol is designed to allow for transmission of data from 
source to destination on a one-to-one basis. A node routes traffic from its origin along 
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various other connected nodes, referred to as hops. As a data packet proceeds from source 
to destination, information contained in the packet header is used to determine to which 
neighboring node the packet should proceed. Protocols such as TCP/IP utilize the unicast 
routing method. Unicasting is applicable to the vast majority of networks, which are 
based on relationships between producers and consumers of data.  
 Unicast routing algorithms can be subdivided into two categories governing their 
operation. The first is that of proactive routing. Proactive routing requires topological 
updates to occur periodically to refresh information contained in routing tables. This is 
similar to internet-based routing that occurs on traditional, hierarchical, general-purpose 
networks, especially those based on 802.3 and 802.11 operating in infrastructure mode. 
Proactive routing is similar in its update requirement as the advertising SDP registration 
mechanism. Since routes are accessed more frequently and more diversely than resource-
to-consumer mappings found in SDPs, maintaining freshness of the routing tables takes 
on a new importance, and thus is likely to make proactive routing largely unsuitable for 
MANET applications. However, there exist some proactive methods which are designed 
to reduce the amount of traffic seen over the ad hoc network. One of these, the Optimized 
Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [26] uses extremely local flooding broadcasts of one 
hop in length. Nodes with special routing functions, called Multipoint Distribution 
Relays, are responsible for providing routing information to associated nodes in such a 
way that not all nodes need immediate knowledge of the large-scale network topology 
[22, 65]. Another approach, called the Topology Broadcast Based on Reverse-Path 
Forwarding Routing Protocol reduces the size of node and route update transmissions, 
and their frequency by only transmitting changes instead of complete, full sets of the 
53 
 
routing tables. In cases of significant mobility, the TBRPF method can switch to a more 
intensive flooding method to assure that all nodes are properly represented [19, 20, 22, 
65]. 
Reactive Protocols 
 In contrast to proactive routing, reactive routing protocols are on-demand 
protocols that flood the network whenever a transmission is needed. This is useful in two 
cases: (1) for highly mobile networks, where flooding will, over the long run, consume 
less bandwidth than constant updates every time proximity relationships change, and (2) 
for networks in which the average rate of communication is relatively low. MANETs 
utilizing the 802.15.4-2006 protocol largely favor this routing protocol [22]. In the 
process of determining the route, two events take place. The first, route discovery, occurs 
as a result of needing to find the route. The second, route maintenance, occurs once a 
connection is established, typically over TCP, to prevent mobility from causing service 
discontinuities.  
 The most common implementation of the reactive routing protocols is the Ad Hoc 
On Demand Distance Vector Routing protocol, or AODV [84], developed by Nokia, the 
University of California Santa Barbara, and the University of Cincinnati. This protocol 
attempts to reduce overhead traffic and variable overflows in state storage that existed 
with prior proactive systems, such as DSDV. AODV sends a Route Request (RREQ) 
packet through the network by means of a packet flood. Upon receiving RREQ packets, 
temporary reverse routes are created from receiving nodes to the originating node. By 
definition, these routes are valid routes. Routes that resolve to the destination then reply 
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through these channels with a Route Reply (RREP) packet, sent in the reverse direction 
(i.e., back toward the originating node). RREPs also establish routes in the reverse 
direction. RREP routes that coincide with RREQ routes therefore form the basis for valid 
routes. Of these routes, the shortest (i.e., the route with the least number of hops or 
intermediate nodes between source and destination) is selected. Once the route is 
established, periodic maintenance messages are sent along the route. If at any point 
acknowledgements to the maintenance messages are not received, the route is 
invalidated. Should route recovery be unsuccessful in re-establishing the route, it is 
removed from the routing list. Thus, AODV fulfills routing discovery and maintenance 
objectives.  
 Multicast and Broadcast networks are high-traffic solutions to routing problems, 
and are optimized for systems in which one source or producer has multiple consumers. 
Some proposed methods include modification of AODV to broadcast route maintenance 
measures rather than single neighbor-to-neighbor updates, which would reduce the need 
for overhead associated with individual connections. Because of bandwidth concerns, this 
dissertation will not focus on multicast and broadcast routing methods as possible 
solutions to the task-to-resource allocation problem. 
 Now let us combine what we have discussed by analyzing similarities and 
differences between Service Discovery Protocols and Routing Discovery protocols. Both 
provide a framework for uniting one or more producers with one or more consumers on a 
one-to-one or many-to-one basis. In the case of an SDP, this is a service that is provided 
by a node on the mobile ad hoc network, and requested by an end user or another node on 
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the network. For routing discovery, a relationship is defined by network-layer routing that 
must be established between the nodes such that an originating node may establish 
communications with a destination node. The consumer, in this case, is the node 
requesting the route. Both types of protocols make clear distinctions between flood-based 
discovery and a maintenance or local broadcast strategy. However, SDPs and Routing 
Discovery Protocols (RDPs) have a distinct difference, which lies in the layer at which 
they operate. For the case of the RDP, routing is performed at the network layer. For a 
large part, this is a process that is completely transparent to the application layer and to 
the system in general. In contrast, SDPs focus almost exclusively on finding services at 
the application layer. SDPs assume the existence of connectivity and routing. Thus, an 
SDP may depend on an RDP, but not vice versa. 
 
Tasks and Resources 
 Earlier, this dissertation mentioned some basic questions regarding the usage of 
SDPs and routing discovery protocols as possible solutions to the proposed resource 
allocation challenge for MANETs. Clearly, there exist multiple protocols that are 
mobility-aware, or can be adapted to mobility scenarios. As seen by SDPs, there already 
exist frameworks for finding services for nodes that are proceeding through the discovery 
process. What then, is the proposed research attempting to accomplish? The key 
difference between the method in Chapter IV and the function provided by SDPs is that 
in the proposed method, the consumers are tasks, which may span multiple nodes. An 
SDP matches an application-level service with an application-level consumer, such as a 
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notebook computer with a printer. To understand the difference, we must investigate the 
concept of tasks and how they fit into the picture.  
The term resource pool,   will 
now be introduced to define a set or 
subset of resources held or serviced by 
nodes on a MANET. A global 
resource pool,  !, is the space 
containing all resource pools such that 
 !  " | $,   …  & ∀ ( ∈ ). There are 
two perspectives by which a resource pool 
can be identified. The first is the resource 
pools as nodes with respect to resources, 
and the second is resources with respect to 
nodes. This dissertation will use the 
second method primarily, as it allows finer 
granularity of the resources available to each node. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the 
difference. For the most part, a pool   will be seen as a resource pool corresponding to 
one node i, while a pool  ∩ represents a pool that is the intersection of resources 
provided by the two nodes i and j.  
 A resource pool allows us to efficiently understand the availability of resources at 
any given time t during the operation of a MANET. The proper visualization of such 
pools is essential to understanding how resource availability evolves during task 
 
Figure 7 - Node pool with respect to resources 
 
Figure 8 - Resource pool with respect to nodes 
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execution in a MANET. Resource pools may also be empty, in which case it will be 
referred to as a null pool, or  ∅. This case represents an occurrence in which a node or 
nodes has no available resources at the given time. It may be the result of initialization, 
an error condition, or a termination state, or may simply represent a normal transition 
state. This dissertation will not use null pools as constant objects, since they represent 
inefficient or useless nodes that do not change over the course of the MANET's task 
execution environment, and are therefore not relevant. Null pools represent a node or a 
set of nodes in a non-interacting state with respect to resource allocation. 
 A resource pool π is comprised of nodes containing one or more resource 
elements ,. Each resource is therefore indirectly a member of one or more resource 
pools. Because this dissertation will focus on node-level interactions and resource 
allocation, each resource will be expressed as a tuple ,(,) where i indicates the resource 
number and j indicates the node to which the resource corresponds. In the case where a 
resource is present across multiple nodes (such as a shared resource), this will be 
identified with a brace in the second component of the tuple, containing the node 
numbers. 
 A resource is empirically defined as a hardware or software component that may 
be atomically applied to fill a basic need. Resources might include an imaging sensor, a 
thermocouple, a motor (though it and other resources are comprised of different elements, 
these elements are not within the scope of the application and therefore the resource is 
still considered atomic), a digital signal processor, a web server application, or a 
relational database. Each resource is used and implemented to solve an integral part of a 
problem. 
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 Because this dissertation will focus on two problems, one of which is an 
allocation problem, we must consider the possibility of a resource that is desired or 
required but unavailable to any node. Such a resource will be referred to as a null 
resource, denoted by ,(,∅) since it corresponds to the set of nodes containing the empty 
set. The null resource will be used during the theoretical and algorithmic solutions to the 
resource allocation problem. A unity pool is defined as a resource pool in which only one 
resource exists. By definition of a resource, this also implies that a unity pool also 
contains one node, as a resource must be represented by at least one node. 
Tasks and resource mapping 
 A task is a process or consumer that requires one or more resources over time to 
accomplish an objective. An objective is an overall purpose that a system accomplishes. 
A task is a subset of an objective. As an example, an objective for the Spirit and 
Opportunity Mars Exploration Rovers might be to identify the presence of water on Mars. 
In order to accomplish this objective, tasks must be performed that lead to the desired 
conclusion or termination of the objective. For instance, soil samples must be analyzed 
with a Mössbauer spectrometer onboard the rovers in order to determine their 
composition. Prior to soil and rock analysis, the robots might utilize their Rock Abrasion 
Tool (RAT) to loosen samples of minerals from rocks and other formations. Each one of 
these operations is a task, T, such that / ⊂ 1 ∀ ( ∈ )2, where O is the objective, and )2 
is the number of tasks present on the system. A task is a comprised of one or more 
subtasks, 3. The differentiation between a task and a subtask is important: a subtask is 
assigned to only one node, and therefore has access to a resource pool that is confined by 
that node only. Using the Mars rover example, the mineralogical examination represents 
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the main task. The subtasks are allocated to individual nodes; one robot might be 
responsible for using its rock abrasion tool and perhaps a manipulator, while another 
performs the analysis with the Mössbauer spectrometer and the alpha particle X-ray 
spectrometer [64]. (In practice, the current MER nodes operate independently. Their joint 
cooperation is listed solely as an example.)  
 A subtask is comprised of atoms. An atom is defined as the most fine-grained 
element of a subtask that can be mapped to one and only one resource. A subtask may be 
composed of several atoms, indicating that multiple resources on one node are 
responsible for executing the subtask. Alternately, the subtask may only be comprised of 
one atom. An example of an atom is the individual execution of the Mössbauer 
spectrometer’s evaluation. Its operation is independent of the alpha-particle X-ray 
spectrometer. Given this terminology, we may now take a look at allocation and 
reallocation processes and proposed solutions. 
(Re)allocation of resources 
 The allocation of resources represents a complete mapping of resources to tasks 
such that all the individual subtask atoms are fully populated by node resources. The 
problem presented by this work is two-fold. First, an initial allocation must occur, which 
provides the first mapping between tasks and resource pools in an efficient manner. This 
is an optimization problem, where an objective, comprised of tasks and subtasks yields a 
set of solutions depending on the level of redundancy of node clones, virtual node clones, 
or shared and share-able resources available at the beginning of task execution. The 
optimal selection of this solution depends on four main factors.  
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1.) Spatial organization: this parameter is used for optimizing task allocation such 
that nodes involved in communication between subtasks are physically proximate 
to each other. Two nodes that must communicate over multiple hops would cause 
overhead that might be avoided by having them be nearest neighbors.  
2.) Employing redundancy: A well-designed MANET should be created with a 
certain risk assessment in mind. If it is estimated a-priori that the network will 
experience frequent node failures, attacks, or both, it may be useful to solve the 
optimization problem with a set amount of redundancy factored in. This can be 
achieved by increasing the number of resources and/or nodes, and then adjusting 
the spatial organization solution to accommodate the extra resources without 
creating unnecessary routing and communications overhead.  
3.) Traffic frequency analysis: When considering an overall solution, let us briefly 
invoke the differences between flood-based SDP searches and node 
update/advertisement methods. The solution to the problem should reflect the 
amount of expected traffic on the network. Flooding might be more useful for 
low-traffic situations, while periodic updates are more useful for high-traffic 
networks, in which the updates will reflect a minor percentage of the actual 
communications throughput.  
4.) Mobility requirements: Again, invoking the SDP discussion, understanding the 
degree of mobility between the nodes, and possible randomness of the motion is 
necessary to choose a protocol that is both resilient and efficient. The initial 
allocation may be performed a-priori and in a static manner, or dynamically 
according to a selected protocol or set of protocols.  
61 
 
Triggering the reallocation process 
 Once the initial allocation has completed, we can look at the main objective of 
this research: how to reallocate tasks to resources in the event of attack or node failures. 
Once a failure or attack takes place, a triggering mechanism must be in place to: (1) 
detect the absence or compromised state of a node, (2) begin the distributed reallocation 
process when appropriate or necessary, (3) suspend tasks that cannot execute due to 
incomplete or impossible mappings (resources that cannot be reliably re-allocated) and 
lastly, (4) re-trigger the re-allocation process upon either receiving newer replacement 
resources, or identifying that the failed or attacked nodes are once again fit to resume 
operation, in order to achieve an optimal allocation that is equal in performance to the 
initial dynamic or a priori allocation.  
 Given our previous discussion on intrusion detection technology (Chapter III), we 
can assume that triggering might be initiated by a distributed IDS engine present on 
multiple device nodes. At the point where anomalous behavior is detected, one or more 
nodes may trigger the removal of a compromised device. Once this occurs, depending on 
the reallocation algorithm in place, one or more nodes must then assume the process of 
regulating the discovery process. For some protocols, this is handled by a dedicated node. 
Of course, the downside to this is that the dedicated node may also fail, leaving the 
reallocation algorithm in trouble – even if more than one dedicated node exists. 
Alternately, a node may assume the responsibility on-demand, based on conditions 
present at the time. For instance, a node that is currently interacting with a compromised 
node may be the de-facto arbitrator of the reallocation process, as it is the first to need 
resources that are no longer available. There may also exist a further distinction between 
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the nodes responsible for identifying the compromised node and the nodes that perform 
the reallocation arbitration. Basu et al. base their system’s triggering on a disconnect 
detection method; no IDS is present. The first node needing the resource or route 
becomes the coordinating node [80]. 
Reallocation Performance Metrics 
 Let us briefly consider some metrics that may be useful in determining the 
efficiency of a reallocation method. Some of these have been mentioned previously. The 
time to allocation is the first metric. This must be viewed in the context of other 
allocation methods as a comparison metric. The circumstances of the network’s 
simulation should be identical. This metric is evaluated as a time in seconds to 
reallocation from the start of the triggering process until the replacement resource is 
engaged in execution. The second metric used here is network utilization, i.e., how many 
messages are required to instantiate the replacement resource? This dissertation chooses 
to use a message instead of packets in order to remove network-layer protocols from 
consideration. For instance, a protocol based on TCP/IP will inherently generate more 
packets for connection stability instead of one based on UDP. Thus, comparing them on 
packets would produce results that do not yield a representative comparison. A message 
is defined as a transaction from one node to another that contains information pertaining 
to discovery, resource requests, and/or discovered nodes. 
 Analyzing the number of messages leads us to the third metric: percent overhead. 
As mentioned earlier, the efficiency and performance penalties of a discovery search 
method must be viewed in terms of the overall communications activity on the network. 
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The same applies for a reallocation protocol. Reduction in the overhead ratio can be used 
to easily compare the efficiency of multiple protocol solutions.  
 There are two existing fields of task allocation and reallocation in existence as of 
the time of this writing. The first is that of Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), proposed 
by Kennedy and Eberhart [85]. PSO represents a chaotic and randomized form of 
allocating consumers to producers by representing producers as objects on a two-
dimensional grid. Spatial coordinates are representative of the organization on the 
network or system. The consumers are particles that move around the map in a clustered, 
yet chaotic manner. Each particle is given an extremely basic behavior, which is copied 
to all the various consumer particles. Because of randomization, all the particles behave 
slightly differently, but act together, similar to a flock of birds over a corn field [85, 86]. 
By utilizing these simplified behavioral movement models (often encoded by a single 
function governing its movement, expressed as one or two lines of high-level 
programming code), the system eventually settles on a solution.  
 PSO is not designed for use explicitly for MANETs. Since MANET nodes are 
generally operating as hard real-time systems, there is little room for a non-deterministic 
method like PSO. It is simply used as a reference for a randomized swarming allocation 
method. An extension to the PSO algorithm is proposed by Yin et al. that adds update 
models to add what the author calls exploitation – which can be seen as a further 
optimization of the solution once a solution is found [86]. The other model presented here 
is by P. Basu et al., called the Task Graph model [80]. It is a solution for service-oriented 
systems in which a consumer enters a network and requires a resource. The system can 
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detect disconnected communications using periodic update signals. Its algorithm requires 
network traversals and transmission of a task graph from node to node. The Task Graph 
model also identifies suitable replacement resources in case of node failure. It is capable 
of transmitting search requests through the entire network if necessary, and utilizes a 
shared information structure that is sent to neighboring nodes in order to reconfigure the 
network topology.  
 The shared structure in the Task Graph model is essentially a tree of nodes (i.e., 
system nodes) with dataflow edges that represent services between system nodes. The 
process of allocation and task graph generation is called embedding. Once a valid 
network representation is formed, identifying services and flow between nodes that offer 
them, a breadth-first-search algorithm is used to optimize the shape of the tree to reduce 
its complexity. The search is facilitated by local coordinator nodes. Figure 9 shows the 
Basu et al.’s representation of the embedding mechanism. 
 
Figure 9 - P. Basu et al.'s Task Graph discovery method [80] 
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 The Task Graph mechanism detects when a node disconnects if a node is unable 
to access a resource specified in the system model. At this point, the task graph must be 
reinstantiated, and the updated model must be retransmitted to neighboring nodes so that 
the system model remains complete. Figures 10 and 11 show the authors’ visual 
representations of how this is executed. 
 
Figure 10 - P. Basu et al.'s Task Graph model service interruption [80] 
 
Figure 11 - P. Basu et al.'s Task Graph method node recovery [80] 
 Now that we have explored topics of security, fault tolerance, and discovery, let 
us turn our attention to ways of implementing discovery approaches into creating a fault-
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tolerant networking atmosphere using techniques of resource reallocation, triggering, and 
principles of MANETs. The work in this chapter forms the basis of the fault-tolerant 
methodology [54] integrated into the developed system found in Chapter VIII. This 
scheme is called a Dynamic Apt Resource Transference System (DARTS) and is based 
on the concept of resource fitness. Let us analyze briefly what resource fitness is and how 
it fits into the scheme of DARTS. 
DARTS: Fitness 
 With reference to the concept of a resource, described in Chapter III, a fit resource 
is defined as one that conforms to or meets the requirements of a task (or as a component 
of a compound resource) within a certain tolerance. For the sake of discussion, as well as 
for an analysis of the implemented methodology, the tolerance is represented by a 
maximum value in a set of integers from zero to  where at most  = max (#89:3), or 
simply the value 9 on a scale from 0 to 9, so as to present a logical arrangement of 
fitness. These tolerance values are referred to as fitness scores, with a score of zero 
indicating that a node containing a relevant resource is completely unqualified to be a 
suitable replacement. An ideal fitness score is . It is possible (and necessary to preserve 
equality, in some instances) for two or more nodes with relevant resources to share the 
same fitness score for their respective resources. This is especially the case on 
homogeneous networks in which nodes are identical in features and systems. Scores can 
vary not only based on the properties of the resources in question, but also based on 
proximity. For example, if a resource is sought and proximity is paramount, two 
identically-equipped nodes may have different fitness scores if one node is farther from 
the requesting node. 
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Resource Caching 
 As mentioned in Chapter IV, there exist two main methods of search discovery. 
The first is flooding [8, 9](also called on-demand), in which a node requesting a resource 
initiates a search that propagates to the rest of the network through a series of forwarded 
messages from node to node until the end of the network is reached. The second method, 
gossip [8, 9], requires that member nodes perform update requests from time to time 
between nearest neighbors (single-hop), which in turn updates routing and resource 
tables. Over time, information is distributed between nearest node sets and eventually, 
most nodes either contain or have access to a table wherein resources are properly 
defined.  
 The method investigated in this dissertation demonstrates a hybridization between 
the two processes, ideally combining the strengths of the two methods while drawing on 
both to minimize their disadvantages. By understanding a network at its application 
scope, we can identify components that help us to differentiate resources specifically 
within their operational concept, as outlined by the fitness scores. This is done through a 
component called the resource fitness cache.  
 As nodes interact on a regular basis, requiring resources from each other at either 
regular or irregular intervals, information about the resources being shared can be used to 
an advantage. Therefore, during the normal course of network interaction, each node 
populates and/or updates a fitness cache, which is a structure containing the resources and 
fitness scores of nearest neighbors (in this case, nearest neighbors are interacting pairs – 
other resource interdependencies may exist, e.g., between two non-directly-connected 
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nodes, but for the sake of cache coherency and freshness, these resources are not included 
in the cache) with information about the neighbors’ resources and fitness scores. This 
method may appear similar to a gossip method, and in principle, it shares many common 
components. However, gossip protocols inherently have an update overhead – meaning 
that traditional gossip protocols consume network bandwidth with additional update 
information, not just data germane to the operation of the distributed task [8]. By 
incorporating information readily available during networked transactions and 
interdependence, the requirement for network overhead for the fitness cache method is 
eliminated. To avoid issues with stale data (i.e., data in the cache that is no longer 
accurate due to changes in network topology and resource availability), entries in the 
cache are aged. Beyond a certain age, cache entries are purged. However, because 
interactions are continuously occurring, the entries can be refreshed provided that an 
interaction has occurred recently to update an older entry. This ensures that frequent 
operations (and likely important ones due to their high level of occurrence) always have 
the freshest, most up-to-date entries in the cache. The purging age is determined 
dynamically during runtime, and is dictated by factors such as network size, mean 
message frequency, and degree of interconnectivity; primarily though, communication 
rate is the overarching factor that should be considered in network design. The aging 
protocol needs to be assessed for each target application; however, a general set of 
guidelines can be used: For critical systems that cannot afford invalid cache entries, 
entries should be purged if inter-node communication frequency has dropped below the 
mean communication frequency; If 20 nodes communicate at 4 Hz, and if a 
communications cycle is missed between a node pair, the cache should immediately go 
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invalid for whichever nodes have gone out of communication. Of course, for systems 
with irregular communications intervals, instead of using a unity scalar for number of 
absent communications cycles, this could be increased linearly. Ultimately, response time 
is based on the candidate application, and implemented by the IDS mechanism. Even if 
the caches are flushed too frequently to be of use in mitigating flood propagation, the 
resulting reallocation search cannot drop below the efficiency of the baseline, un-cached 
search.  
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Finding a Fit Resource 
 Now that the concept of fit resource caching has been introduced, let us then 
examine how DARTS proceeds to overcome node failures and reallocate resources. 
Figure 12 shows a network consisting of 5 nodes. One of the nodes, labeled 5, is drawn 
with a dotted line. This indicates that the node has either failed or is in the process of 
failing, either due to environmental concerns or a malicious attack. Its resources are 1, 5, 
and 7, and are represented in a blue table next to it. Tables in green are resource fitness 
caches. Note that the malfunctioning node also has a green fitness cache, meaning that it 
too was caching the fitness of other nodes’ resources during the course of normal network 
interactions until it became compromised. The triplets in the cache indicate (node 
number, resource ID, fitness score) for each node’s resources. 
 Next to it, Node 4 requires a resource that Node 5 was providing. At this point, 
there is a discrepancy between 
available resources and consuming 
tasks, assigned to the nodes. The 
minimum impact of this scenario, 
according to terminology defined 
in Chapter IV, is that an atom (an 
individual operation assigned to 
one resource on one node) can no 
longer execute, which therefore 
threatens the execution of a subtask (assigned to one node). At the task level, (assigned to 
more than one node) execution may not be immediately threatened due to sequential 
Figure 12 - A sample network with resources (blue) and fitness 
caches (green) 
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ordering of subtasks. In fact, a particular subtask may be called only as a contingency 
method, with a statistically improbable chance of being executed. However, for the sake 
of reliability concerns, it is assumed that any failure of an atomic operation and 
corresponding subtask is a threat to the operation of a general task, and therefore a threat 
to the overall objective.  
 Depending on the organization and population of the network, there is a 
reasonable probability that there exists resource redundancy somewhere on the network. 
For instance, a collective of autonomous aircraft may possess multiple ground-scanning 
radar modules, all of which may or may not be in use at the time of the resource disparity. 
The probability of a network having a possible replacement resource, therefore, is 
contingent on the size of the network and whether or not nodes are homogeneous (highest 
probability of a replacement resource), heterogeneous (moderate probability) or strictly 
heterogeneous (meaning that there is no resource redundancy – minimal probability of 
finding a replacement resource.) Note that in the strictly heterogeneous case, it is still 
possible to find a fit replacement resource, though it may not be an identical replacement 
resource.  
 To exploit the inherent redundancy in a MANET, Node 4, which was consuming 
a resource from the now-defunct Node 5, issues a flooding search request to determine 
whether or not fit replacement resources exist. The flood is begun with a message, called 
a Transference Inquiry Packet (TIP). Each TIP contains four information fields known as 
TIPlets: (1) the requested resource identifier (resources are categorized by integer types, 
which are known prior to run time), (2) the minimum required fitness score, (3) the 
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originating node identifier, and (4) the failed node identifier. Each one of these identifiers 
is used to allow receiving nodes to understand for what resources they should poll their 
cache, where a cache hit should be directed (the source of the flood’s origin – the 
arbitrator), and, likely as important, what node is NOT available – the node containing 
resources that the originating node is attempting to reallocate. The failed node identifier 
issues a particular request directly to the resource fitness cache (called a cache manager) 
to purge the failed node from its cache. This way, cache coherence, in terms of removing 
invalid nodes, is assured throughout the network. Because requests are received prior to 
searching caches and forwarding requests, caches are purged without the possibility of a 
false positive. The node that initiates the TIP flood becomes the arbitrator node, and is 
responsible for managing the resource reallocation itself, once necessary information is 
returned from the rest of the network regarding available fit resources. An additional, 
optional fifth TIPlet includes a unique sequence number that corresponds to a particular 
occurrence of a resource search flood; all TIPs during the course of that search process 
will possess the same sequence number, which is then incremented once the next flood is 
initiated. This allows for proper distinction of different search TIPs, which aids in the 
mitigation of forwarded traffic. 
 When a node receives a TIP, it first checks its resource fitness cache to see 
whether there are up-to-date entries that may correspond to a neighbor with containing a 
fit resource, based on the criteria contained in the TIPlets. There are two outcomes to this 
search. A positive cache hit resolution indicates that the receiving node has identified a 
replacement resource, negating the need for further TIP propagation at that node to 
further nodes to which it is connected. Upon resolution of a cache hit, the node then 
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returns a notification of a found resource, and sends it by the network’s routing protocols 
back to the originating arbitrator node, as identified in the originating node TIPlet. In 
addition, each node receiving a TIP stores the arbitrator’s node number in memory, 
should these nodes eventually require the use of the failed resource; instead of issuing a 
new reallocation flood for each node that required a failed resource, the original search’s 
arbitrator can be polled for the solution it found with an on-demand basis. The sequence 
number is important in this regard, as during the arbitrator polling process, the search’s 
sequence number is used to inform the arbitrator which result to return, in case the 
arbitrator acted as the search initiator for multiple resource reallocations. 
 Alternately, should the node’s fitness cache return a miss (i.e., indicating that 
either no matching resources are found, or that a matching resource exists, but of 
insufficient fitness required by the arbitrator node, and therefore the original task), then 
the original TIP is re-broadcast to all of the receiver nodes’ neighbors, with the exception 
of the node from which the TIP was received prior to the cache search. Figure 13 
demonstrates visually how cache hits and misses resolve. Nodes in green indicate 
positive cache hit, while nodes in red are nodes that have 
received TIPs, checked their caches, and found no suitable 
replacement resources among their neighbors as indicated 
in the cache. Blue nodes are nodes that were not reached 
during the reallocation flood due to caching efficiency 
gains. These nodes then forward the TIPs onward. In 
Figure 13 - A completed cached 
traversal 
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addition, in order to prevent re-broadcasting of TIPs to and from nodes that have already 
performed a cache search, nodes with cache misses become insensitive, meaning that 
further TIPs for that particular resource request will be subsequently ignored.  
 Once the arbitrator has received one or more returned resources within a timeout 
value, it begins assessment of the ideal resource based on replies. Although it may seem 
tempting to simply choose a found resource that has the highest fitness score, other 
factors must be considered before arriving at a final decision. Primarily, the arbitrator 
must decide whether or not a replacement resource is a sound choice, when considering 
network complexity. Therefore, the number of hops from the node containing a potential 
replacement resource back to the arbitrator is used to weigh the fitness scores. As an 
example, a node containing a replacement resource with score 6 (minimum 5) that is 2 
hops away from the arbitrator (recalling that the arbitrator node is whichever node is first 
and foremost in need of the replacement resource) might be chosen as a more feasible 
replacement instead of another node with fitness score 7 that is 4 hops away. The system 
functions according to the following pseudocode example: 
if ( detect resource failure) 
 send TIP 
 while (no replies) 
  wait 
 for all replies 
  check for highest fitness score 
  accept resource with highest score 
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 The first justification for this weighting method might seem obvious – time and 
overhead mitigation. However, a second and more subtle point must be made that is in 
line with MANET resource constraints presented in Chapter II. Overall battery life will 
be significantly altered if more nodes are required to route information between two 
distant points. If instead, two resources are more locally positioned, then the traffic will 
require fewer hops, stressing fewer radios, and requiring less overall battery power.  
 In the event that the arbitrator receives no messages after the timeout value, the 
arbitrator must decide whether or not a subtask, task, or the entire objective must be 
suspended. The timeout value is determined by the maximum amount of time taken to 
send a packet over the longest possible path from the arbitrator to the most distant 
endpoint and back, plus a certain padding factor to account for high network traffic, 
cache lookup times, forwarding delays, and other node processing concerns. The level of 
granularity and overall impact of the unavailable and unreallocatable resource determines 
whether a subtask, task, or objective is suspended. For instance, if a collection of nodes is 
performing distributed sensing, and one particular resource is involved in optimization of 
the sensing efficiency, it is conceivable that the MANET could continue to achieve its 
objective despite a lack of replacement resources. Therefore, in this case, the 
optimization subtask (or task, if it involves multiple nodes) is suspended. 
 Task suspension must therefore be followed by a reactivation or reinstatement 
mechanism. This can occur automatically in one of two ways. The first case, in which a 
compromised node becomes once more available, may be triggered either by the re-
76 
 
association of the previously-compromised node, or by a timed re-evaluation and re-issue 
of a search flood to see if a node is once more operational. Alternately, reactivation may 
occur if a new resource is added to the MANET, after which the announce and node 
discovery process allows the arbitrator to issue a reallocation and reactivation of the 
suspended task(s). Either case requires a reassessment of available resources on the 
network in order to achieve reactivation or reinstatement. In the case of a node becoming 
available again, the node will then issue the reallocation mechanism itself. Because the 
DARTS reallocation algorithm assesses the fitness of nodes, regardless of whether or not 
they are replacements or the original resource-containing node, the rehabilitated node will 
then assume control once more. Logically, this feature can be enabled or disabled based 
on security concerns of allowing previously potentially-compromised nodes to redirect 
resource utilization. By default, this capability is disabled. In this case, only when a new 
need for resource redundancy occurs, for the same resource, will the rehabilitated node be 
reinstated as the optimal resource solution. This permits DARTS to create deterministic 
reallocation schemes, assuring that given the same set of circumstances, the same 
reallocation procedure will be met, barring unusual conditions on the network.  
Benefits and Limitations 
 Because DARTS is intrinsically uses a flood-based search algorithm, it is 
guaranteed to reach all network nodes if no cached entries are found. This means, from a 
reliability standpoint, that one or more, even all, of the resource fitness caches located on 
each node can fail to operate or be disabled without a loss in the capacity to reallocate 
resources. Of course, the main benefits of DARTS’s caching protocols, namely message 
reduction and decreased reallocation time, are then no longer available. Therefore, the 
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availability and functionality of each resource fitness cache on each node on the MANET 
is critical to the prevention of unneeded TIP propagation. 
 This fact brings up the question of what happens when DARTS-based MANET 
implementations have nodes with incomplete or non-functional fitness caches. Because 
some caches will still be available, the number of messages is still likely reduced, but will 
still be higher than during optimal 
configurations. Ultimately, the position of a 
node with a working cache can determine much 
of the network’s behavior. Consider the network 
shown in Figure 14. In this case, there exists a serial link between two network clusters. 
Supposing that node AC0 in the left-most cluster is attempting to find a resource located 
on node AC4, the cache of node AC3 is key to preventing message requests from 
forwarding to the entirety (or a large part) of the rightmost cluster. Because of this, we 
say that node AC3 controls a critical path. If, instead, the node were not part of a serial 
link, and instead an isolated fringe comprising part of a densely-clustered network, the 
benefits of DARTS’s caching algorithm would be significantly reduced.  
  
Figure 14 - A serially-linked network 
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CHAPTER V 
NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND REALLOCATION EFFICIENCY 
Clustering Density 
 This chapter analyzes how a particular aspect of network topology, known as 
clustering density, affects the speed and efficiency of DARTS. It begins by defining how 
clustering density is derived, and proposes how density can affect the performance of the 
system. Results are later discussed, and implications of other topological impacts on the 
efficiency of DARTS are analyzed. 
This dissertation will analyze clustering density as a means of identifying the 
concentration and distribution of nodes. A segment of the network with high clustering 
density will represent many nodes in close proximity with significant interconnectivity 
among neighbors. A segment with low clustering density will instead be sparsely 
populated, with a higher likelihood of containing serial links. A serial link is a connection 
segment of network topology that has at most two nodes that it connects such that the loss 
of the this link would impair communications between the outer two nodes. Figure 15 
shows an example of various clustering densities. It is important to consider clustering 
density as a criterion for selecting a reallocation protocol because the arrangement of the 
topology will affect how the discovery portion of the protocol operates. Densely 
interconnected nodes can, if flooded at a basic level, generate tremendous amounts of 
redundant traffic. On the other hand, serially-connected network segments can benefit 
from flooding, since it will guarantee network traversal regardless of other factors in the 
implemented algorithm.  
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Figure 15 - Two examples of network clustering densities 
  
Let us define clustering density as a visual and mathematical observation of the 
number of connections (unique radio links) as related to the number of nodes present on 
the MANET within a certain hop radius. Let us define a center node as );, where the 
center node occurs at the geometric center of the MANET. This geometric center is not 
strictly or rigorously-defined, but rather visually identified. It can be considered the point 
closest to which a network, if put on a two-dimensional plane, would balance; its center 
of gravity, if it were so quantifiable. Also, let us refer to )(;<$,) as the (-th nearest 
neighbor node that corresponds to the center node, meaning that it is one hop 
(connection) away from );. We refer to )(;<,) as the =-th nearest neighbor of each 
)(;<$,), such that each )(;<,) is one hop away from )(;<$,) and thus two hops away 
from the center node. In addition to quantifying the nodes themselves, this dissertation 
defines the quantity ; as the number of unique connections or links that are present 
between a center node and its neighbors. Similarly, (;<$,) and (;<,) refer to the 
number of unique links present on nodes one and two hops away from the center node. It 
is important to understand that there cannot exist any duplicate links when all links  are 
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summed. This means that links counted on the center node ; mutually exclude links 
counted from any (;<$,) that represent the same connection. Specifically, clustering 
density is expressed as a density quotient, >?, that is evaluated as:  
>? =
; + ∑ (;<$,) + ∑ (;<,)∗$∗$
); + ∑ )(;<$,) + ∑ )(;<,)$$
 
Due to the mutual exclusivity requirement in counting links, (∗and =∗ are denoted as such 
with an asterisk to imply unique, singly-counted links. This is only true for the number of 
links; the number of nodes will always be unique. The computation of the density 
quotient outlined here is called the two-hop density analysis method, or simply the two-
hop method. An alternative method does not restrict the counting to two hops, and instead 
uses a fractional-exponential weighting mechanism (nearby nodes are weighted higher 
than outlying nodes) – meaning that the density is computed similarly to the two-hop 
method, but instead of stopping at two hops, the entire network is included in 
computations. For each successive hop, individual link/node quotients are weighted 
differently and added to the overall sum. While this method has some advantages, such as 
covering the network extensively, it is subject to both computational difficulty, and 
unequal representation for networks that have skewed center node points.  
 Prior work was done to understand the effectiveness of DARTS on various levels 
of clustering densities, using a unified topology approach [54]. By attempting to 
minimize the changes present in the physical network topology, the research focused on 
understanding the gains that DARTS provides over baseline network cases. It also 
utilized the two-hop method for determining clustering density. The paper showed that 
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Figure 16 (a – left, b – right)- Networks with similar topologies but differing densities 
MANETs with higher clustering density quotients benefitted the most from DARTS, 
since having a working cache mechanism can significantly reduce the spread of messages 
to the rest of the network. An overall reduction of over 40% was shown in some of the 
densest cases. In addition, it was demonstrated that there was an appreciable decrease in 
the amount of time needed to perform a reallocation task, up to 25% on densely-clustered 
networks. This study forms the basis to demonstrate how understanding the network 
density can yield optimal improvements in needed reallocation. 
 The networks represented in this study yield average network scenarios; a worst-
case scenario would be outlined by a network with only serial links. A best-case scenario, 
on the other hand, would be represented by any network layout in which the replacement 
resource is located within one hop. 
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 Let us see how clustering density affects network throughput in a generic case. 
Figures 16 shows different networks with similar topologies but 
with disparate density quotients. The number of links present in 
the second network is reduced. From a logical standpoint, we 
could deduce that the second network presents a “less-dense” 
connectivity profile. Figure 16a shows a clustering density of 
2.88, as computed by the approach mentioned earlier. Figure 16b presents a clustering 
density of 1.60 – a configuration in which nodes are at a “square” position with only links 
at normal angles (no diagonal cross-connections.) Figure 17 shows a network of density 
1.28. In all of these cases, denser networks experience an improvement in reallocation 
times, as well as the number of messages required. Table 1 shows a list of clustering 
densities, the improvement in the number of messages, and the associated speedup. Note 
that there exist some unusual variations; one would expect a linear decrease in 
reallocation efficiency using DARTS as network density decreases, and more serial links 
are present. However, the discrepancy is likely in part due to undesired topological 
changes that will occur as the number of links is decreased; while a configuration may 
look like a square, it may not actually be a square shape when arranged in terms of 
logical links. This indicates that topology is an important factor in reallocation, capable 
of redefining performance in terms of expected values. 
 
 
Figure 17 - A network with 
density of 1.28 
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Table 1- Raw cached and uncached results 
Density 
Baseline 
Messages 
CachedMs
g BaseTime 
CachedTim
e 
%MessageImproveme
nt Speedup 
2.88-inward 113 57 0.598 0.346 49.56 1.73 
2.88-outward 118 103 0.685 0.356 12.71 1.92 
2.64-inward 103 63 0.609 0.374 38.83 1.63 
2.64-outward 106 93 0.430 0.226 12.26 1.90 
2.56-inward 101 73 0.918 0.498 27.72 1.84 
2.56-outward 103 90 0.894 0.597 12.62 1.50 
2.52-inward 98 55 0.722 0.291 43.88 2.48 
2.52-outward 100 88 0.621 0.376 12.00 1.65 
2.24-inward 83 53 0.526 0.265 36.14 1.99 
2.24-outward 86 75 0.611 0.343 12.79 1.78 
1.92-inward 85 62 0.900 0.612 27.06 1.47 
1.92-outward 87 80 0.783 0.687 8.05 1.14 
1.60-inward 53 41 0.969 0.753 22.64 1.29 
1.60-outward 55 51 1.068 0.794 7.27 1.35 
1.44-inward 46 38 1.122 0.826 17.39 1.36 
1.44-outward 48 46 1.285 0.839 4.17 1.53 
1.28-inward 54 40 0.770 0.597 25.93 1.29 
1.28-outward 55 51 0.982 0.601 7.27 1.63 
 
 Conditions marked “in” (shaded in light orange) refer to tests where a reallocation 
request originated at a fringe (near the outside of the network), while “out” refer to 
allocation requests originating from the geometric center and radiating outward. For 
purposes of discussion, and for data that makes more sense in terms of the application 
described in Chapter VI, we will analyze the “in” results. The “in” networks were 
generated by selecting the node at the geometric center because this would generate the 
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most traffic from a reallocation flood. Experimental results indicated that locating the 
start point for the “out” reallocation benefitted more from topological concerns than from 
the efficiency of DARTS as directly related to clustering densities. In order to have all 
network simulations be identical in their staring points, the center starting point was 
preserved. Figure 18 shows the improvement in the number of required messages for the 
“in” case, and Figure 19 shows the related speedup. 
 
Figure 18 - Improvement in number of messages using DARTS over a variety of network densities 
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Figure 19 - Improvement in speedup using DARTS over a variety of network densities 
While some of the results are unexpectedly non-linear, topological concerns seem to alter 
these results. If some of the unusual results are discarded, there appears a general linear 
trend from minimum to maximum density. The reasoning for the unusual peaks is simple: 
although serial links are generally conducive to worse performance, in some cases, 
networks will experience certain types of serial links that actually stem the propagation of 
TIPs to other portions of the networks. When examining the networks showing a higher 
response, this is the case. 
Combining DARTS with a Triggering Method 
 As mentioned briefly in Chapter III, a holistic approach to security is preferable to 
any method involving only one aspect of computer security; if a system only decides to 
implement passive encryption methods, it will be vulnerable if or when sufficient 
techniques are developed to circumvent this static technology. Alternately, systems that 
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are only based on intrusion detection technologies are vulnerable because passive 
encryption plays an important part as a deterrent to intrusions. And, of course, a system 
based only on intrusion response cannot exist without at least the detection component. 
For this reason, this dissertation advocates a combined approach to intrusion prevention 
that integrates passive encryption (which for reasons of scope is assumed to be 
functional, even if imperfect) with an intrusion response methodology – a resource-aware 
intrusion detection technology that serves as a triggering mechanism for the resource 
reallocation method that we have outlined in this chapter. Such an integrated approach 
offers several benefits, such as being able to detect and correct for attacks and failures 
before they cause system downtime due to resource or node failure. In addition, detection 
can be used as a tool for optimizing system design, allowing network failures to be 
quantified and applied towards improving the network’s connectivity and methods of 
operation. 
 Primarily, there exists overlap between the cryptographic/obfuscation methods 
and the intrusion response mechanism. Therefore, the failure of either system is in itself 
not conducive to imminent systems breach, unless the failures are connected (e.g., as the 
result of a sophisticated attack). Secondly, encryption and detection/response operate on 
distinctly different components of the host system. While encryption serves as a 
standalone component designed to work with the communications infrastructure, 
intrusion detection and response are application-aware and thus work on a different level 
independently of the passive prevention phase. From a fault-tolerance perspective, this is 
preferable both from the security perspective (i.e., neither systems have shared data, 
preventing an attack from simultaneously disabling both components) and from an 
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error/failure mitigation perspective (i.e., a fault or bug in one system, due to lack of 
shared data or global variables will not affect the stability of the other, barring a kernel 
panic.) Lastly, overlap is useful in case one system or another is unable to protect or 
identify a threat; the probability that an attack both disables an encryption method AND 
is capable of going undetected by an IDS is improbable (with the exception of internal 
malicious modification of runtimes or compiled source code). 
Limitations of the Triggered DARTS Approach 
 Any good developer will freely acknowledge potential limitations of a system, 
and this author is no exception. The reallocation method, for instance, is dependent on the 
triggering method selected. In the case of this dissertation’s intended implementation, 
triggering is based on two components. The first method examines both radio power level 
monitoring and packet retransmit requests. By monitoring dropped packets, and the 
subsequent modification of the radio’s power level to attempt to compensate, one of two 
things is likely happening: (1) a physical barrier or range limitation is occurring, and one 
of the two nodes will soon drop communications, or (2) the network is being jammed. By 
monitoring subsequent increases versus packet drops, a basic profile and signature can be 
assembled, which can then trigger reallocation. 
 The second triggering method implemented is based on the author’s prior work in 
lightweight distributed intrusion detection technologies. In this case, we can identify 
statistical events related to the system’s application layer. In [28, 29], which describe the 
multi-stage IDS called HybrIDS, there exist two complementary methods for detecting 
anomalies at the application layer. Instead of relying on signature-based detection 
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schemes in which compute-heavy packet analysis is necessary, application-layer scope 
allows the IDS to reduce its dependency on data collection and, like the reallocation 
method specified in DARTS, is based on device-to-device interaction.  
 In the case of a triggering implementation using HybrIDS, there are some unique 
benefits as opposed to utilizing other IDS methodologies. First, as mentioned before, both 
DARTS and HybrIDS use node-to-node interactions to either monitor system activity 
(and analyze it for possible deviant behavior) or to update resource fitness caches to 
improve the efficient search for replacement resources if a node or specific resource is 
lost. This has far-reaching implications because it does not require duplication of data 
collection in the effort to secure and harden the host node’s system. Furthermore, both 
systems are node-based, meaning that they are decentralized; the same data set that is 
relevant to HybrIDS is also directly relevant to DARTS. With this information, it seems 
logical to pair HybrIDS as the triggering method to initiate reallocation by DARTS. In 
fact, while the two are different systems and, other than sharing a common data stream, 
are isolated from each other, they can operate in one overall process or security protocol 
suite, managed with independent execution 
threads. 
 A common dataset also allows for 
information exchange between the IDS and the 
reallocation system – more than a simple 
reallocation triggering request. Both HybrIDS and 
DARTS use similar storage methods for their per-Figure 20 - A Layered Response Mechanism 
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node databases, meaning that future functionality could be added that allows DARTS to 
“peek” at results from HybrIDS to monitor certain network health conditions more 
closely. Also, because both systems are non-resource-invasive, they can operate without 
overwhelming the host node. Because computational effort involved in collecting data 
can be combined and shared, the amount of unnecessary polling overhead is reduced by 
50%, which would not be the case were heterogeneous, non-complementary technologies 
implemented. 
 Because of this integration strategy, there now exists a viable three-stage solution 
covering encryption/obfuscation, intrusion detection and intrusion response components 
(Figure 20). The encryption method is assumed to be functional (as per secure 
communications protocols that have been established in the system communications 
specifications). Also, the IDS and response layers (HybrIDS and DARTS) are designed to 
implement the detection and response components efficiently and interoperatively, yet 
with sufficient component-based autonomy. This requirement avoids issues if one system 
or another were compromised due to either security or system fault concerns. Now that 
we have explored this combination, let us see how it can prove a worthy part of a real-
world implementation with a unique distributed sensing application, namely disaster area 
assessment with UAVs, which is also a contribution of this research. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TORNADOGENESIS AND CLASSIFICATION 
 According to data gathered in the calendar year 2008, over 1690 tornadoes struck 
the continental United States [87]. These wind-based phenomena are capable of creating 
severe destruction in localized areas with which they make contact. Although hurricanes 
cause more widespread devastation, there exists no more intensely-destructive natural 
event than a strong tornado. Understanding tornadogenesis is a complex and multi-
faceted field, requiring the computation of tremendous amounts of data. Despite all the 
work that has been done in over decades of research, comparatively little is known about 
how, why, or when such storms form. Understanding storm aftermath is a critical piece to 
unlocking the complex problem of tornadoes. For this reason, this dissertation 
implements the DARTS resource reallocation mechanism in a unique way, with the 
intention of aiding first-responders and meteorologists in aiding victims and 
understanding the storm’s effects, hopefully yielding greater prediction accuracy and 
furthering the understanding of these elusive storms. This section will briefly outline 
tornadogenesis, storm characteristics, and storm classification that will aid the reader in 
understanding this research’s application of DARTS.  
Tornadogenesis 
 The fundamental principles behind tornadogenesis are well known, particularly 
for supercell thunderstorm types. While squall lines (resulting from the clash of cold and 
warm weather fronts) are capable of creating tornadic storms, these are generally rarer 
and less intense. Therefore, this discussion will focus on tornadogenesis within the 
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context of supercell thunderstorms. A supercell is defined as a storm, typically localized 
within a single draft zone, containing the rotation of winds within its cloud base [88]. 
These storms are typically accompanied by hail, torrential rains, and frequent lightning. 
There do exist low-precipitation (LP) supercell storms, which, by definition have little or 
no rain associated with them, but this discussion will focus mostly on high-precipitation 
(HP) supercell storms, which are the most common. Another factor is the atmospheric 
instability, which measures the vertical temperature gradient. Higher instability implies a 
stronger gradient, which creates a stronger convection potential. A high atmospheric 
instability combined with moisture form the basic elements needed for supercell storm 
formation. Regions in the United States that include large, flat plains, offer the perfect 
conditions for thermals to form updraft columns. In addition to heat, these regions are 
located in such a manner that moisture from the Gulf of Mexico can often interact with 
the thermal activity and form powerful storms that have the capacity to be tornadic 
(spawning the term Tornado Alley for states where this combination of moisture and 
thermal activity is optimal). Once atmospheric instability interacts with warm, moist air, 
a vertical convection potential is created to cause that warm, moist air to rise into the 
atmosphere. On a calm day, this occurs rapidly, and updraft currents can quickly bring 
the moist air up to high altitudes where it condenses and forms clouds. With stronger 
gradients, updraft currents can be exceedingly fast. In typical thunderstorms, such 
updrafts average between 1,200 to 2,500 feet per minute, roughly between 15-30 miles 
per hour [88] (the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA, reports 
its data using the English measurement system). Supercell thunderstorms, in contrast, 
have updrafts that can reach up to 15,000 feet per minute, or approximately 170 miles per 
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hour. These large and powerful air columns create a significant pressure differential at the 
base of the updraft column. In contrast to the updraft column, which pulls in warm moist 
air into the storm, a downdraft column represents the flow of condensed, cooler air that 
falls downwards, much like the gel-like medium in a “Lava Lamp.” The downdraft 
column occurs at the “front” of a storm cell, along with any precipitation phenomena. 
Figure 21 shows a classic supercell thunderstorm with precipitation phenomena. 
Downdraft phenomena are attributed to devastating straight-line winds, which can flatten 
large swaths of land with downward-directed winds exceeding 70 miles per hour. These 
straight-line wind phenomena are typically called micro or macro bursts, depending on 
their size and speed [89]. Often, damage that is initially attributed to a tornado can in fact 
be the result of a downdraft phenomenon. Upon closer inspection, the direction of fallen 
debris, and the wide damage pattern can, to the experienced observer, confirm whether 
or not a tornado or downdraft phenomenon has occurred [88]. The technologies presented 
in this dissertation can be of further assistance in determining such differences.  
 Following the formation of a strong thunderstorm, and an established 
updraft/downdraft in the storm’s core, further conditions are necessary for storms to 
spawn tornadoes. If the atmospheric temperature gradient is sufficient, and the main 
Figure 21 - A classic supercell storm (left) and the updraft (red) and downdraft (blue) columns (NOAA) 
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updraft zone is strong enough, two factors may (with relatively low probability) 
contribute to tornadogenesis. The first is the formation of a mesocyclone – in which the 
updraft column begins to rotate. This is generally the result of wind shear – either from 
weather boundaries (the meeting of hot and cold fronts) or inflow phenomena that cause 
horizontally-rotating air movement. In supercell storms, these rotating columns are 
affected by the updraft zone at the core of the storm, and set in motion. 
  
Figure 22 - A well-defined cloud at the base of a supercell storm 
This causes rotation around the updraft zone, which can extend below the cloud base into 
a funnel cloud. Prior to tornadogenesis, moist air that is cooled by rain causes 
condensation to occur below the cloud base, forming a wall cloud. Figure 22 shows a 
storm base with a well-developed wall cloud. 
 The second phenomenon associated with tornadogenesis is less-well understood, 
and is called a rear-flank downdraft (RFD). Unlike forward-flank downdraft, which is 
considered the “normal” storm downdraft, RFD occurs behind the storm, and is a closed-
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loop rejection of moist, warm air entering the storm’s updraft zone. RFD is responsible 
for the formation of the wall cloud, as well as a “clear slot”, which is a precipitation-free, 
and cloud-free area directly behind the wall cloud and related storm. It is postulated that 
RFD is crucial both in tornadogenesis, as well as in a tornado’s eventual demise, as 
strong RFD tends to eventually wrap around its tornado, severing the flow of vitally-
needed warm moist air that fuels the strong updraft zone.  
 As mentioned before, atmospheric instability, in addition to warm, moist air is 
essential for storm growth and eventual tornadogenesis. Wind shear, which can, with an 
updraft, create a mesocyclone within a storm, is also responsible for mitigating or 
limiting the growth of storms. If wind shear is present at high altitudes, caused by high-
altitude air currents such as the Jet Stream, updraft zones in storm cells are cut off and 
shifted, tilting the precarious updraft/downdraft balance and effectively destroying the 
storm’s potential energy and growth. Figure 23 shows thunderstorms being affected by 
strong upper-level wind shear – practically decapitating the storm’s top. Given sufficient 
shear, storms cannot form updrafts strong enough to sustain tornadogenesis. 
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Figure 23 - Storm clouds under strong shearing conditions 
Anatomy of a tornado 
 This section has briefly described the conditions and storm types necessary for 
tornadogenesis. Let us briefly discuss tornado anatomy. For the sake of clarification, a 
tornadic storm product is referred to as a funnel cloud if it has not made contact with the 
ground. A funnel cloud that begins to stir up debris from the ground is then called a 
tornado. Tornadoes are generally asymmetrical with respect to a horizontal axis, meaning 
that the part of the storm descending from the wall cloud is typically thicker than the end 
of the funnel cloud touching the ground. The “cloud-like” or opaque nature of the tornado 
itself is due to the condensation of water caused by the extreme low-pressure differential 
created in the tornado’s updraft column, aided by the rotational movement of the 
mesocyclone that keeps the cloud formation cylindrical. In the case of weaker tornadoes, 
where the updraft pressure gradient is lower, condensation may not occur at all, yielding 
weak tornadoes that stir up dust, but not much else. Despite the absence of a visible 
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funnel, these are still characterized as 
tornadoes due to their nature and formation 
from a thunderstorm cloud’s mesocyclone. 
Figure 24 shows a stereotypical tornado.  
Concerning shape, there exist three main 
types of tornadoes, though many shapes and sizes exist throughout a continuum.  
1. The “classic” tornado shape, illustrated in countless textbooks and imprinted into 
the minds of many, is called a stovepipe tornado. These funnel clouds feature a 
relatively-smooth, straight shaft that is proportionally not much wider at the cloud 
base than at the ground. Such storms indicate a well-formed and stable updraft 
zone in the supercell storm that spawns them.  
2. Alternately, a wedge tornado exhibits a funnel diameter at the storm cloud’s base 
that is proportionately much wider than the diameter near or at the ground. As 
wedge tornadoes can exceed over two miles in diameter, their cloud-base 
diameter may be so large that it appears to be low-hanging clouds strafing the 
countryside – a potentially deadly mistake in cloud classification.  
3. Lastly, rope tornadoes do not fit either category, and are almost sinusoidal, or S-
shaped from top to bottom, indicating a weak or unstable updraft zone that is 
shifting. Rather than descending in a straight line to the ground, rope tornadoes 
have dissociating, weak updraft columns. In fact, some rope tornadoes may 
appear to be “missing” entire sections of the funnel cloud as it progresses from 
top to bottom.  
Figure 24 - A classic stovepipe tornado 
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 Figure 24 shows images of the three classic tornado types (stovepipe, wedge, 
rope). In addition to shape types, tornadoes either occur as single-vortex storms, in which 
the updraft column of the thunderstorm supercell extends uninterrupted all the way to the 
ground, or multi-vortex storms, in which the updraft column is comprised of smaller, but 
intense pairs of rotation (some storms have been observed to have five vortices or more). 
The first multiple-vortex tornado was discovered (and photographed) in or around 1957. 
The reason for this occurrence is still not yet well understood as of the time of this 
writing, but is being actively researched. Wedge tornadoes often will be multiple-vortex 
tornadoes. Multiple-vortex tornadoes should not be confused with sister or satellite 
tornadoes, which are two or more tornadoes occurring in the same storm or storm system, 
but resulting from individual and distinct updraft zones.  
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 Tornadoes vary in color based on the medium that they are disturbing, in addition 
to diffraction effects caused by different angles of lighting. Some storms may have poor 
lighting or may be wrapped in rain (as is the case with high-precipitation supercell 
storms) and thus are exceedingly dangerous as visual identification is nearly impossible. 
Unknowing motorists may be unaware that a rainstorm they are approaching in fact 
contains a deadly funnel cloud. Vehicular encounters remain one of the leading causes of 
tornado-based fatalities, as automobiles may be lifted by a strong storm and tossed 
 
Figure 25 - Stovepipe (top left), rope (top right) and wedge (bottom) tornadoes 
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elsewhere by the rotating winds [88]. Furthermore, the glass windows in a car or truck do 
not offer adequate protection against tornado-borne projectiles and debris (sometimes, 
inaccurately, termed missiles). The NOAA in past years has suggested that occupants of a 
vehicle seek shelter by exiting their vehicle and assuming shelter in a low-lying ditch. 
However, based on new public safety statements, and, in this author’s opinion, common 
sense, this recommendation has been retracted, and motorists are urged to drive away 
from the storm at right angles if possible. This change is motivated by the fact that low-
lying ditches do not provide adequate protection from large debris. Debris are, by far, the 
leading cause of injuries and fatalities due to tornadoes. The most violent of storms are 
capable of hurling large pieces of wood, brick, or steel at exceedingly-fast speeds. The 
results of these high winds should not be underestimated, as their effects result in 
situations ranging from the tragic to the bizarre – residents of storm-damaged 
communities have noted blades of grass shot like arrows through telephone poles, and 
even glass windows.   
 In addition to characteristics of wind speed, size, shape, and color, tornadoes are 
also characterized by their duration. An average, typical spring-time tornado generally 
lasts for less than five minutes. There is a general correlation between the strength of a 
storm and its duration; stronger storms have larger associated thunderstorm supercells, 
with larger, well-defined updrafts. The formation of such storms requires immense 
amounts of energy (in the form of heat) to remain viable, and thus the energy in the 
atmosphere required to generate such a large storm is also capable of sustaining it for 
extended periods of time. Note that tornadoes rarely maintain perfectly-constant contact 
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with the ground. Instead, they tend to “hop” along, destroying entire sections of 
communities, but sparing houses just meters in between. 
Classification – The Fujita Scale 
 The classification of tornadoes is done by quantifying the amount of damage 
observed on the ground, rather than through recorded wind speeds using a Doppler 
RADAR. This quantization has been historically measured through the use of the Fujita-
Pearson Scale, developed by Tetsuya Fujita and Allen Pearson at the University of 
Chicago in 1971 [90]. The scale quantifies levels of destruction of man-made and 
naturally-occurring objects, such as houses, trees, and strong brick buildings. Finalized in 
1973, this scale lists a storm’s destructive power on an integer scale from zero to five, 
demarcated with the prefix ‘F’. The lower score on the scale, F0, indicates a storm 
producing little or no damage. In contrast, an F5 storm indicates a violent storm that 
destroys and levels entire communities with catastrophically-strong and fast winds. 
Tornadoes generally have inconsistent damage patterns; many tornadoes will “skip” or 
“hop” along the ground, rather than maintain constant contact with the ground. Because 
of this, damage is variable; some structures may be completely demolished, while others 
remain unscathed. For this reason, the maximum-observed storm damage to any structure 
is used to categorize the tornado on the Fujita scale. Wind speeds are, in fact, correlated 
to the various F-scale degrees, but offer only an approximate range, and can be deceptive.  
 An F0 storm is typically carries with it winds of between 64-116 km/h. However, 
because the F-scale does not derive its classification from observed wind speed, it is 
possible for a tornado with 500 km/h winds (measured rotationally) to register as an F0 
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storm if it does not reach the ground and cause damage. High-speed funnel clouds may 
form, but be classified as F0 storms for their lack of contact or damage. F5 storms, on the 
other hand, must have made contact with the ground in order for destruction to take 
place. These storms can be more accurately correlated to observed wind speeds. Utilizing 
the original Fujita scale, F5 wind speeds are characterized as occurring between 419-512 
km/h (again, measured rotationally.) F5 storms are typically characterized by catastrophic 
damage to structures and complete devastation. Large objects, including automobiles, and 
in some cases, train cars and locomotives, can be hurled distances exceeding 100 m. Such 
storms can have long life spans (the longest-recorded F5 storm in history is known as the 
“tri-state tornado”), which remained on the ground for an uncharacteristically-long 24-
hour period. An average tornado typically has a lifespan of shorter than 5 minutes. 
 In addition to observed damage and wind speeds, the Fujita scale also 
incorporates storm statistics such as storm track length (the distance over which the 
tornado was making contact with the ground), and path width, though this data is not 
used to compute the actual intensity score. Some of the strongest tornadoes on record 
were merely 150 m across. On the other extreme, the author has personally been involved 
in a tornado that struck his grade-school transport van on a return trip from an outdoor 
activity. The width of the tornado was approximately 0.8 km, but its wind speeds (128 
km/h) and overall lack of destruction with the exception of broken tree limbs and 
scattered small debris rendered the particular storm an F0. Note that because of a 
tornado’s horizontally-asymmetrical shape, the width of the storm is generally larger at 
the base of the cloud than on the ground. This is especially true for “wedge” tornadoes, 
which have widths at the cloud base exceeding over 2 miles in diameter. In some rare 
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cases, especially when a tornado is dissipating, the cloud-base portion may be at times 
thinner than the ground-based portion. This does not, however, indicate whether or not a 
storm is weak or strong, only that it is potentially unstable and at risk of dissipation.  
 Table 2 in the next chapter lists the degrees of the Fujita scale, from F0 to F5. 
Note that the Fujita scale, originally developed from 1971-1973, has now been replaced 
by the Enhanced Fujita scale, which was first implemented in 2007. The change to the 
Enhanced Fujita, or EF scale, was brought about based on studies of storm damages over 
a period from 1950 to 2000. The work done on this dissertation incorporates research 
done on 40,881 storms from 1950 to 2001, classifying each storm based on observe 
damage, path length and width, and wind speed. Each classification is statistically 
analyzed using a Weibull distribution of those parameters to form an average statistical 
representation of “typical” storms in each F-scale range.  
 Because the EF scale has only been implemented since 2007, it provides 
relatively little available data for use in this dissertation. For this reason, and because it 
has been established for such a long time, all references to tornado intensity will use the 
original Fujita scale from 1973.  
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CHAPTER VII 
DISTRIBUTED UAV SYSTEM DESIGN 
The focus of this chapter is to describe a method to perform distributed aerial 
assessments of disaster areas to give first responders, and, eventually, researchers, a 
better understanding of the immediate impact of a tornadic storm. The author believes 
that applying DARTS to a distributed set of low-cost autonomous aircraft can provide 
safe, rapid response, canvassing more ground in a shorter period of time and more 
effectively than by human operators in a single aircraft. By employing multiple planes, 
together with the DARTS reallocation mechanism, fault-tolerant disaster area assessment 
can be performed with a low startup budget, and negligible operating costs. The 
following sections describe the current techniques and costs associated with aerial 
assessment, and demonstrate the use of DARTS with a system called the Distributed Apt 
Resource Transference for Broad-response Overhead Airborne Reconnaissance Dispatch 
(DARTBOARD). Simulated and real-world trials are used that will present an alternative 
to human assessment in a way that saves time, expense, and lives. 
Traditional Manned Disaster Area Reconnaissance 
 With knowledge of atmospheric temperature gradients, temperature boundaries, 
moisture levels, and upper-level wind shear, meteorologists can, to some degree, predict 
when conditions are optimal for the formation of tornadoes. And, given the magnitude of 
these variables, forecasters can, to some extent, predict the possible severity of such 
storms. With newer Doppler RADAR technologies and weather models rendered by 
supercomputers, forecasters can even predict general locations that might be more 
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susceptible to tornado strikes. However, they can neither pinpoint the time or location of 
a tornado strike. For this reason, gathering information about storm aftermaths can be 
vital in improving future forecasts and severity predictions.  
 The focus of this chapter, and of the dissertation itself, is to use DARTS, applying 
it to the use of distributed autonomous aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can perform 
distributed aerial assessments of disaster areas to give first responders, and, eventually, 
researchers, a better understanding of the immediate impact of a storm. The justification 
for employing a robotic solution is simple. Currently, such observations are done using 
manned helicopter flights. This presents a number of obstacles and possibilities for error, 
which will be outlined in detail. 
Current Equipment 
 The most commonly-used helicopter in use today, especially for use in aerial 
photography (including news casting) are turbine-powered aircraft that employ Brayton-
cycle rotary internal combustion to drive a shaft at a high number of revolutions per 
minute (RPM). These engines are called turbo shaft engines, and are derivative from 
turbojets, but do not have the same exhaust pressure (instead directing most of the energy 
into the output shaft). Gas turbines, especially when driving a shaft, require significant 
quantities of fuel. As of the time of this writing, turbine-driven helicopters consume fuel 
at a rate of over 1000 USD per hour. With the addition of maintenance costs, pilot salary, 
aircraft and airport permits, and other necessary equipment, the cost of running aerial 
disaster area assessment can be prohibitively expensive, especially for local governments 
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that have just been hit by a tornado and are facing significant future infrastructure 
expenses to rebuild and rehabilitate a community. 
 In addition to operating expenses, the use of a helicopter introduces a single point 
of failure. Not only is the craft human-operated; any malfunction, equipment failure, or 
other problem could ground the helicopter, or worse, create a problem in flight with 
potentially catastrophic results for the helicopter and its crew, as well as those on the 
ground. From an operational standpoint, this single point of failure can be problematic, 
particularly when lives are on the line from a first-responder’s point of view. Logically, 
more helicopters and crew could be added, but this only further complicates the survey 
(including logistical challenges of coordination) and adds tremendously to the cost of 
running the operation.  
Designing DARTBOARD for a Candidate Storm Intensity 
 DARTBOARD should be designed to survey a disaster area typically found after 
a tornado. Based on the data on tornadoes from 1950-2001 collected by NOAA, the next 
logical step is to design a solution to provide superior coverage, speed, and safety; to do 
so, this dissertation has focused on a target storm category that weighs the frequency of 
storm types (based on the original Fujita scale), the risk to humans (referring to damage 
that can be imparted by the storms in both casualties and property damage), and the 
probability of each storm type’s occurrence (derived from the frequency analysis). The 
results of this detailed analysis yield a target storm type of an F2 tornado based on its 
probability of occurrence and its human impact. Let us briefly analyze how this target 
determination was made. 
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 Table 2 shows the probability of a tornado’s severity in fractional values adding 
up to 1. The distribution is also shown in Figure 26. 
Table 2 - Tornado Intensities and Probabilities 
 
From this data, we can see that the most common types of storm occurrences are F1 
tornado types – according to the 2001 report. Note that this statistic has changed; in more 
recent interpretations of the original 1973 Fujita scale, F0 to F5 
 
Figure 26 - Intensity vs. Probability 
probabilities are listed as 0.39, 0.36, 0.19, 0.05, 0.01, and < 0.001. However, because this 
dissertation analyzes storm statistics in line with the data gathered in the 1950-2001 
report, the frequencies in Table 2 will be used instead. A likely reason for the change in 
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probabilities is the increased resolution of weather RADAR, and improved 
communication between local storm spotters and storm predictions and response centers. 
Increased RADAR resolution can explain why more F0 storms are detected; while they 
may not produce damage on the ground, they can be seen in RADAR images at a certain 
detail threshold. Otherwise, the storm could conceivably be missed. Logically, because 
the likelihood of tornadogenesis are low when compared to the number of overall storms 
and severe storms covering the United States, it is reasonable to assume that many of 
those storms that do form will be low in intensity due to minimally-adequate updraft 
zones and insufficient thermal and moisture gradients to support larger storms; larger 
storms require significantly more atmospheric energy.  
 Prior to 1994, the mean width of a tornado’s path was listed for each storm. Since 
1994, new data has been recorded in terms of maximum storm path width. [87] Logically, 
stronger storms with well-defined updraft zones and sufficient atmospheric energy on 
which to feed tend to have longer storm tracks, as they last longer. In order to design a 
system based on an “ideal” target tornado, storms with either low probabilities or low risk 
of damage were eliminated from the set of tornadoes from F0-F5. A subset, spanning 
storm intensities from F1-F3 was therefore selected because F0 storms typically produce 
little or no damage, and the likelihood of an F4 or F5 storm is less than 2% according to 
the 2001 NOAA report. Though F4 and F5 storms can cause catastrophic damage, 
designing a system exclusively around these storms may be impractical due to their low 
frequency, especially for locations where tornadoes occur less often.  
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 Once the subset of storms was selected, their probabilities were re-computed. The 
probability was computed assuming that all storms that occurred fell within the range, 
such that the subset’s cumulative probability was 1. Table 3 shows these updated 
probabilities for the subset of storms F1 through F3. Figure 27 shows a plot of these 
probabilities.  
Table 3 - Normalized Storm Probabilities 
Based on these statistics, an F1 tornado is most probable. Of course, this fits identically to 
the findings of the superset of storms. Given the computed subset probabilities, a 
weighting scheme was needed in order to determine the impact of a storm in terms of 
casualties and property damage. To this end, the probabilities were re-computed by using 
weighting scalars on the array of F1-F3 storm occurrence probabilities. These values 
were chosen based on predicted human impact, but are not 
 
Figure 27 - Normalized intensity probabilities for the F1-F3 subset 
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scientifically derived as there are no absolute or average measurements of damage based 
on storm intensity types. Because F3 tornadoes can cause severe damage, their 
probability factors were multiplied by 0.7, F2 storms by 0.2, and F1 storms by 0.1. These 
scalars were selected because weighting F3 storms heavily due to their high amount of 
damage seems reasonable. The scores were then re-normalized and plotted to yield which 
storm type should receive primary focus.  
 Figure 28 shows this plot, and shows a well-defined maximum (despite the large 
weighted 
 
Figure 28 - Impact assessment normalization for F1-F3 storms 
advantage of F3 storms) indicating that F2 storms represent a design constraint balance in 
terms of probability of occurrence and the weighted potential damage. Recent reports 
independently suggest that F2 storms are likely the most relevant of tornado phenomena 
[87], lending credibility to the subset selection and weighting model described above. 
This gives us a model we can now use to design a system within a certain set of 
specifications dictated by a representative storm, producing an aftermath that needs to be 
assessed efficiently and effectively. For this reason DARTBOARD is designed to 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
F1 F2 F3
W
e
ig
h
te
d
 R
is
k
F-Scale subset F1-F3
Relative Cost and Risk for F1-F3-intensity Tornadoes
110 
 
effectively assess a disaster area typically resulting from an F2 storm. Because the 
system’s design and control constraints are actually quite flexible, the system is by no 
means limited to F2 storm damage; simply adding more nodes or re-specifying resolution 
requirements and setting altitude changes can easily account for larger or smaller storm 
tracks. In addition, because tornadoes vary greatly in track length, size, and path shape, 
the system is over -specified in order to account for natural variability.  
Configuring an Airframe 
 Designing an airborne distributed sensing application requires thought in selecting 
an appropriate airframe to be used by each sensing nodes. An airframe, meaning the 
structural and propulsion aspects of an aircraft, can dictate almost all the performance 
characteristics of an airplane; wing design (mounted high or mounted low, or biplane), 
camber (the degree of curvedness of the top surface of the wing), fuselage length (long 
tail designs lend more stability), wingspan (determines loading), shape (whether the plane 
is a delta-wing aircraft or a standard dihedral configuration), and construction material, 
such as wood, carbon fiber, or foam. In addition, the power plant (electric, gas, turbine, or 
electric ducted fan) is critical in providing a good tradeoff between takeoff speed and 
distance, long flight times, and sufficient power to compensate for winds, drag due to 
heavier weight, steep climbs, emergency maneuvers, and other power-related factors. 
Because the target application for DARTBOARD requires a light, mobile, and cost-
effective aircraft solution, full-scale aircraft are not considered; instead, model radio-
controlled (R/C) aircraft make a perfect fit for short-range overhead reconnaissance and 
assessment. Because of their agility and low cost, these aircraft can be implemented in 
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almost any environment with restricted takeoff and landing conditions, reducing cost by 
their simplicity and materials.  
In particular, this dissertation implements DARTBOARD on airplanes, rather 
than helicopters or Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs), such as quadrotor aircraft. Because 
agile helicopters employ collective pitch rotor heads, their complexity, maintenance 
requirements, and high cost preclude them from use. In addition, because keeping a 
helicopter airborne requires large amounts of power, poor battery life or high fuel 
consumption rates typical of radio-controlled helicopters make their use impractical. 
However, helicopters do feature unmatched maneuverability and the ability to hover in 
place; to solve some problems of helicopters (in particular their difficulty of flight), there 
exist quad and six-rotor aircraft that utilize distributed electric motors to provide cyclic 
flight response and hovering capabilities. However, even in their most basic 
configurations, these aircraft are expensive, exceeding $15,000 USD as of the time of this 
writing. Because such aircraft do not have collective pitch, rudders, or other moving 
control surfaces, a computer must be employed in order to allow a human to operate the 
device with controls that might be familiar to an R/C operator. In addition, helicopter-like 
aircraft have limited means of dealing with propulsion failure; a well-designed airplane 
can easily glide back to its runway without risking damage and injury to itself, others, 
and its operator. A helicopter at altitude that loses power must perform an autorotation 
maneuver; this can only be done once (because the rotor blades will slow due to drag) 
and must be enacted immediately to prevent a catastrophic event. MAVs, such as quad-
rotors, are exclusively dependent on their power source to operate individual propellers; 
unlike a collective-pitch helicopter, where the blade pitch can still be modified in case of 
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engine failure to allow for autorotation and an attempt at landing, MAVs do not have any 
such capability. If one or more motors fail, a MAV will always have a catastrophic 
landing.  
When considering R/C aircraft, there exist two main construction materials; foam 
and wood. Although electric foam aircraft are gaining popularity due to their low weight 
and inexpensive cost, they do not presently offer sufficient practical flexibility to load 
heavy sensors and communications equipment. Therefore, due to cost, design, and 
operational reasons, this work has selected the use of large wooden trainer R/C aircraft, 
which offer slow and stable flight, high payload capabilities, resilience to wind 
conditions, and ease of flight at the controls. These planes feature wingspans exceeding 
1.6 meters and can carry over 1 kg of payload without difficulties. This dissertation 
names two candidates (one has been implemented) that fit desirable weight, flight time, 
and flight characteristic requirements. The first, which is functional as of the time of this 
writing, is the Hangar 9 Alpha 40, developed by Horizon Hobbies. Figure 29 shows a 
stock Alpha 40. A “40-size” trainer refers to the cubic-inch 
capacity of the nitromethane-fueled engine that typically 
power these aircraft; most engines have a volume of 0.4 
cubic inches. Also called glow engines, nitro engines use 
glow plugs and compression ignition to provide power to a 
single front-mounted propeller. As the nitromethane fuel (consisting of 15% 
nitromethane, 80% or higher of castor oil, and a small quantity of methanol) is 
compressed in the 2-cycle, single-cylinder engine, the methane reacts with the platinum 
Figure 29 - A stock Alpha 40 
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glow plug at high pressures and causes it to glow right as compression reaches its peak. 
Ignition occurs, and the cycle continues. There exist 4-cycle variants, but these are not 
price-competitive.  
The rest of the airframe is simple; it features fully-functional control surfaces, 
such as ailerons, elevators, a rudder, a steerable nose wheel, and throttle control, and has 
a detachable wing for portability; the wing is fastened using rubber bands that are easily 
removable, and flexible in the case of a hard landing. It employs tricycle landing gear 
(with a nose wheel in front) with flexible landing gear struts to cushion harder landings. 
Using a 2.4 GHz DSSS uplink from a transmitter, the aircraft features a multiple-channel 
Pulse-Position 
Modulation (PPM) 
receiver that drives 
servos using Pulse-
Width Modulation 
(PWM) signals. 
One or more servos 
are employed to 
move the control surfaces with control loops operating between 60 to 300 Hz, depending 
on the required application. The plane is balanced so that its center of gravity (CG) is less 
than a centimeter aft of the wing’s chord line. Figure 30 shows where this center of 
gravity is on the Alpha. Coincidentally, the CG is also positioned so that the maximum 
payload weight lies directly beneath it, maintaining aircraft balance regardless of how 
much equipment is installed. All of the wooden components, consisting of the fuselage, 
 
Figure 30 - The location of the CG on the Alpha 40 
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as well as the ribs and spars (the cross members that hold ribs in place, give the wing its 
length, and keep the wing mounted to the aircraft) on the wing, are coated with a heat-
shrinking polymer (polyolefin) that adheres to the wood at one temperature, and then 
shrinks to tighten its fit at a higher temperature. This coating is necessary for the wings to 
provide lift, as well as to protect the aircraft’s frame. In aircraft featuring internal 
combustion engines, this is especially important to prevent the degradation of wooden 
surfaces and components. 
When configuring the airframe and selecting instrumentation, flight path, flight 
path, and flight conditions, three main factors of embedded systems physical design 
affect the aircraft’s ability to fly, especially with small-scale-sized Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs.) These factors are:  
• Wing loading: the capacity of an airframe to support and carry weight. Measured 
in weight per unit area, wing loading 
gives the capacity of a wing to provide 
lift. Note that the weight of the aircraft 
fuselage is not included in the wing 
loading quantity, and thus must be 
factored in when designing an airframe. 
Therefore, an embedded system must not 
exceed the wing loading capability, in 
order for the aircraft to be able to 
achieve lift. Further constraints are the physical load bearing of the wing spars. A 
wing may break due to momentary forces, even if the wing loading capacity is not 
Figure 31 - The location of the CG on a generic aircraft 
(NASA GRC) 
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exceeded. A quick maneuver while heavily loaded is sufficient to cause 
catastrophic failure of a wing spar due to incurred G-forces and negative 
acceleration, resulting in the wings folding in on themselves.  
• Center of gravity (CG): The CG of an aircraft allows it to take controlled flight. 
Figure 31 shows an aircraft with a properly-adjusted center of gravity. Ideally, 
with a high-wing aircraft, such as the one used in this dissertation research, the 
CG is located just aft of the wing’s leading-edge spar. If mounted too far forward, 
an aircraft will tend to tip forward; too far aft, and the plane becomes tail-heavy 
and difficult to control, especially at higher speeds. If the CG is not centered 
properly along the center line going through the roll axis of the aircraft, the 
operator or autopilot will need to compensate by applying ailerons to oppose the 
force (if so equipped). Thus, positioning of the system into an airframe is critical, 
unless the aircraft is large enough where small weight offsets will not adversely 
affect performance.  
• Drag is a big factor that affects operational efficiency. If an aircraft is loaded with 
mass that is below wing loading, but representing a significant portion of the total 
payload capacity, the aircraft will tend to sink, requiring more power from the 
propulsion system. In UAVs, requiring more energy can lead to incomplete 
surveys, as battery life is also a scare resource. Gas or nitromethane-powered 
aircraft will also consume more fuel, cutting short the usable timeframe of the 
aircraft. 
Additionally, onboard systems typically may require their own power source. 
Because high-torque electric motors may generate feedback into the power system 
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(unless equipped with an opto-isolated speed controller), undesirable power 
characteristics may occur when operating sensitive equipment. Furthermore, if an aircraft 
is electrically powered, additional drain on the principal battery is undesirable, and 
battery exhaustion (even with aircraft equipped with low-voltage cutoffs) can cause 
serious problems for onboard electronics and radio communications systems. Aircraft 
batteries are considered exhausted when they are unable to provide power to the motor or 
Electronic Speed Controller (ESC); they are still able to power servos and receivers in 
some cases, in order to safely bring the aircraft down by gliding. Further discharging a 
lithium-ion polymer battery is then considered over-discharging. Therefore, the addition 
of an extra avionics battery must be factored in to the system design, and therefore in the 
overall weight profile. The Alpha is equipped with a primary flight battery to power the 
motor, and a second, isolated, and smaller battery to power its computer systems, 
receivers, and servomotors. Mounting avionics, sensors, and other embedded systems 
will have consequences that can dramatically affect airworthiness of an unmanned aerial 
vehicle distributed sensing platform.  
The Alpha implemented for this work has recently been converted to an all-
electric platform. Substituting the heavy 2-stroke nitro engine for a 12-pole, 16-stator 
brushless motor capable of consuming 800 watts of power, the plane is now equipped 
with considerably more power, if needed. An electric conversion offers significant 
benefits to nitro or gasoline engines, especially when managing a large fleet of distributed 
aircraft. First, electric motor equivalents can provide much more torque, and better flight 
characteristics. They also do not suffer from flameouts, which occurs when a poorly-
tuned or malfunctioning engine’s combustion cycle is interrupted. This can lead to 
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catastrophic failure, as R/C aircraft generally are not equipped with ways to restart the 
engine. Secondly, an electric motor is quieter and cleaner, and has no emissions; 2-stroke 
nitromethane engines are famous for releasing a slurry of un-burned castor oil, which 
serves as the engine’s lubricant, out of the muffler and down along the aircraft’s side, 
requiring solvents and a cleanup procedure following each flight. Despite the battery’s 
weight (electric R/C aircraft use Lithium-Ion Polymer batteries), electric aircraft have a 
far better power-to-weight ratio, and are lighter, allowing the airframe to be loaded with 
additional equipment. Lastly, although the batteries themselves have significant hazards 
when shorted or charged improperly, electric planes do not need fuel that is inflammable, 
reducing on-the-ground safety concerns when fueling and maintaining the aircraft. 
The Alpha is equipped with an ESC that is capable of supplying up to 60 amperes 
of current, at a voltage depending on the particular battery pack used. Batteries are 
typically measured in terms of their series rating; a 1S pack implies a single-celled 
lithium-ion polymer battery at 3.7 volts (all Li-Poly batteries have the same per-cell 
nominal voltage) whereas a 4S battery supplies 14.8 volts (4 1S cells in series). The 
capacity of a battery is rated in mAh. Each battery cell must be precision-charged by a 
balance charging system that ensures that no one cell exceeds 4.20 volts during charging; 
any overcharging causes intense heating, swelling of the battery, and often, fire. Li-Poly 
technology also is capable of supplying tremendous current; many batteries can 
continuously discharge at 20-40 times their rated capacity per unit time, without causing 
a safety concern. For instance, a 14.8 V (4S) 3200 mAh battery with a 30C where C is 
Capacity/hours rating can discharge at 30*(3.2 Ah)/h = 96 amperes. Many batteries also 
have a maximum burst discharge rate of up to 60C, which can provide almost 200 
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amperes of current. For this reason, caution must be taken never to short the battery 
terminals; a split-second mistake can damage or destroy the battery pack and cause a fire. 
Despite these risks, when charged properly and cared for, batteries provide a safe, and 
more reliable alternative to small internal combustion engines. Figure 32 shows the 
Alpha 40 in its new electric configuration. With a nitro engine, the Alpha 40 is capable of 
around 30 minutes of flight, possibly longer if the engine is run at a lower speed. Under 
electric power, the modified Alpha 40 can run up to 25 minutes on a single battery pack, 
provided light winds and efficient throttle management. The aircraft is able to operate 
continuously at speeds exceeding 15 meters per second (~35 MPH) and can exceed 27 
meters per second (~60 MPH) with little effort. Glide and landing speeds can be as low 
as 3 meters per second in 
appropriate conditions (~7 
MPH).  
An alternative (and 
complement) to the Alpha 
40 is the Telemaster 40, 
from Hobby Lobby 
International (the radio-controlled division). This aircraft features a longer wingspan and 
slightly more robust fuselage design. Instead of a tricycle landing gear, it features 
conventional (i.e., tail-wheel) landing gear. Instead of a steerable nose wheel as found in 
the Alpha (which is controlled by the rudder input), the tail-wheel system’s tail wheel is 
used for steering, and is attached to the rudder. A disadvantage of this configuration is 
that during landings, flaring, which is the practice of pitching up the nose just before 
Figure 32 - The upgraded, electric power modification on the Alpha 40 
119 
 
touchdown to reduce airspeed, is more difficult to accomplish. It does, however, require 
fewer servo linkages to 
accomplish rudder-based 
steering. Figure 33 shows a 
Telemaster 40 that has been 
converted from nitro to electric, 
as described above for the 
Alpha. This aircraft is intended 
for use as a second or third 
distributed node, but as of the 
time of this writing, has not been 
equipped with onboard navigation computers and hardware. 
Appendix A contains important information on the Alpha 40’s autopilot system 
(Implemented with the Paparazzi open-source autopilot project) and its associated 
Ground Control Station (GCS). The reader is urged to complete this section to gain a 
better understanding of the Paparazzi autopilot system and its operating principles and 
specifications before covering the remaining material in this chapter. 
Flight Planning 
 Based on the default configuration for a single-aircraft assessment setup, flight 
plans are made ahead of time (as mentioned previously) by creating an XML 
specification file containing waypoints and blocks. In the tests conducted for this research 
work, the waypoints were selected from a Google Maps overlay, representing key 
Figure 33 - A Telemaster 40 modified for electric use 
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coordinate points that resembled a necessary overflight of a disaster area. An average F2 
tornado has a path length of 7.5 kilometers. For this reason DARTBOARD’s flight plans 
need to incorporate this as an optimal path length. The tornado’s actual path will be 
variable, twisting (pun intended) and turning in unpredictable ways. This path is based on 
the motion of its parent storm, as well as instabilities generated by atmospheric 
conditions immediately surrounding the tornado, which cause it to move haphazardly in 
some cases. Other storms, particularly wedge tornadoes, have a path that is dictated 
exclusively by its parent storm’s updraft location. These tornadoes do not vary as much 
because of their structural soundness.  
 The 7.5 km path length only indicates an absolute overall storm path length. This 
does not, however, dictate that 7.5 km-worth of property and structures will be at risk. In 
addition, because a tornado does not maintain constant ground contact, the 7.5 km path 
length may be comprised of “spotty” coverage, where distinct sections were affected and 
others not. Because missiles can be generated and hurled several meters beyond the 
storm’s funnel width, a buffer zone of 25 meters on each side is specified, yielding an 
assessment width of 175 meters. At a 7.5 km track length, assuming 5 aircraft and a 
funnel width of 175 meters, an area of 1.32 km2 must be assessed. The Alpha can fly at a 
speed of 15 meters per second for up to 30 minutes under ideal conditions (a more 
realistic number is 25-27 minutes, which includes a high-speed and high-powered 
takeoff, and enough power to bring the craft in for a safe landing). At this rate, it can 
traverse a full 7.5 km path length in approximately 8 minutes. If necessary, this can be 
expanded – the Alpha can easily glide to a safe landing without power (known in R/C 
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Figure 34 - Sample aerial images 
 
hobbyist terms as a “dead-stick” landing, referring to engine and propeller stop), provided 
it has enough receiver/servomotor power.  
 However, this large of a damage area is outside the path length design constraint; 
local government agencies will typically see damage to their communities spanning a 
shorter distance; though the 
tornado may stay on the 
ground for a full average 
path length, the damage may 
not all occur in one 
community. For this 
research, a pair of housing 
developments in West 
Nashville, TN, spanning a 
curved path length of 1.4 km 
was selected. Although 
every community will vary, 
the selection was picked 
because of its proximity to 
the R/C flight field, in order 
to maintain legal operation 
guidelines with the FAA. 
Samples of aerial images from these developments can be seen in Figure 34. Large urban 
developments are not always favorable to tornado development, because large buildings 
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disrupt airflow and provide uneven heating patterns which can affect or impede 
tornadogenesis. Cities emit considerable heat from the sun, but not all surfaces are 
identically colored. Of course, tornadoes do regularly strike cities, and therefore should 
be considered equally in this context. 
 Under a more automated scenario, a field operator would be able to select start 
and end-points of a disaster area, based on observed storm tracks and RADAR-based 
storm reports. If needed, intermediary points can also be added using a simple point-and-
click-style GUI. By reducing the amount of time needed to assemble waypoints, an 
automated procedure could save lives and bring back data earlier. At present, the GCS 
does exhibit point-and-click functionality, but blocks must still be defined in the XML 
specification. Because Paparazzi and the GCS are free and open-source software (FOSS), 
the GCS is an excellent candidate for eventual modification to add point-and-click storm 
track targeting functionality. In addition, the GCS can overlay not only GIS information, 
but also custom imagery, such as observed storm tracks, to aid in the facility of 
deployment.  
 This dissertation has designed path selection in terms of its length (experimentally 
a 1.4 km swath.) While length is important, it is an easily-adjusted variable. A variable 
more difficult to identify is necessary flight altitude. A number of concerns govern an 
acceptable flight altitude. The first is obvious – proximity to the ground must be reduced 
to avoid interference with tall obstacles, such as antenna towers, multi-story buildings, 
and tree lines. Second, although most tornadic storms are followed by clear skies, this is 
not always the case. In this instance, flying at too high of an altitude could cause the 
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aircraft to enter cloud formations, obscuring any camera images. The third factor is 
camera resolution. The Alpha 40 test plane used in this dissertation was retrofitted with 
an Oregon Scientific ATC3K camera. Water resistant up to 5 meters depth, and virtually 
shock-proof, this camera is inexpensive and provided reliable video imagery for the test 
runs. Though the completed DARTBOARD implementation requires cameras that can 
upload data to a wireless link, or at the very least support a serial data interface, the 
ATC3K provided all the necessary imagery to conclude feasibility studies. The author 
custom-built a mounting solution that allowed the camera to be clipped to the side of the 
airframe before attaching the wing assembly. The camera itself was detachable by a 
pressure clip from the mount, for easy removal without necessitating wing removal.  
 Image resolution, in the case of the fixed-focus and fixed-focal-length ATC3K 
must be determined by the UAV’s flight altitude – literally zooming in and out of a 
picture by changing altitude. Although higher-resolution, high-definition cameras with 
pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) now exist, the 640x480-pixel ATC3K provided a good balance 
between resolution, cost, and eventual required data bandwidth. The aircraft was flown at 
altitudes between 31 and 731 meters off the ground (relative altitude, rather than altitude 
above mean sea level (MSL)). After experimental trial and error, it was determined that 
an altitude of 142 meters off the ground provided sufficient resolution in pixels per meter. 
The visible wide-view from the camera presented images 75 meters across. The 
resolution in terms of pixels per meter is therefore 8.5, yielding significant detail about 
structural elements such as rooftops, vehicles, roads, and trees.  
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 Of course, as other sensors are fitted to the aircraft, a compromise in altitude, the 
addition of further aircraft, or repeated passes must be considered. Also, a heterogeneous 
sensing scheme may be implemented. In such a sample configuration, the first three 
aircraft in the pass are fitted with camera modules, capturing images at fixed time 
intervals. The two planes directly behind and staggered are fitted with infrared (IR) 
scanning equipment to locate survivors that may be present near or underneath structures 
during a night-time pass – where rescuers may have difficulty locating people due to low 
lighting conditions. Near-IR cameras may also be used in low-light situations to capture 
images that cannot be seen with a visible-light camera. And, cameras with pan/tilt/zoom 
capabilities can be added to give an operator control of what he or she is seeing. Each 
addition must be weighed and tuned to work optimally in the presence of other sensing 
equipment, whether or not the sensors reside on the same airframe or not. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, calibration will be centered on the ATC3K. 
 Critical to successful PID control is error minimization with respect to the 
aircraft’s intended track. Because performing aerial assessments require precision in 
order to photograph or record video of the intended target, error minimization must be 
done thoroughly. Because a GCS was not employed, a test flight was flown with a 
secondary, track-logging GPS onboard. As both GPS receivers were given plenty of time 
to calibrate, measurements between the two receivers was measured to within 5 meters. 
In order to determine path accuracy, an ideal raster path from two waypoints signifying 
the start and end of a disaster area was plotted. Data from the tracking GPS was used to 
compare actual traversed path to the ideal track path. Despite any possible adverse wind 
conditions, the desired vs. actual measured waypoints differed by less than 45 meters. 
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Given accuracy concerns (assigning a maximum error of 5 meters to each waypoint), the 
difference shrank to a possible 35 meters of error in tracks between the actual and 
intended final waypoints. Because the aircraft must perform a relatively wide turn around 
the waypoint, this error is to be expected. Even so, the difference in actual path 
trajectories was not measurable (when considering possible deviations due to GPS 
accuracy), as it was within the GPS accuracy limitation. Because Paparazzi’s LEA-5H 
GPS provides a speedy update frequency, this is to be expected. Furthermore, the AP’s 
60 Hz control loop response allows it to issue servomotor commands faster than the 
servos themselves can respond – negating any bottlenecks from the AP to the servo 
controls themselves.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DARTBOARD WITH DISTRIBUTED AIRCRAFT 
 This chapter describes how DARTS is used with the Alpha 40 UAV airframe. It 
describes how fault-tolerant techniques can assist the system in its assessment passes, 
ensuring complete coverage of the assessment area. Here, a number of configurations are 
described that are used in simulation. Real-world flight data from a single-aircraft 
experimental configuration is used to generate data that drives an Omnet++ simulation 
environment. 
Multiple-Aircraft Operations and Deployment 
Based on resolution information obtained from 
single-aircraft tests, three planes juxtaposed in a linear flight 
plan can then reliably cover an area of 225 meters, well 
beyond the 175 meter maximum debris range of an F2 
tornado. Because of variations in flight path, this first line of 
aircraft would be followed by a second line of two juxtaposed aircraft that would 
superimpose between the two outermost tracks, in a staggered formation (the 5s 
configuration seen in Figure 35.) In the case of wider storm damage (caused for instance, 
by storms with widths between 200 m and 2 km or greater), either a different 
configuration will be necessary (the rear line in the staggered formation could be 
rearranged, extending a single-path standard-resolution pass up to 375 meters, or more 
aircraft could be added), multiple passes made, or a resolution compromise be reached. 
Figure 35 - The 5s configuration 
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An example requiring the extended survey area configuration is the Greensburg tornado 
of 2007. This storm was the first F5-category storm of the 2007 tornado season, and 
completely leveled the small town of Greensburg, Kansas. Figure 36 shows Greensburg 
prior to its destruction. As seen in the figure, the town itself was roughly circular in 
shape, with a few exceptions, and roughly 1 km wide by 2.3 km. 
 
Figure 36 - Greensburg, KS, prior to the 2007 F5 tornado 
The tornado that struck the city measured 2.7 km in diameter (significantly 
exceeding the town’s width) and destroyed 95 percent of the town’s buildings and 
structures. Figure 37 shows the city after the tornado’s strike. In this case, the path of 
destruction exceeds the 225 meter assessment path width of the staggered aircraft 
configuration. This is the default configuration that will be referred to in this dissertation 
as configuration 5s – the first number indicates the number of aircraft, while the second 
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indicates the organization pattern – Staggered, Linear, or Normal (in which aircraft are 
arranged in squares, with all aircraft normal to each other)) is exceeded. These 
organization types fit clustering density categories of dense, sparse, and dense, 
respectively. In order to preserve linear resolution of 8.5 pixels per meter with the 
ATC3K camera, the 5s configuration would need to make four passes over the area. The 
2.3-kilometer area can be covered in approximately 3 minutes, with an average aircraft 
speed of 56 km/h, corresponding to an average efficient cruise speed for the electrically-
modified Alpha. This means that the overall time to rasterize the complete damage area 
would be 12 minutes, excluding the time it takes for the aircraft to reposition themselves. 
  
Figure 37 - Greensburg, KS, follwing the 2007 F5 tornado 
A number of factors will, of course, affect the overall flight time. First, a strong 
takeoff will deplete the battery somewhat; when simulating the amount of battery 
capacity that a full takeoff would require, this was experimentally evaluated to be around 
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200 mAh for full-throttle takeoff and climb of 60 seconds. In reality, a full-throttle 
takeoff is not required for the Alpha to become airborne, as the motor is far more potent 
than necessary; a full-throttle flight is highly inadvisable, as the aircraft would exceed 
speeds of 110 km/h and cause the wings to break due to stress. These speeds are 
significantly higher that what can be accomplished with the nitro engine, as it runs at a 
higher RPM but generates less torque, necessitating a propeller with reduced pitch; the 
overall effect is reduced thrust.  
Factoring in the 200 mAh loss of a takeoff, the battery should last approximately 
25 minutes of cruise flight per plane. In the extreme case, highlighted by the Greensburg 
storm, the planes would need to make each pass, and then travel a considerable distance 
before making the pass again. The return trip is divided into two legs, forming a triangle, 
as seen in Figure 38. As the planes approach the common point O (the origin), the planes 
serialize, meaning that they disassemble themselves from their 5s configuration and form 
a 5L configuration, seen in Figure 38. The reasoning behind this is twofold:  
1.) Returning to a common point allows for fault-tolerant methods to take effect 
during this serialization point; if a re-scan is needed by one or more planes, these 
can continue being airborne, while the R/C pilot can land the remaining aircraft.  
2.) When serializing, a common order is maintained, so that when the aircraft leave 
the common point, they can parallelize back into their native configuration easily. 
Furthermore, serialization allows the aircraft to each have similar path lengths, 
allowing for identical battery utilization during this particular leg of the operation. 
Ground controllers and pilots can also see the planes pass by and detect any 
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problem by looking at each plane as it passes, rather than having to search the sky 
to see each plane go forward. 
 
The lengths of the return trip legs, and the position of the serialization and 
parallelization points, are determined by a set of scalars. These were computed 
experimentally by analyzing flight video and determining the best way to allow smooth 
transitions between waypoints while simultaneously reducing the length of the return legs 
to reduce battery consumption. The point O was limited to the flight field’s location. 
Based on experimental data gathered at the Warner Park flying field in Nashville, TN, 
lengths of legs to point O were set to three destination points: The first, the home point, 
in Figure 38, is the point where all aircraft return and should be in serial formation. The 
Figure 38 - 5s configuration becomes serial during the course of the flight 
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distance from this home point O to the first turn was computed at 850 meters. This first 
leg, the downwind leg approaches the disaster area from the side and above in order to 
minimize course corrections from the second turn, after which the aircraft will start its 
assessment pass. The distance from the first point to the second point, called the 
crosswind-leg, was computed at 710 meters in length. The assessment pass is approached 
while exiting the crosswind leg at an obtuse angle; this is important because approaching 
a turn at a right angle can be a recipe for overcorrection by the autopilot’s PID control. 
The final turn point, following the assessment leg is the return leg to the home point. By 
this measurement, the total flight path of the mean curved path was 2.8 kilometers. Flying 
at 56 km/h, the pass can be completed in approximately 3 minutes, plus or minus 12 
seconds depending on whether or not a particular aircraft is following the center (mean) 
path or on the outside. The 12-second error is a boundary condition. Consuming 3 
minutes out of a total of 27 “safe” minutes of battery capacity indicates that each aircraft 
is capable of performing either multiple passes, or providing redundancy in the case of a 
single or multiple point of failure. To understand how this can be accomplished, let us 
proceed to the next section where the implementation of DARTBOARD with the 
Paparazzi-based UAV will be discussed. 
DARTBOARD Integration 
 When examining contents of Chapter IV, we remember that the reallocation of 
tasks is based on resource allocation of one or more resources assigned to a node. 
Therefore, we must answer the question of what in the disaster area assessment scenario 
is a resource, and what is a node containing those resources. The breakdown of resources 
to nodes is not as transparent as the generic case for DARTS, so it will be explained in 
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more detail. Specifically, there is a dichotomy between what resources are and where 
they exist and to whom they belong. 
 The first resource of interest is a radio link. Specifically, the MANET-to-GCS 
link, which must be capable of transmitting two-way information over a distance of 4 km 
or more, depending on the search path. The 900 MHz GCS link mentioned earlier is 
based on a MaxStream 802.15.4 modem pair with a power output capable of exceeding 4 
km if properly powered. Power at the ground control station is flexible, because larger 
batteries or portable power inverters may be present. However, the aircraft, especially in 
the 40-size category, must be frugal in its weight considerations in order to achieve 
efficient flight characteristics, and to be able to carry any necessary equipment to 
complete its objective. A separate battery will likely be needed to power the transmitter 
to prevent back-EMF, which is an electromagnetic field that is induced in the three-phase 
motor power lines due to rotation from pole to pole. It is used for understanding the speed 
of the motor, but can also induce unwanted electrical noise into common power systems. 
Therefore, rather than equipping each aircraft with a plane-to-ground link, it is likely a 
better idea for efficiency and cost to equip two planes with the long-distance link. One of 
these links will remain active, while the other remains on standby; this eliminates 
interference (even though the 802.15.4 protocol specifies Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum transmission technology, allowing for the superposition of multiple signals in 
the same band space without data loss) and makes for a simpler ground control system. 
All other aircraft can use local, low-powered networks, such as Bluetooth or low-
powered 802.15.4 variants. Because each aircraft will eventually need to return images 
(ideally in real time) back to the GCS and observers on the ground running the 
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assessment, data is routed through mesh protocols from one aircraft to the next, until it 
reaches the ground relay. The result of this arrangement is that we now have our first 
resource: the GCS link. Because two aircraft will carry the capability to link to ground 
(using paired transceivers that can hot-swap to the GCS), reallocation in this case means 
that the failure of either the entire aircraft or associated power systems, or of the radio 
link itself, will trigger the reallocation as one airplane or another will eventually request a 
link back to the ground to route data that it has gathered. During the time that no links are 
available, aircraft will need to cache their data until a link is re-established by the 
DARTS protocol. Because the ground link is monitored only by the aircraft on which it is 
implemented (neighboring nodes requesting data cannot and do not know the state of the 
GCS link), there is no good way to issue triggering based solely on the observation of 
neighboring nodes; unlike HybrIDS and related possible triggering methods, that rely on 
behavioral analysis at the application scope, the ground link is negotiated exclusively by 
its host aircraft. For this reason, based on principles implemented in DARTBOARD, the 
GCS link must fail first before reallocation can take place; timeouts associated with 
requests from neighboring aircraft will bring link failure to their attention, spawning the 
reallocation process. Because the timeouts will generally not occur until GCS link 
bandwidth has dropped to levels so low that it is unusable, or has been terminated 
altogether, pre-emptive reallocation is generally not possible. Were DARTBOARD to be 
modified to include regular status updates, or an advanced triggering method that 
proactively warns other nodes of link failure, this would be possible. However, because 
trusting information from a compromised node is always a security risk, this is not 
implemented on the version of DARTBOARD developed for this dissertation. 
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The second resource that we can identify, at least within the scope of disaster area 
assessment, is related to path management. Instead of focusing on a node’s individual 
camera as a resource, we can also suppose that the path, which must be rasterized by a 
particular aircraft, is a resource that is assigned to an aircraft. As each aircraft nears its 
target run, its intended path is the optimal path based on its position. For instance, as seen 
in Figure 39, Node 0 is the most fit for Path 0, and Node 4 is most fit for Path 4. 
However, Node 1 is reasonably capable of assuming the path for Node 3 if there were a 
disruption; as there are five distinct paths, we can assign fitness scores to these methods 
of path management based on proximity of the aircraft in question. It is possible to reduce 
the number of fitness scores, as there will exist an overlap of used scores, as some aircraft 
are centrally-located and equidistant to other points. However, for reasons of simplicity, 
the fitness score will be identified by the total number of identical resources, which in 
this case corresponds to the number of available paths.  
 Figure 39 - Nodes and most-
Because it would be disruptive to have an aircraft
course as the result of a reallocation attempt, reallocation will have the immediate effect 
of defining a successor to the missing node’s path. As the aircraft approach their point of 
origin and serialize, aircraft not needed as the result of the reallocatio
while the newly-assigned replacement node can complete the sweep that was left un
finished by the failed or compromised aircraft. The reader may at this point wonder why 
fitness scores are needed; any node can act as a replacement for a
and at the serialization point, an arbitrary aircraft could be chosen to go back and 
complete the unfinished assessment. The answer to this is two
most obvious, is the case in which multiple passes are requir
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a large damage area. In this case, upon serialization, all aircraft will need to return to the 
area and proceed to scan again, at a certain offset. Meanwhile, the chosen replacement 
resource will return to the first scan’s unfinished path and run the needed scan. At this 
point, the remaining group and one or more replacement resources are partitioned into 
two different areas. Once the primary group completes their scan, they can land after 
having serialized. The one or more aircraft finishing up incomplete scans can then 
perform their remaining pass(es) and land afterwards. This gives the system the 
flexibility to schedule passes on-demand according to most desired capabilities. If the 
replacement node to also fail during the re-scan of the first section, then a node on the 
second section could be reallocated, and it would be sent back to the start where the 
second node had failed to complete the pass of the first-compromised node. This can 
happen flexibly until all resources are exhausted. Using fitness scores with this scheme 
also permits conservation of battery life, by not arbitrarily assigning scans to resources 
that may already have performed extra scans. 
The second benefit of fitness scoring is the implementation of heterogeneous 
hardware; if the two rear nodes in a sample 5s configuration were set to run infrared 
scans instead of using visible-light cameras, then the two rear-most aircraft cannot supply 
fit resources to replace nodes using only visible cameras. A single node could also be 
retrofitted with both resources, reducing cost and then be the most fit to replace either 
resource upon compromise. This permits the systems to partition node replacement based 
on individual resource capabilities. As such, these two benefits to using fitness scoring 
allows DARTS to be integrated directly, without modification directly into use in the 
disaster area assessment application.  
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DARTBOARD Triggering 
 When considering ways of triggering reallocation in the DARTBOARD 
implementation, there are two types of resource losses that occur with respect to 
neighboring nodes. The first is request-detected resource loss, in which a neighboring 
node can identify the failure of another node because it needs the other node in order to 
complete a task; there is a product-to-consumer relationship between the detecting node 
and the failing node. These cases are easily detected by an intrusion detection 
mechanism; when a resource becomes unavailable, or times out, a fault is suspected. (Of 
course, more elegant variations on this theme are likely, such as monitoring request 
difficulties before a complete failure occurs. Also, IDSs are able to pick up on abnormal 
behavior before a problem arises.) An example of this product-consumer triggering 
mechanism is the aircraft-to-GCS link that is present in one aircraft; if one of the 
distributed nodes attempts ground communication and difficulties arise, the failure is 
identified due to the dependency on the failed resource. 
 The second triggering scheme occurs when a node identifies a failing resource 
independently from whether or not the node needs the resource; for instance, a fringe 
node can fail, which is not used in data routing among the group. Although no other node 
will explicitly need resources from this failed node, they will notice a communications 
dropout. In this particular case, no other node’s operation is threatened, but the overall 
objective is at risk and thus reallocation must occur. In our 5s example, an outside, fringe 
node may stop reporting images and status updates to its neighbors.  
138 
 
 Before we can discover how DARTBOARD implements its IDS-based triggering 
approach, let us first discuss the behavioral interactions that are present on the MANET 
during normal operations. This gives a perspective on how an IDS should characterize 
system occurrences to determine whether or not reallocation triggering is necessary. 
Because HybrIDS technology is applicable to detecting whether or not hostile 
interactions are taking place as well as simultaneously being applicable to detecting 
abnormal interference in normal operations due to natural phenomena or system failure, 
we can extract useful techniques from it to apply to DARTBOARD. The HybrIDS 
method itself is a generic solution, and in this case, can stand modification to apply it 
more appropriately to a networked distributed UAV scenario. In essence, the 
implementation incorporates a “HybrIDS light”, representing a useful set of IDS 
capabilities that are tailored to operation on DARTBOARD. 
Updating Caches 
 A feature of interest to general and commercial aviation is the ability to broadcast 
identifiers that help prevent aerial collisions. There exist two primary methods used in 
aviation today: TCAS, and ADS-B. The Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is a 
simple transponder-based location awareness broadcast system that aircraft can use to 
implement rudimentary collision avoidance. TCAS-equipped aircraft issue a general 
broadcast that polls for nearby aircraft. These aircraft then reply with their current 
position information so that the requesting plane can compute likely paths to prevent a 
collision. TCAS was first implemented in the early 1990s on all commercial aircraft 
(turbine-powered) with more than 30 passengers [44, 45]. Its evolution is the Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast system, ADS-B. ADS-B relies on the same principles 
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of operation as TCAS, but adds additional functionality and data, along with ground-
based stations that can update the aircraft with information about: (1) aircraft not in 
range, (2) specific flight conditions, and (3) airport and runway conditions. The system is 
also extensible to provide cockpit displays and automated collision avoidance and 
airspace conflict management. The ADS-B system entered commercial use in 2006 and is 
likely to replace TCAS in the near future as the dominant collision avoidance and traffic 
conflict management system operating on aircraft, supplementing ground-based radar 
stations in their efforts to keep aircraft from colliding with each other. 
 Based on the principles of ADS-B and TCAS, DARTBOARD is outfitted with a 
rudimentary hybrid version of TCAS/ADS-B. Instead of having aircraft submit requests 
for position information and then wait for a reply, TCAS-like messages are broadcast 
from each aircraft in the DARTBOARD airborne configuration at a rate of 4 Hz. This 
behavior can be tracked by IDS components of neighboring nodes to determine whether 
or not an aircraft is compromised by interference. If a TCAS message is not received 
within a certain period of time, its neighbors know that a failure has occurred. Referring 
to the two types of triggering methods, identifying resource loss due to TCAS latency is 
considered a resource-independent triggering method; neighbors may not need the 
aircraft (other than for routing purposes, which can trigger the IDS on its own), but they 
can report its absence.  
 The TCAS message itself also contains a small table of resource fitness 
information, feasible at the small TCAS message level due to the small number of 
resources in this implementation – so that neighboring nodes can update their caches 
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opportunistically based on the TCAS broadcast. It also includes other optional 
information that can be used to transmit data form aircraft to aircraft, and includes GPS 
position information, autopilot operation state (i.e., whether or not the aircraft is under 
manual or AP control), and battery state. The battery state can be used by neighbors to 
determine unusual modes of operation; if one aircraft exhibits excessive battery use, it 
could indicate a failing power cell. If two aircraft are exhibiting extreme battery usage, 
this may be an indication that either the group is experiencing adverse weather conditions 
(e.g., requiring more throttle input) or that the other planes are experiencing abnormal 
radio or control surface utilization, possibly indicating a network intrusion or other fault. 
Of course, battery depletion may be the result of an aircraft having implemented a second 
pass due to resource reallocation, which would be expected and ignored as an indicator. 
Lastly, and optionally, rather than routing image capture data through the network by 
normal means, TCAS messages could theoretically embed photographic information. 
This capability has not been implemented. 
 In addition to TCAS messages and periodic GCS information updates, image data 
must be transmitted to the ground; rather than depending on storing the images on the 
aircraft themselves (image storing is already done in case redundant GCS links all fail), 
the data is transmitted directly to the ground to reduce the time needed for a ground 
operative to wait on data. With each aircraft operating at a preset flight speed (around 15 
meters per second), images can be taken at preset intervals, presenting some image 
overlap, but not too much so as to prevent excessive bandwidth usage. However, if 
aircraft face heavy headwinds, slowing their progress despite additional throttle input, or 
if they face strong tailwinds that cause the aircraft’s speed to exceed its preset despite 
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throttle input reduction, this preset speed must be altered accordingly. Because sufficient 
field test data is not available, all simulation work is done assuming a 15 meter/second 
flight speed. Each photograph at 640x480 (VGA) resolution consumes approximately 40 
kilobytes of space with high-quality JPEG compression, and must be transmitted every 2 
seconds in order to capture detail of the scene at the given speed with an overlap of 90 
pixels per image (approximately 15 percent).  
 Local networking between aircraft is implemented with the 802.15.4 protocol on 
2.4 GHz links, and is capable of reaching aircraft within 150 meters of each other. For 
security and cost reasons, local networking is not capable of interacting with the GCS, 
requiring any node wishing to transmit data to the ground to use the GCS link, operating 
on a similar protocol, but with greater range and different operating frequency (900 
MHz). The local network has a maximum bandwidth of 250 kilobits per second per node 
to maximize battery performance. This means that the transmission of photographic 
material occupies a network overhead of 64% (320 kilobits twice every 2 seconds, 
yielding 160 kilobits per second average) during normal use. TCAS messages are 256 
bits in length to accommodate 
up to 32 characters of ASCII 
data, the default encoding 
format of the message data itself, plus an additional 32 bits of packet header for reserved 
use. Figure 40 shows the formation of this message. Transmitted at 3 Hz, which can 
provide sufficient reaction time in the case of sudden aircraft maneuvers or wind gusts, 
the 256-bit packets consume 0.1% of the available bandwidth. Naturally, one would 
expect the need to transmit more data than just the data of the plane itself; because mesh 
Figure 40 - TCAS packet organization 
142 
 
routing occurs on the network, a plane must be able to transmit more than just its own 
images on the data stream. This introduces a unique challenge not yet addressed by the 
802.15.4 standard, which at 2.4 GHz does not provide more than 250 kilobits/second 
transfer speed. To circumvent this limitation, there are four possibilities. The first, and 
most obvious, is to choose a higher protocol, such as Bluetooth 2.0 Extended Data Rate, 
which supports throughput speeds of 768 kilobits per second. The second option is to 
reduce the speed of traversal so as to require a lower image frequency. Third, redundant 
radio links can be added to each aircraft, though this increases cost, weight, and power 
issues. The fourth, and likely most feasible, is to simply compress the images further. The 
40 kilobyte image assumes a relatively high image quality. In fact, each image can be 
compressed to approximately 15 kilobytes (at VGA resolution) using the JPEG algorithm 
without significant loss in quality; though some loss is evident, it is not enough to impair 
visualization of the target area. At 15 kilobytes per image every two seconds, the mean 
data rate required is 60.3 kilobytes per second, allowing up to three aircraft to send their 
data through one node, reaching a 
total network utilization of 73%. 
Because of the proposed 5s 
configuration, the data from no more than two nodes will ever be transmitted to the 
ground link at any time, with the exception of the serialization point configuration. Here, 
cameras are unneeded, so the problem is resolved. 
 By this point, we have discussed airframes, implementation, systems, resources 
(scan paths and GCS links), and local and ground communications. Let us now discuss 
how these systems were tested either in the field or in simulation to analyze the 
Figure 41 - TCAS packet organization 
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performance of the described system. Because only one aircraft was autonomously-
capable as of the time of this writing, in-field test were done to determine ideal scan 
paths, traversal speed, battery life, image resolution, required altitude, scan path width, 
and communications range, among many other variables. Therefore, trials with multiple 
aircraft were done in simulation to extend the findings of the single-aircraft field trials. 
Simulation was performed in Omnet++ version 4.0 [91], an open-source, widely-accepted 
and validated network simulator.  
 Because Omnet++ does not feature a native mobility simulation component, 
integrating actual flight paths from field tests would prove to be tricky. Although a third-
party mobility framework, called MiXiM, is available, it is in early stages of 
development, and lacks in robustness and usability; with time, adding this component 
into Omnet++ could prove more fruitful. Instead, the target 5s configuration was broken 
down into a “basis set” of possible orthogonal configurations that mimic different stages 
of the flight path. For instance, the target of the pass, the 5s configuration, is maintained 
constant throughout the pass, and well into the serialization and parallelization points. Of 
course, as would be expected, the link lengths will vary constantly; however, because 
network links provide nearly-instantaneous communication between networked nodes, 
changes in distance do not reasonably affect the operation of the network in any way, 
provided that all aircraft stay in range of nodes in compliance with the 5s configuration.  
 There are five principal configurations that were implemented; the approach, the 
5s assessment pass, the parallelization point, the serialization point, and the serial flight 
path over the ground control station (i.e., the origin point.) These are five unique 
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configurations; many non-orthogonal configurations exist, but are really duplicates or 
modifications of the five listed here. For instance, an identical network configuration will 
exist between the serialization point and parallelization point; for this reason, those two 
configurations are used not for their name but simply to outline two possible situations 
under those conditions. The intended configurations represent likely possibilities that the 
aircraft will take under normal operation. In practice, there may be some unaccounted 
configurations in this method, but they are not investigated in the dissertation. A more 
conclusive study involving a different simulation mechanism is expected to be conducted 
in the future. 
 The Omnet++ outputs that are most interesting to analyze are time to reallocation 
and the number of messages required to reallocate using DARTS versus utilizing the 
baseline flooding algorithm (similar to the study in Chapter V.) The network itself is 
capable of simulating the average network traffic (i.e., image data) plus the TCAS 
messages and mesh routing to reach the GCS. TCAS messages were configured to run at 
3 Hz intervals to allow for sufficient time to correct for proximity errors; although the 
onboard GPS systems themselves update at only 2 Hz, having an asynchronous position 
monitoring scheme allows for a bit of overlap should a critical decision be necessary; 
setting a 2 Hz TCAS rate yields a higher probability that the GPS position updates and 
the TCAS broadcasts are out of sync by one message. The HybrIDS Light 
implementation is an insertable Simple C Module construct that integrates within 
Omnet++’s runtime to allow for two types of monitoring: The first is TCAS packet rate 
monitoring to check whether or not traffic from neighboring nodes is received at 3 Hz 
plus or minus 30%, in case of delay due to either a delayed I/O response or processing 
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overhead. The second is a link request timeout for the GCS link, based on a timeout value 
(500 ms to account for possible buffered traffic). Each of these two scenarios employs a 
specific implementation of the larger HybrIDS scheme; rather than using its complete, 
multiphase intrusion detection systems, condition checking is called for (and available as 
a feature in the original HybrIDS kernel). While it would be beneficial to include the full 
behavioral monitoring and IDS strategies of the multiphase solution to test for intrusion 
anomalies, it is beyond the scope of this work. It was mentioned earlier that monitoring 
radio link power level could be used to identify potential problems. Because there is no 
standardized power framework in Omnet++, this has not been implemented. However, 
the related idea of monitoring packet retry requests is being implemented in future 
versions of the mobile-aware DARTBOARD system. 
 In order to test possible error conditions, such errors must be identified 
preemptively so that they may be included in the simulation. Because the triggering 
scheme is designed to identify operational errors, most possible failures, such as link 
failure, hardware faults, software bugs, jamming, or radio frequency interference, are 
automatically included as possibilities in the simulation environment. However, other 
possibilities exist, such as a cache failure, cache staleness, fault identification failure, and 
combinations of errors. Most of these can be addressed because of the periodic nature of 
the system; Failures affecting performance and response time will almost always be 
identified by the triggering mechanism, causing reallocation to take place. Of course, by 
this reasoning, a simple and quickly-resolved error could result in a false-positive 
identification, or an unnecessary reallocation. From the point of view of the author, it is 
preferable to reallocate tasks to other resources, especially if small errors are the 
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precursor to a larger failure on a node, such as indicated by memory failure or processor 
cooling issues. Another potential failure could be due to power supply problems, such as 
batteries, power conditioning systems, and voltage regulators. As systems increase their 
complexity, small errors may be the only way to prevent a catastrophic failure from 
occurring later. 
 Caching errors represent a measurable fault that can be detected and tested in 
simulation. Because caches are updated with information from the TCAS broadcast at a 
rate of 3 Hz, it is highly unlikely that cache coherency and staleness would ever be a 
problem. Because each node is only aware of resources of neighboring nodes, other 
nodes more than one hop away are not concerned with these resources, and therefore do 
not need synchronization of their caches, which could create cache coherency problems 
between nodes separated by a certain number of hops. This is where DARTS has an 
advantage over a gossip-based protocol, because caches are updated frequently by the 
TCAS broadcast and do not, therefore, suffer coherency problems. Invalid cache 
references to a failed resource are impossible because each reallocation request contains a 
method of invalidating the cache entry associated with that resource. The only remaining 
staleness concern involves entries that are invalid because a neighboring resource has 
moved away from formation. This is also an improbable scenario, however, because at 
the rate of relative forward and lateral movement will never be fast enough to cause 
staleness concerns if the TCAS broadcasts are done at 3 Hz intervals; forming a new 
aircraft configuration from the 5s formation in under one third of a second is not 
physically possible. (Transitions to different configurations are stepwise – they occure 
instantaneously as aircraft move in and out of radio range.) This is especially true 
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Figure 42 - The simulated aircraft configurations 
 
Serial (5L)  Parallelizing  Approach Assessment Serialization 
because each aircraft is separated by 75 meters from side to side, and an additional 100 
meters or more from front to rear. However, there does exist the possibility of a failed 
cache. A node could have a fitness cache is simply not operating for one reason or 
another. Therefore, DARTBOARD is tested in simulation with randomly-determined 
failed caches; a resource reallocation attempt is made with one or more nodes having a 
disabled cache in order to simulate this condition. In the 5s configuration, one or two 
nodes were randomly picked to have inactive caches, using the atmospheric-interference 
true random number generator (using radio interference values to generate true random 
numbers) API from random.org. With 5 nodes, cache failures occurring in more than 2 
nodes would cause the system to approximate the baseline condition, depending on the 
node’s location; this negates further testing. Recalling that during a reallocation attempt, 
four aircraft or less will be present during a 5s configuration, the selection of two failed 
nodes (50%) seems a reasonable compromise. Start position (i.e., the node running the 
reallocation, as well as the failing node) were also randomized. 
Simulation Results 
 Simulations were run for the five configurations mentioned earlier. These are 
seen, without the removal of the failed nodes, in Figure 43. Table 4 lists each trial and 
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configuration, with baseline (non-cached) and cached results. Reallocation times (in 
seconds) and the number of required messages are listed, along with any pertinent 
observations that may serve to clarify the particular result. Table 5 shows the same trials 
run with one and two failed node respectively. While somewhat more difficult to 
visualize, the light-orange fields show that speedup and message improvements are still 
considerable. The randomly-chosen node is indicated in the configuration description 
column. The tables also show whether the reallocated resource was a radio link (GCS) or 
one of the five available paths in the 5s configuration. 
Table 4- Variable-configuration simulation results 
Configuration Failed 
Node 
Baseline 
Messages 
Cached 
Messages 
Baseline 
Time (s) 
Cached 
Time-s 
Message 
Improvement 
Speedup 
5s Approach 1 8 3 0.69 0.22 62.50 3.18 
5s 
Assessment 
3 6 2 0.67 0.10 66.67 6.58 
5s 
Serialization 
4 3 1 0.26 0.14 66.67 1.83 
5s Serial 2 3 2 0.41 0.39 33.33 1.06 
5s 
Parallelizing 
1 6 2 0.34 0.14 66.67 2.50 
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Table 5 - Simulation results for single- and dual-node cache failures 
Configuration Disabled 
Nodes 
Cached 
Messages 
Cached 
Time (s) 
Message 
Improvement 
Speedup 
Approach 1 3 0.11 62.50 6.43 
Approach 0,1 3 0.11 62.50 6.27 
Assessment 1 4 0.30 33.33 2.22 
Assessment 1,4 5 0.27 16.67 2.47 
Serialization 3 2 0.11 33.33 2.40 
Serialization 1,2 2 0.30 33.33 0.88 
Serial 4 2 0.36 33.33 1.16 
Serial 1,2 2 0.34 33.33 1.23 
Parallelization 1 4 0.11 33.33 3.18 
Parallelization 3,4 3 0.11 62.50 6.43 
 
 Based on the data obtained by seeking a random resource from a random node 
failure, and with the additional test run including one or two random node failures, it 
becomes apparent that the caching algorithm presented in DARTS is an effective way to 
curb unneeded reallocation requests. Figures 44 and 45 show the percentage 
improvement and the speedup gained from using DARTS in the fully-functional cache 
model. Each reallocation request returned resources fairing a fitness score of 3 or higher 
on a scale from 0 to 5 (the score of 3 is chosen to select an above-average (50%) 
replacement resource). This automatically eliminates unneeded result returns, and 
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dramatically increases the likelihood of finding a high-quality fit resource faster. 
 
Figure 43 - Percent improvement using DARTS 
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Even the addition of failed caches (i.e., one or two out of four nodes) did not prevent the 
system from accomplishing its reallocation goals; in some instances, performance was 
reduced, but even the worst-recorded value still represented a 17% improvement over 
baseline. Figure 46 shows percent improvement under the different conditions (i.e., fully 
functional, single-cache and dual-cache failures) together. In the 5s serial configuration, 
the dual-cache failure actually scores higher because the nodes experiencing caching 
failures were randomly selected, even between trials; therefore, the position and selection 
of  the node, in this case, has a greater effect on overall performance that the strict 
number of nodes with inoperative caches.  
 
Figure 44 - Speedup using DARTS 
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Speedup also followed the predictable patterns of the number of messages 
required; in the 5s assessment case, speedup was over 6, fitting with the conclusion 
reached in Chapter V; the network was more densely connected (as opposed to serial), 
and therefore experiences a higher improvement. Likewise, the least-benefitting 
configuration in terms of speedup (1.06) was the serial link communication, also fitting 
the conclusions reached in Chapter V. As a result, in every functional case, the 
configuration that benefitted the least from the caching algorithm was, predictably, the 
serial case. Here, a caching algorithm can save one or two message propagations, as 
serial links forward end-to-end. Worst-case, the cache only blocks one 
 
Figure 45 - Percent improvement using DARTS with 0, 1, and 2-node cache failures 
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encompasses a relatively small number of aircraft compared with large MANETs, a one-
link propagation block can still register as a significant improvement, all things 
considered. 
 When looking at the reallocation speedup and message reduction in 
DARTBOARD, we must remind ourselves what this means in context. If the local 
connections between aircraft were gigabit Ethernet connections and the aircraft’s onboard 
computers eight-core CISC-based CPUs, the reallocation task would be a feat so 
miniscule and menial that the entire argument of this dissertation would be invalidated. 
However, because the onboard computers on each aircraft use low-power 32-bit RISC 
CPUs, a meager amount of memory, and local links with 250 kilobit/second maximum 
data speeds, assisting the reallocation effort through intelligent caching algorithms and 
discreet message footprints becomes more important and useful. For the 5s assessment 
pass configuration, for example, the total local bandwidth becomes 7 links * 250 
kilobits/second maximum. However, in practice, the radio throughput is divided among 
the number of connections per node, giving us an overall theoretical bandwidth of 5 
nodes * 250 kb/s = 1.25 Mbit/s maximum. When multiplied by a “realism” factor of 80% 
(chosen completely arbitrarily) we can expect an average of 1 Mbit/second overall 
throughput. When using the DARTS method of reallocation, we see that the maximum 
time to reallocate under the baseline condition was 0.69 seconds under 5s approach 
configuration case. With 8 messages required at 256 bits each, this gives us a reallocation 
overhead (not including any other data running on the network) of 8 * 256 bits = 2048 
bits (256 bytes) of data during the reallocation process. Instead, for the cached approach, 
we use 3 * 256 bits = 768 bits (96 bytes) during the reallocation process. When 
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considering the global bandwidth loss mentioned in Chapter III, this metric is affected not 
by node failure, but rather by reallocation overhead. In this case, the global bandwidth 
less is insignificant – less than 0.1%. In the cached case, the process took only 0.21 
seconds, meaning that the reallocation speed and “bandwidth” is significantly higher. 
Small numbers either way, but supposing a larger MANET, of say 64 nodes, the savings 
become immediately apparent; while the size of the MANET varies, the speed of the 
links cannot, making the impact of the method even greater. In addition, the significant 
speedup (over 6 in some cases) means that the reallocation method not only uses less data 
(in terms of the number of messages) but also requires significantly less time, reducing 
the average impact on the network even further by making its process a brief event. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 Combined with a triggering mechanism, like the HybrIDS implementation 
featured here, DARTS provides a powerful preemptive problem solving architecture that 
forms the core of the DARTBOARD fault-tolerant disaster area assessment platform 
targeted at F2 tornados and above in its design specifications. Quite simply, no other 
distributed and preemptive fault-tolerant mechanism exists as of the time of this writing. 
With life-saving capabilities, the promise of reduced costs, the elimination of a single 
point of failure, and a faster, wider, heterogeneous and more detailed way to scan for 
survivors and structural damage, this author believes that DARTBOARD succeeds in 
providing benefits like no other system. With future work and development concentrated 
on bringing the multiple-aircraft scenario out of the world of simulation and into field 
tests, the potential of this system to develop into other applications is apparent.  
 This dissertation research sought to develop a resource reallocation mechanism to 
provide fault-tolerance to homogeneous and semi-homogeneous networks. This was 
effectively achieved through the implementation of DARTS, which also made such a 
reallocation system more efficient and capable of understanding application-level 
resource requirements. Through testing and optimization, the work has shown that the 
greatest gains to be made stand in densely-populated networks, where a larger degree of 
interconnectivity exists. Lastly, the successful integration of DARTS into a viable 
application along with a triggering mechanism was accomplished through the integration 
of DARTS into a distributed sensing application involving multiple airborne disaster area 
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assessment aircraft. The author believes that the system demonstrates potential for use in 
a number of distributed sensing applications where resource redundancy is present. 
Because of the significant time reduction (up to 6 times speedup) and minimization of the 
reallocation flood (a reduction of up to 75% of messages needed) was achieved, a sound 
case and proof of concept has been demonstrated and highlights the system’s adaptability 
and potential. 
 The investigation into clustering density demonstrated that this metric does in fact 
alter how effectively DARTS, the reallocation solution in this dissertation, can operate. 
The test results of both the generic DARTS testing and application-specific 
DARTBOARD efficiency tests show that serial, sparse network configuration stand, on 
average, to benefit the least from the cached reallocation mechanism.  
 As mentioned earlier, work must be done to integrate multiple airframes together 
to perform in-field testing of the triggering mechanism, reallocation methods, and the 
ability for aircraft to stay cohesive during their assessment runs. The cooperation and 
launching of multiple aircraft into a pattern alone involves considerable planning and 
work to accomplish. However, because the Paparazzi platform offers flexibility of 
implementation due to its open-source and modular design, coordination is a feasible 
concept and should be explored.  
 Furthermore, once a functioning multi-aircraft platform is operational, the level of 
testing must far exceed the number of trials run in simulation for this dissertation. An 
appropriate boundary exploration study is necessary, and will be performed in the future. 
Also, because error conditions of the IDS (outside of the scope of this work) can affect 
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the operation and efficiency of DARTBOARD (i.e., reallocation prior to a failure is 
preferable to reallocation after a failure) the efficacy of HybrIDS in this context must be 
identified in more detail, with possible functional limitations exposed in order to better 
tune its operation and ensure deterministic error handling and improved efficiency. For 
the dissertation work, it performed perfectly; no errors were identified during its 
operation, as its parameters were strictly specified. However, it is likely that in the field, 
conditions that were not accounted for during simulation may exist, requiring further 
modification of the triggering mechanism. 
 Regardless of the direction this research will take, it holds the promise of 
changing how post-storm disaster area assessment is done. What the future holds for 
DARTBOARD, especially if included in collaborative work with the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, the National Severe Storms Lab, the National Storms 
Prediction Center, and collective efforts such as the Verification of the Origins of 
Rotation in Tornadoes Experiment (VORTEX), is unknown, but likely promising. This 
author believes that DARTBOARD hits a bull’s eye when considering a capable, all-
inclusive ready-to-fly solution that is ready to take on the future challenges it may face. 
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APPENDIX A 
AVIONICS AND GROUND CONTROL 
 
 This appendix is designed to aid the reader in understanding the components 
onboard the Alpha 40-implementation of DARBOARD. Described are the Paparazzi 
Autopilot system, how it works, configuration settings, and interface to the Ground 
Control Station (GCS).  
Avionics 
 The selection of an exceptional candidate airframe provides aircraft stability, 
extended runtimes, and the flexibility to operate in variable environments. Each 
aircraft/node in the DARTBOARD system configuration must be capable of autonomous 
flight  in order to proceed through an assessment procedure (multiple aircraft would 
require multiple pilots, yielding coordination, expense, and accuracy problems). To this 
end, two candidate autopilot systems and navigation computers were evaluated based on 
performance, flexibility of future customized modules and control methods, and the 
comprehensive nature of the air and ground control systems. The first, called the 
Paparazzi Tiny 2.11 [92], is an open-source (hardware and software) platform with 
primary research originating at ENAC in France. Its flight computer is based on a 32-bit 
ARM7 microcontroller, featuring 8 kilobytes of RAM. The second autopilot, called the 
ArduPilot [93], is based on the Arduino micro development board, a popular 
microcontroller platform among hobbyists and embedded systems enthusiasts (including 
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the author). It runs on an Atmega 168 16-bit microcontroller with 4 kilobytes of RAM 
and 16 kilobytes of EEPROM.  
 Both the ArduPilot and the Paparazzi project provided end-to-end hardware and 
software support (though “support” must be used loosely, as considerable time was spent 
compiling, creating, editing, and tweaking configuration files for the airframe, radio 
system, and flight paths), and accept a variety of input sensors (including GPS) in order 
for the host aircraft to fly efficiently and within its target zones. Both systems incorporate 
inner and outer proportional–integral–derivative controller (PID) control loops for 
actuating the host aircraft’s control surfaces. Also, both systems feature a variety of input 
capabilities, such as the use of infrared thermopiles, pitot tubes, MEMS-based 
accelerometer gyroscopes, and GPS receivers. Both also can implement bidirectional 
wireless control to a ground control station (GCS) by means of medium to long-range 
802.15.4 radio modems, interfaced by a serial or direct protocol. After careful 
consideration, the Paparazzi project provided a more powerful computing platform, 
coupled with a well-developed and tested control architecture. However, it required 
significantly more development and implementation time – taking several weeks to fully 
prepare an airframe for flight.  
 Once the Alpha’s airframe parameters were input (control methods, radio 
communication modes, servo actuation throws and limits, directions, and number and 
configuration of control surfaces), the airframe was calibrated in-flight to allow optimum 
efficiency with ideal course tracking. PID control gains were adjusted rigorously to 
minimize oscillations. The Paparazzi aircraft configuration calls for the use of a ground 
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control station (GCS) in addition to the aircraft’s 2.4 GHz receiver link. In this 
configuration, the R/C radio receiver in the airplane outputs to a PPM encoder board that 
then relays the received control inputs to the autopilot (AP) computer board. The 
autopilot, when operating in “manual” mode, relays the signals directly to the 
servomotors, to actuate the control surfaces. In this mode of operation, Paparazzi acts 
transparently, only as a mediator between the receiver and the servos.  
 A three-way toggle on the R/C radio (or a command from the GCS) is used to 
activate the AP’s autonomous flight modes. Mode 1 is an “enhanced stability mode”, 
incorporating some feedback from the control sticks on the R/C radio (a Spektrum DX7 
7-channel 2.4 GHz DSSS DSM2 digital computer radio) but maintaining constant altitude 
and stable flight characteristics. Mode 2, used most often, initiates autonomous waypoint 
navigation, as specified in waypoint files that are preloaded and/or updated on-the-fly by 
the GCS. The GCS itself utilizes the AP board’s serial link by means of a 900 MHz 
802.15.4 radio (XBee MaxStream) pair. For its role in the distributed sensing application, 
we will refer to this link as the Ground Link. In Mode 2, no control stick inputs on the 
DX7 cause an effect on the control surfaces, unless this is specified ahead of time. For 
instance, the Alpha can be steered using only ailerons (and applying corrective elevator to 
pull the aircraft around the turn), by using only the rudder (skidding or sliding the aircraft 
around by the tail), or by using coordinated turns (employing both the ailerons to bank 
and the rudder to pull around the turn). While coordinated is the most stable flight mode, 
the AP has been programmed to use aileron steering. This way, the rudder can be used to 
override for custom course corrections. In practice, this has become completely 
unnecessary, as the three-way toggle can disable the autopilot. In addition, flight 
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characteristics in AP Mode 2 are so stable, that even on gusty, windy days, the aircraft 
flies to its intended coordinates.  
 Attitude sensing was accomplished by integrating a set of horizontal and vertical 
thermopiles. Four orthogonally-oriented thermopiles are pointed normal to the vertical 
axis. By measuring far-infra-red light, these devices can understand the pitch of the plane 
by performing a differential temperature assessment. In theory, and in practice, the 
ground is always warmer than the sky. Even on cloudy and snowy days, this holds true. If 
the aircraft is steeply banked, there will be a significant temperature differential between 
the left-side and right-side set of thermopiles. The amount of this difference corresponds 
to the bank angle. The same holds true for pitch control. The vertical thermopiles are 
used to assess absolute orientation (whether or not the plane flight right-side-up or 
inverted) and to determine to some degree the aircraft’s relative altitude (a weaker ground 
temperature indicates higher altitude, when measured continuously from the start of the 
flight (assuming it was launched on the ground.) Figure 
34 shows this configuration. The Paparazzi project 
includes modules for the integration of accelerometers 
for absolute positioning and fast bank angle detection. 
This has proven unnecessary because the Alpha is a 
large plane, and therefore moves gracefully and deliberately, with less oscillation in its 
movements. Also, experimentally, flight path following was accurate and needed no 
further assistance in the form of gyros.  
Figure 46 - Thermopile orientation  
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 Flight-path monitoring, on the other hand, relies exclusively on GPS for altitude, 
and absolute position information. While the thermopiles can detect the attitude and angle 
of attack of the plane, this alone provides little or no information on the aircraft’s position 
in a 3-dimensional geodetic coordinate system. The Paparazzi Tiny 2.11 AP board 
utilizes a Ublox LEA-5H differential GPS that can provide 2 Hz update (most GPS units 
only provide 1 Hz updates, a general limitation imposed by the time scale used in global 
positioning system satellites. The LEA-5H overcomes this limitation by using differential 
integration.) Once an airframe and radio configuration XML files have been established, 
the user must define a flight plan configuration file. 
 The flight plan file is organized into two sections. The first lists coordinates of 
waypoints, while the second is comprised of “blocks” that lists the order and routing 
method for those waypoints. For instance, there may exist three co-linear waypoints, but 
the routing blocks may direct the aircraft to fly them non-sequentially. Both the waypoint 
and routing block sections can specify altitude and operational methods. “For” loops can 
be integrated into the routing blocks, as well as conditional data, for advanced navigation 
patterns. Furthermore, the routing blocks can be updated on-the-fly through the GCS. 
Ground Control 
 The GCS provides a tactical overview of flight path, error, (the difference 
between the intended path and the actual path) flight statistics (such as speed, altitude, 
heading, climb rate, and attitude) and control over the flight plan, among many other 
duties. When properly implemented, the GCS is capable of fully controlling a UAV 
utilizing the Paparazzi system, if such intervention is desired. Its primary use during 
 setup and configuration is for tweaking airframe and configuration parameter
flights; because the GCS is connected to the UAV’s AP by the use of a 900 MHz XBee 
radio, such updates are possible. However, because final updates to the flight computer 
must be made in the form of compiled, uploadable firmware files that mu
the microcontroller’s EEPROM, these changes are only stored in volatile memory until 
the system is powered off. The GCS also displays the waypoints and the UAV’s present 
position in real time, overlaying the map with tiles from the Google 
Information System (GIS). Figure 35 shows the GCS during a simulated run. 
Figure 47 - The Paparazzi Ground Control Station (CGS)
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Software Simulation 
 The GCS is also used to execute a simulation run; because configuring an 
airframe and testing a flight plan is risky on a sophisticated airframe, the Paparazzi 
airframe permits two types of simulation: Software-In-The-Loop (SITL) and Hardware-
In-The-Loop (HITL). SITL implements all the airframe configuration files and flight 
plans, and compiles this into an x86-executable simulation on the GCS computer 
(running an Ubuntu or Debian Linux distribution). Execution is done identically to the 
AP board’s firmware. The second option utilizes the AP board’s CPU to execute and 
return control decisions. In this case, the GCS merely displays the outputs of the AP 
board’s hardware. This simulation method was not used; airframes and flight plans were 
preliminarily tested in SITL simulation and then implemented on the actual airframe. 
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APPENDIX B 
FLIGHT CONDITION LIMITATIONS 
This appendix lists information that can affect flight performance of the DARTBOARD 
implementation. Of particular issue are wind speeds immediately following a storm. 
Listed here are maximum operational wind speeds and associated characteristics that can 
alter whether or not the system is capable of canvassing the disaster are. 
Flight Condition Limitations 
  A potential obstacle to navigation and general operation of the aircraft is wind 
speed, and in particular, unpredictable gusts. Because the Alpha has a large wing camber 
and oversized wing area, it is capable of lift at speeds as low as 6 meters per second, or 
24 kilometers per hour; in gliding conditions, this speed can drop even lower. Because 
wind speed must be used to choose the takeoff direction (to maximize lift, and therefore 
flow-rate of air over the wing surface, planes should take off facing into the wind), 
runways or open fields may not provide sufficient takeoff length in ideal conditions. 
Though downwind takeoffs are possible, strong winds could prevent lift and cause 
unpredictable takeoffs and stalls, or worse, longer takeoff length causing the plane to 
strike an obstacle before achieving lift. This particular problem can be solved by hand-
launching the aircraft. This technique is popular with smaller aircraft, but may be difficult 
to accomplish with the Alpha, and especially the Telemaster, due to weight concerns and 
possible force exerted by the human arm. Still, in un-ideal conditions, this offers a 
feasible compromise.  
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Figure 48- The first Alpha with Autopilot and vertical thermopile and servos 
 Barring a failed takeoff, wind can prevent the aircraft from reaching its 
destination; the Paparazzi AP is capable of performing real-time throttle management. 
The author has had some experience with overpowering winds; a prior version of the 
Alpha 40 UAV suffered catastrophic damage as wind proved to be too strong for the 
engine to pull the plane forward; the over-sized wing caused the plane to rotate, pointing 
the nose straight toward the ground, just a meter or two off the ground. While the 
fuselage was not salvageable, careful design and positioning of the AP’s electronics 
allowed them to be salvaged and re-used in the newer, electric version of the Alpha. 
Figure 37 shows the positioning of the autopilot board (on the old, no-longer existing 
Alpha) and associated control electronics. The Alpha can safely fly in winds not 
exceeding 28 km/h. Stronger winds, or the presence of gusts can put the entire flight (and 
bystanders) at risk. Because the propeller mounted on the front of the airframe is powered 
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by an 800 W motor at speeds of up to 9000 RPM, it is capable of causing severe injury or 
death if it contacts a person while spinning. Still, the danger is less than that of a rotary-
wing aircraft, such as a helicopter, which requires much larger rotating surfaces, and is 
inherently less stable than an airplane. A useful bit of information, for the R/C pilot, for 
the survey, and for bystanders, is that according to [94], winds can variable or calm 
within minutes of the passage of a thunderstorm – tornadic or otherwise. Gust fronts 
ahead of the storm and other storm-related phenomena precede the weather front or 
supercell, leaving calmer air in its wake, as most of the atmospheric energy has been 
dissipated by this point. However it is still possible for secondary storm lines or cells to 
follow behind the first. Winds in this case would be dominated by the secondary storm’s 
gust front, posing a potential problem to UAV-based flight. 
 
  
168 
 
REFERENCES 
1. J. Langenwalter, “Embedded automotive system development process - steer-by-
wire system,” Design, Automation and Test in Europe, pp. 538-539 Vol. 531. 
2. E.A. Lee, “Absolutely positively on time: what would it take?,” Computer,  vol. 38, 
no. 7, 2005, pp. 85-87. 
3. K. Walther, and J. Nolte, “A Flexible Scheduling Framework for Deeply Embedded 
Systems,” 21st International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and 
Applications Workshops, AINAW '07. , pp. 784-791. 
4. M. Barr, “Real men program in C,” 2009; http://embedded.com/design/218600142. 
5. A. Garcia-Martinez, J.F. Conde, and A. Vina, “A comprehensive approach in 
performance evaluation for modern real-time operating systems,” 22nd 
EUROMICRO Conference EUROMICRO 96., pp. 61-68. 
6. G. Karsai, C. Biegl, S. Padalkar, J. Sztipanovits, K. Kawamura, N. Miyasaka, and M. 
Inui, “Knowledge-Based Approach to Real-Time Supervisory Control,” American 
Control Conference, 1988, pp. 620-625. 
7. Z. Yang, L. Jie, and E.A. Lee, “A Programming Model for Time-Synchronized 
Distributed Real-Time Systems,” 13th IEEE Real Time and Embedded Technology 
and Applications Symposium, RTAS '07. , pp. 259-268. 
8. Z. Gao, Y. Yang, J. Zhao, J. Cui, and X. Li, “Service Discovery Protocols for 
MANETs: A Survey,” Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 4325/2006, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 232-243. 
9. A.N. Mian, R. Baldoni, and R. Beraldi, “A Survey of Service Discovery Protocols in 
Multihop Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Pervasive Computing, IEEE,  vol. 8, no. 1, 
2009, pp. 66-74. 
10. C. Jo Woon, H. Ho Young, J. Chang Yong, and S. Dan Keun, “Analysis of 
Throughput and Energy Consumption in a ZigBee Network Under the Presence of 
Bluetooth Interference,” IEEE Conference on Global Telecommunications 
Conference, GLOBECOM '07., pp. 4749-4753. 
11. A. Rajeswaran, K. Gyouhwan, R. Negi, and N. Sai Shankar, “Interference Handling 
in UWB Versus 802.11n Networks,” IEEE International Conference on 
Communications, ICC '07 pp. 4710-4715. 
12. Z. Alliance, “ZigBee Home Automation: The New Global Standard for Home 
Automation,” Book ZigBee Home Automation: The New Global Standard for Home 
169 
 
Automation, Series ZigBee Home Automation: The New Global Standard for Home 
Automation, 2007, pp. 
13. D. Chakraborty, A. Joshi, Y. Yesha, and T. Finin, “GSD: A Novel Group-based 
Service Discovery Protocol for MANETS,” Book GSD: A Novel Group-based 
Service Discovery Protocol for MANETS, Series GSD: A Novel Group-based 
Service Discovery Protocol for MANETS, ed., Editor ed.^eds., University of 
Maryland, Baltimore County, 2000, pp. 
14. S. Jian, and G. Wei, “A survey of service discovery protocols for mobile ad hoc 
networks,” International Conference on Communications, Circuits and Systems, 
ICCCAS 2008, pp. 398-404. 
15. R. Zoican, “Analysis of Scalability in MANET's Protocols,” 8th International 
Conference on Telecommunications in Modern Satellite, Cable and Broadcasting 
Services, TELSIKS 2007, pp. 605-608. 
16. T.K. Paul, and T. Ogunfunmi, “Wireless LAN Comes of Age: Understanding the 
IEEE 802.11n Amendment,” IEEE Circuits and Systems Magazine,  vol. 8, no. 1, 
2008, pp. 28-54. 
17. J. Lorincz, and D. Begusic, “Physical layer analysis of emerging IEEE 802.11n 
WLAN standard,” 8th International Conference Advanced Communication 
Technology, ICACT 2006. , pp. 6 pp.-194. 
18. T. Selvam, and S. Srikanth, “Performance study of IEEE 802.11n WLANs,” First 
International Communication Systems and Networks and Workshops, COMSNETS 
2009, pp. 1-6. 
19. D.D. Perkins, H.D. Hughes, and C.B. Owen, “Factors affecting the performance of 
ad hoc networks,” IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2002. , 
pp. 2048-2052 vol.2044. 
20. H.A. Amri, M. Abolhasan, and T. Wysocki, “Scalability of MANET routing 
protocols for heterogeneous and homogenous networks,” Computers & Electrical 
Engineering,  vol. In Press, Corrected Proof. 
21. C.E. Perkins, and E.M. Royer, “Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing,” 
Book Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing, Series Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector Routing, Sun Microsystems Laboratories 
University of California, Santa Barbara, 1997, pp. 
22. H. Zhou, “A Survey on Routing Protocols in MANETs,” Book A Survey on Routing 
Protocols in MANETs, Series A Survey on Routing Protocols in MANETs, ed., 
Editor ed.^eds., Michigan State University, 2003, pp. 
170 
 
23. A. Patwardhan, J. Parker, M. Iorga, A. Joshi, T. Karygiannis, and Y. Yesha, 
“Threshold-based intrusion detection in ad hoc networks and secure AODV,” Ad 
Hoc Networks,  vol. 6, no. 4, 2008, pp. 578-599. 
24. J.S. Khoury, H. Jerez, and L.D. Cicco, “Design and implementation of a framework 
for persistent identification and communication in emerging networks,” Book Design 
and implementation of a framework for persistent identification and communication 
in emerging networks, Series Design and implementation of a framework for 
persistent identification and communication in emerging networks, ed., Editor 
ed.^eds., ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and 
Telecommunications Engineering), 2008, pp. 
25. A. Boukerche, and S.K. Das, “Congestion control performance of R-DSDV protocol 
in multihop wireless ad hoc networks,” Wirel. Netw.,  vol. 9, no. 3, 2003, pp. 261-
270. 
26. J.B.D. Cabrera, C. Gutierrez, and R.K. Mehra, “Infrastructures and algorithms for 
distributed anomaly-based intrusion detection in mobile ad-hoc networks,” IEEE 
Conference on Military Communications, MILCOM 2005., pp. 1831-1837. 
27. L. Keum-Chang, and L. Mikhailov, “Intelligent intrusion detection system,” 2nd 
International IEEE Conference Intelligent Systems, pp. 497-502 Vol.492. 
28. A.P. Lauf, “HybrIDS: Embeddable Intrusion Detection System,” Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, 2007. 
29. A.P. Lauf, R.A. Peters, and W.H. Robinson, “A distributed intrusion detection 
system for resource-constrained devices in ad-hoc networks,” Ad Hoc Networks,  
vol. In Press, Corrected Proof, 2009. 
30. N. Marchang, and R. Datta, “Collaborative techniques for intrusion detection in 
mobile ad-hoc networks,” Ad Hoc Networks,  vol. In Press, Corrected Proof. 
31. A. Mishra, K. Nadkarni, and A. Patcha, “Intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc 
networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications,  vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 48-60. 
32. K. Nadkarni, and A. Mishra, “Intrusion detection in MANETS - the second wall of 
defense,” 29th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, 
IECON '03, pp. 1235-1238 Vol.1232. 
33. A. Patwardhan, J. Parker, M. Iorga, A. Joshi, T. Karygiannis, and Y. Yesha, 
“Threshold-based intrusion detection in ad hoc networks and secure AODV,” Ad 
Hoc Networks,  vol. In Press, Corrected Proof. 
171 
 
34. R. Puttini, J.M. Percher, L. Me, and R. de Sousa, “A fully distributed IDS for 
MANET,” Ninth International Symposium on Computers and Communications, 
ISCC 2004 pp. 331-338 Vol.331. 
35. S.A. Razak, S.M. Furnell, N.L. Clarke, and P.J. Brooke, “Friend-assisted intrusion 
detection and response mechanisms for mobile ad hoc networks,” Ad Hoc Networks,  
vol. In Press, Corrected Proof. 
36. S.A. Razak, S.M. Furnell, N.L. Clarke, and P.J. Brooke, “Friend-assisted intrusion 
detection and response mechanisms for mobile ad hoc networks,” Ad Hoc Networks,  
vol. 6, no. 7, 2008, pp. 1151-1167. 
37. J. Voelcker, “Top 10 tech cars [hybrid electric vehicles],” IEEE Spectrum,  vol. 42, 
no. 3, 2005, pp. 22-30. 
38. D. Watkins, and C. Scott, “Methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of intrusion 
detection in tactical mobile ad-hoc networks,” IEEE Conference on Wireless 
Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2004, pp. 622-627. 
39. Z. Xiaodong, H. Zhiqiu, and Z. Hang, “Design of a Multi-agent Based Intelligent 
Intrusion Detection System,” 1st International Symposium on Pervasive Computing 
and Applications, pp. 290-295. 
40. A. Yamada, Y. Miyake, K. Takemori, and T. Tanaka, “Intrusion detection system to 
detect variant attacks using learning algorithms with automatic generation of training 
data,” International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and 
Computing, ITCC 2005., pp. 650-655 Vol. 651. 
41. Y. Zhenwei, J.J.P. Tsai, and T. Weigert, “An Automatically Tuning Intrusion 
Detection System,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,  vol. 37, 
no. 2, 2007, pp. 373-384. 
42. D. Allard, and J. Hutcherson, “Communications Across Complex Space Networks,” 
Aerospace Conference, 2008 IEEE, pp. 1-11. 
43. C. Daskalakis, and P. Martone, “Alternative surveillance technology for the Gulf of 
Mexico,” The 23rd Digital Avionics Systems Conference,DASC 04. , pp. 1.D.4-1.1-8 
Vol.1. 
44. W.H. Harman, “ADS-B airborne measurements in Frankfurt,” The 21st Digital 
Avionics Systems Conference, pp. 3A3-1-3A3-11 vol.11. 
45. D.S. Hicok, and D. Lee, “Application of ADS-B for airport surface surveillance,” 
The 17th AIAA/IEEE/SAE Digital Avionics Systems Conference, pp. F34/31-F34/38 
vol.32. 
172 
 
46. R. Nichols, D.J. Bernays, T. Spriesterbach, and V. Dongen, “Testing of traffic 
information service broadcast (TIS-B) and ADS-B at Memphis International 
Airport,” The 21st Digital Avionics Systems Conference, pp. 3A2-1-3A2-13 vol.11. 
47. Y. Pizhou, and L. Chaodong, “A RISC CPU IP core,” 2nd International Conference 
on Anti-counterfeiting, Security and Identification, ASID 2008. , pp. 356-359. 
48. K. Sung Ho, L. Seung Ho, C. Byeong Yoon, and L. Moon Key, “A 32-bit low power 
RISC core for embedded applications,” IEEE Region 10 International Conference 
on Microelectronics and VLSI, TENCON '95., , pp. 488-491. 
49. G. Thomas, “Benefits of performance standards for lithium-ion and lithium-ion 
polymer batteries,” The Seventeenth Annual Battery Conference on Applications and 
Advances, pp. 223-225. 
50. D. Ganapathy, and E.J. Warner, “Defining thermal design power based on real-world 
usage models,” 11th Intersociety Conference on Thermal and Thermomechanical 
Phenomena in Electronic Systems. ITHERM 2008. , pp. 1242-1246. 
51. A.H. Han, H. Young-Si, A. Young-Ho, L. So-Jin, and C. Ki-Seok, “Virtual ARM 
Platform for embedded system developers,” International Conference on Audio, 
Language and Image Processing, ICALIP 2008., pp. 586-592. 
52. Texas Instruments, “OMAP 3 Processors: OMAP3440,” 
http://focus.ti.com/general/docs/wtbu/wtbuproductcontent.tsp?templateId=6123&na
vigationId=12796&contentId=36505. 
53. G. Dhillon, Principles of Information Systems Security: Texts and Cases, Wiley, 
2006. 
54. A.P. Lauf, and W.H. Robinson, “Fault Tolerance in MANETs Using a Task-to-
Resource Reallocation Framework,” International Conference on Computational 
Science and Engineering, CSE '09. , pp. 753-758. 
55. L. Xiao, C. Xu, and W. Zhong, “Performance Analysis of the DSSS System Based 
on Sequence Pairs,” First International Conference on Communications and 
Networking in China, ChinaCom '06. , pp. 1-4. 
56. Y. Kazuaki, C. Wenxi, and W. Daming, “An Intensive Survey of 3G Mobile Phone 
Technologies and Applications in Japan,” Sixth IEEE International Conference on 
Computer and Information Technology, CIT '06. , pp. 265-265. 
57. E. Chikuni, and M. Dondo, “Investigating the security of electrical power systems 
SCADA,” AFRICON 2007, pp. 1-7. 
173 
 
58. P. Kocher, R. Lee, G. McGraw, A.A.R.A. Raghunathan, and S.A.R.S. Ravi, 
“Security as a new dimension in embedded system design,” 41st Design Automation 
Conference, pp. 753-760. 
59. J. Li, L. Da-You, and Y. Bo, “Smart home research,” International Conference on 
Machine Learning and Cybernetics, pp. 659-663 vol.652. 
60. D.R. Choudhary, D. Anshul, S. Roy, and C.S. Thejaswi, “Computationally and 
Resource Efficient Group Key Agreement for Ad Hoc Sensor Networks,” 2nd 
International Conference on Communication Systems Software and Middleware, 
COMSWARE 2007., pp. 1-10. 
61. C. Day, “Quantum Computing Is Exciting and Important--Really!,” Computing in 
Science & Engineering,  vol. 9, no. 2, 2007, pp. 104-104. 
62. J. Henkel, and L. Yanbing, “Avalanche: an environment for design space exploration 
and optimization of low-power embedded systems,” IEEE Transactions on Very 
Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems,  vol. 10, no. 4, 2002, pp. 454-468. 
63. A. Patcha, and J.-M. Park, “An overview of anomaly detection techniques: Existing 
solutions and latest technological trends,” Computer Networks,  vol. 51, no. 12, 
2007, pp. 3448-3470. 
64. G.E. Reeves, and J.F. Snyder, “An overview of the Mars exploration rovers' flight 
software,” IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, pp. 1-7 
Vol. 1. 
65. Y.-A. Huang, and W. Lee, “Attack Analysis and Detection for Ad Hoc Routing 
Protocols,” Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 3224/2004, Springer, 2004, pp. 125-145. 
66. O. Kachirski, and R. Guha, “Effective intrusion detection using multiple sensors in 
wireless ad hoc networks,” 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, pp. 8 pp. 
67. A.P. Lauf, Peters, R. A. and Robinson, W. H., “Intelligent Intrusion Detection: A 
Behavior-Based Approach,” The 21st Advanced Information Networking and 
Applications: Symposium for Embedded Computing, 2007. 
68. E. Naess, D.A. Frincke, A.D. McKinnon, and D.E. Bakken, “Configurable 
middleware-level intrusion detection for embedded systems,” 25th IEEE 
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, pp. 144-
151. 
174 
 
69. R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L.M. Adleman, A method for obtaining digital 
signatures and public-key cryptosystems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Laboratory for Computer Science, 1977. 
70. M. Borsc, and H. Shinde, “Wireless security & privacy,” IEEE International 
Conference on Personal Wireless Communications, ICPWC 2005., pp. 424-428. 
71. L. Chih-Chung, and T. Shau-Yin, “Integrated design of AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) encrypter and decrypter,” IEEE International Conference on Application-
Specific Systems, Architectures and Processors, pp. 277-285. 
72. Q. Yang, X. Wu, R. Zhou, and R. Lu, “An embedded RSA processor for encryption 
and decryption,” 4th International Conference on ASIC, pp. 356-359. 
73. H. Seung-Jo, O. Heang-Soo, and P. Jongan, “The improved data encryption standard 
(DES) algorithm,” IEEE 4th International Symposium on Spread Spectrum 
Techniques and Applications, pp. 1310-1314 vol.1313. 
74. Inno-Logic, “AES CCM Encryption and Decryption,” Book AES CCM Encryption 
and Decryption, Series AES CCM Encryption and Decryption, ed., Editor ed.^eds., 
2008, pp. 
75. O.O. Khalifa, M.D.R. Islam, S. Khan, and M.S. Shebani, “Communications 
cryptography,” RF and Microwave Conference, RFM 2004, pp. 220-223. 
76. S. Buchegger, and J.Y. Le Boudec, “Nodes bearing grudges: towards routing 
security, fairness, and robustness in mobile ad hoc networks,” 10th Euromicro 
Workshop on Parallel, Distributed and Network-based Processing. 
77. S. Buchegger, and J.Y. Le Boudec, “Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT 
Protocol,” 3rd ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and 
Computing. 
78. S. Buchegger, and J.Y. Le Boudee, “Self-policing mobile ad hoc networks by 
reputation systems,” Communications Magazine, IEEE,  vol. 43, no. 7, 2005, pp. 
101-107. 
79. , “Swarming for Success,” Book Swarming for Success, Series Swarming for 
Success, NASA Ames, 2005, pp. 
80. P. Basu, K. Wang, and T.D.C. Little, “A novel approach for execution of distributed 
tasks on mobile ad hoc networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking 
Conference (WCNC2002), pp. 579-585. 
175 
 
81. W. Freeman, and E. Miller, “An experimental analysis of cryptographic overhead in 
performance-critical systems,” 7th International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis 
and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems, pp. 348-357. 
82. C. Yingying, W. Trappe, and R.P. Martin, “Detecting and Localizing Wireless 
Spoofing Attacks,” 4th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on 
Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, SECON '07., pp. 193-
202. 
83. L. Zhou, and Z.J. Haas, “Securing ad hoc networks,” IEEE Network,  vol. 13, 1999, 
pp. 24-30. 
84. C.E. Perkins, and E.M. Royer, “Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector routing,” Second 
IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, WMCSA '99. , pp. 
90-100. 
85. J. Kennedy, and R. Eberhart, “Particle swarm optimization,” IEEE International 
Conference on Neural Networks, pp. 1942-1948 vol.1944. 
86. P.-Y. Yin, S.-S. Yu, P.-P. Wang, and Y.-T. Wang, “A hybrid particle swarm 
optimization algorithm for optimal task assignment in distributed systems,” 
Computer Standards & Interfaces,  vol. 28, no. 4, 2006, pp. 441-450. 
87. H.E. Brooks, “On the Relationship of Tornado Path Length and Wind to Intensity,” 
Weather and Forecasting,  vol. 19, 2003, pp. 310-319. 
88. SkyWarn, “SKYWARN Advanced Storm Spotter Guide,” 
http://spotterguides.us/advanced/advanced01.htm. 
89. A.M. Society, Glossary of Meteorology. 
90. T.T. Fujita, “Proposed characterization of tornadoes and hurricanes by area and 
intensity,” Book Proposed characterization of tornadoes and hurricanes by area and 
intensity, Series Proposed characterization of tornadoes and hurricanes by area and 
intensity, University of Chicago, 1971, pp. 
91. , “Omnet++,” 4.0 ed., 2008 
92.  “The Paparazzi Autopilot Project,” http://paparazzi.enac.fr/. 
93.  “The ArduPilot Project.” 
94. S. Vassiloff, National Severe Storms Laboratory 
 
 
